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Abstract 
 
Due to its widespread implementation in clinical settings, the neuroscientific study of 
mindfulness meditation has seen a rapid growth in the last two decades. Despite the 
evidence of changes in brain activity and structures, the neurocognitive mechanisms 
underlying meditation practices are largely unknown. In this work, we investigated the 
hypothesis that mindfulness meditation entails a cognitive stance towards experience 
which impacts the formation of mental habits. With this aim, we studied the 
relationship between the phenomenology of different styles of mindfulness 
meditation, in expert and novice practitioners, and neurophysiological markers of 
perceptual learning (i.e. auditory mismatch negativity) and attention in neutral and 
emotional settings.  
We found that, in expert practitioners, a nondual style of mindfulness meditation 
increases sensory monitoring and reduces perceptual learning compared to a focused 
attention practice (Study 1). Additionally, we demonstrated that auditory perceptual 
learning is not affected by unpredictable threat, except for individuals with high 
dispositional anxiety; an effect that might be downregulated by mindfulness 
meditation independently of the level of expertise (Studies 2 and 3). Finally, we 
identified components of the auditory evoked response as putative neural correlates 
of monitoring processes during mindfulness practices and we highlighted a direct link 
between changes in subjective experience and emotion regulation in expert 
practitioners (Studies 1 and 3). 
Some of the findings presented here were not reproduced by following studies or were 
in contrast with the previous literature. As such, they await replication in the healthy 
and clinical population. Moreover, evidence from this work point to the need of 
differentiating the effects of mindfulness-related processes during meditation states 
from general effects of expertise. To this end, future studies should implement more 
refined methods to track changes in subjective experience and explore uncommon 
frameworks, such as single-case paradigms and long-term meditation retreats. 
Overall, the present work expands and fosters the dialogue between cognitive 
neuroscience and phenomenological models of meditation. It uses meditation as a tool 
to question existing theories on neural and bodily processes and provides evidence of 
the possible neurocognitive mechanisms underlying meditation practices and 
expertise.  
 
Keywords: meditation, mindfulness, EEG, MMN, perceptual learning, anxiety, auditory, 
attention 
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Résumé 
 
De part sa mise en pratique considérable dans des conditions cliniques, l’étude scientifique de 
la méditation de pleine conscience a vu un développement rapide ces deux dernières 
décennies. Malgré des preuves de modifications de l’activité et de la structure du cerveau, les 
mécanismes neuronaux et cognitifs sous tendant les pratiques méditatives sont encore peu 
connus. Dans le présent travail nous avons testé l’hypothèse que la méditation de pleine 
conscience implique un changement dans la cognition de l’expérience vécue, impactant de ce 
fait la formation des habitudes mentales. Pour cela nous avons étudié la relation entre la 
phénoménologie de différents styles de méditation, chez des pratiquants experts et novices, et 
des marqueurs neurophysiologiques de l’apprentissage perceptuel (i.e. négativité de 
discordance auditive) et de l’attention dans des conditions neutres et émotionnelles. 
Nous avons trouvé, chez des pratiquants expérimentés, qu’un style de méditation non-duel 
augmente la vigilance sensorielle et réduit l’apprentissage perceptuel comparé à une pratique 
d’attention focalisée (Étude 1). Par ailleurs, nous avons démontré que l’apprentissage 
perceptuel auditif n’est pas influencé par une menace non prédictible, à part pour des sujets 
naturellement plus anxieux ; un effet qui pourrait être diminué par la méditation de pleine 
conscience, quelque soit le niveau d’expertise (Études 2 et 3). Nous avons aussi identifié des 
composants de la réponse évoquée auditive comme potentiels corrélats neuraux des processus 
de vigilance à l‘œuvre lors des états de pleine conscience. Enfin, nous avons mis en évidence, 
chez des pratiquants experts, un lien direct entre la régulation émotionnelle et des 
changements de l’expérience subjective (Études 1 et 3). 
Certaines découvertes présentées dans ce manuscrit contrastent avec la littérature passée ou 
n’ont pas été reproduites par des expériences postérieures et méritent donc réplication au sein 
de populations saines et cliniques. De plus, certains résultats soulèvent la nécessité de 
différentier les effets de la méditation de pleine conscience durant l’état méditatif, de ceux plus 
généraux liés à l’expertise. Pour répondre à cela, les études futures devront implémenter des 
méthodes plus raffinées pour évaluer des changements dans l’expérience subjective des 
pratiquants, mais aussi explorer des cadres encore mal connus comme les paradigmes en cas 
unique ou les longues retraites contemplatives. 
Au final, le travail actuel étends et enrichit le dialogue entre les neurosciences cognitives et les 
modèles phénoménologiques de la méditation. Il utilise la méditation comme un outil pour 
questionner les théories existantes sur des processus neuraux et physiologiques et apporte des 
preuves sur les possibles mécanismes neurocognitifs sous-tendant les pratiques méditatives 
et leur expertise. 
 
Mots clés : méditation, pleine conscience, EEG, MMN ou négativité de discordance, 
anxiété, audition, attention. 
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Chapter 1 
Aims and outline 
 
 
 
 
The present work aims to expand and foster the dialogue between cognitive 
neuroscience and Buddhist philosophy and practices. It uses meditation as a tool to 
question existing theories on the neural and bodily processes underlying perception 
and emotion regulation. In turn, it aims to understand the mechanisms of meditation 
practices through the study of their neurobiological underpinnings.  
The neuroscientific research on mindfulness meditation is still in its infancy, despite 
considerable developments over the last two decades. Previous studies have been 
affected by several limitations, such as limited access to subjective accounts of 
meditation experience in experimental settings, lack of rigorously selected groups of 
expert and novice practitioners and development of theories that could explain brain 
functions in a way that favour the confrontation with Buddhist accounts of mental 
processes. In this work we aimed to address these issues by mapping specific 
phenomenological profiles related to different practices and levels of expertise into 
biomarkers of perceptual learning and attention in neutral and emotional settings.  
We investigated how the brain processes the auditory environment in a neutral setting 
and during stress. We formulated hypothesis on how different meditation states and 
levels of expertise would impact neural markers of perceptual learning and why this 
framework could be useful in understanding the mechanisms of action of mindfulness 
practices. Finally, we related third-person data to measures and theories of 
phenomenological dimensions characterising meditation practices to understand the 
mechanisms underlying the modulation of neural and bodily markers.    
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Chapter 2 is a general introduction to the field of research on mindfulness meditation. 
It describes theoretical accounts of the cognitive functions cultivated by mindfulness 
practices and a brief review of neuroscientific studies on this topic. It also introduces 
the notion of perceptual learning and related biomarkers studied in this work. Finally, 
it reviews the existing evidence on the modulation of perceptual learning processes by 
attention, emotions and meditation.  
 
Chapter 3 outlines the general hypotheses for the studies presented in this work.  
 
Chapter 4 describes the general methodology used in the present work, with special 
emphasis on those methods that are new or scarcely implemented in the field of 
meditation research. Most importantly, this chapter includes the description, and 
related experimental results, of a training protocol which aimed to introduce control 
subjects to meditation practices and specific phenomenological dimensions that were 
investigated in experimental settings (Study 3). This information is provided in a 
Protocol Study, which stems from the collaborative effort of our entire research team 
in the context of a broader research project.  
 
Chapter 5 presents findings on the effect of different mindfulness practices on the 
neural correlates of auditory perceptual learning and attentional monitoring processes 
in expert and novice meditation practitioners in neutral settings (Study 1) 
 
Chapter 6 explores the impact of unpredictable threat on the neural correlates of 
auditory perceptual learning and sensory processing in novice practitioners during a 
control condition (Study 2). It also investigates the effect of mindfulness practices and 
expertise in this emotional setting (Study 3), providing evidence of a relationship 
between the specific attentional and motivation stance cultivated in mindfulness 
meditation and emotion regulation mechanisms.  
 
In Chapter 7, I discuss the findings from studies 1, 2 and 3, draw general conclusions 
and propose future research directions. 
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Chapter 2 
Introduction 
 
 
 
2.1 General rationale: meditation as a tool 
 
When I tell someone about my research topic, I am often asked the question: “so, does 
meditation work?”. Normally, my answer is: “I cannot say, you should try it yourself!”. 
It feels surprising and slightly dangerous to be entitled, as a researcher, the faculty of 
certifying pros and cons of meditation. It is a phenomenon that stems from an intricate 
mixture of scientific positivism, media sensationalism and a blind faith in “science 
said”. It derives also from the constant need of self-improvement and healing that 
seems to prevail in western societies. Certainly, the main aim of Buddhism is to “relieve 
suffering” in human beings, but I am not sure if that applies to the after-work headache 
caused by sitting in front of a screen for several hours.  
The aim of this slightly provoking paragraph is to affirm that I am not seeking to prove 
whether meditation works by the means of cognitive neuroscience, but rather trying 
to elucidate questions in my field through the confrontation with theories and 
phenotypes that were not previously considered. In my opinion, the study of 
contemplative practices serves as a tool to falsify existing theories in cognitive science, 
neurosciences and experimental psychology (and other fields of study that fall outside 
of my competence). To this aim, the choice of focusing on Buddhist philosophy and 
practices was made not only because Buddhist scholars were investigating the 
mechanisms of the mind long before western psychology, but also for the validity of 
meditation practices as an empirical method of subjective enquiry. Surely, the dialogue 
between different theories and methods in contemplative science is not unilateral. The 
investigation of neural mechanisms involved in meditation can also help scholars and 
practitioners in understanding phenomena that are mostly experienced subjectively, 
as well as provide a different perspective on existing models.  
The study of meditation can help clarifying the functional meaning of brain and bodily 
processes and developing models of the mechanisms underlying cognition, emotions 
and sensory processing, to list a few. This can be achieved by operationalising and 
investigating Buddhist theories in our scientific framework, by the observation of 
training-induced changes and, most importantly, by informing third-person data with 
accounts of subjective experience from practitioners. Through the neuroscientific 
study of meditation we can, for instance: identify the neurophysiological correlates of 
concentration and mind-wandering (e.g. Braboszcz and Delorme, 2011; Brewer et al., 
2011), understand the encoding of values in the brain and how it is influenced by 
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cognitive inputs (Kirk et al., 2014) and discuss the plausibility of comprehensive 
theories on brain dynamics, in relation to theoretical accounts coming from different 
methodological and cultural backgrounds (Pagnoni and Guareschi, 2017). In the 
present work, meditation was used as a tool to investigate the modulation of 
perceptual learning processes by attention and emotions, as well as the functional 
significance of specific neurophysiological responses. On the other hand, through this 
work we made a small step towards the understanding of the neurophysiological 
mechanisms of meditation practices; an understanding that is necessary for the 
implementation of secularised practices in clinical contexts.  
 
 
 
2.2 Definitions and context   
 
Historically, the term meditation has been used to refer to a wide range of practices 
that belonged mostly, but not only, to spiritual traditions. From ritual dances of African 
tribes, to specific Tibetan tantric practices, “meditation” encompassed activities and 
experiences that were thought to be essentials of any religion (Proudfoot, 1985). Lutz 
et al. (2007) have previously pointed out that such broad meaning could and did bias 
the scientific investigation of contemplative practices and they were within the first 
researchers in the field of cognitive neuroscience to propose a structured conceptual 
framework for such investigation. They defined meditation as "a family of complex 
emotional and attentional regulatory strategies developed for various ends, including 
the cultivation of well-being and emotional balance" 
In the context of cognitive neuroscience and experimental and clinical psychology, the 
type of meditation studied today belongs mostly to Buddhist practices or their secular 
derivations. This is due to historical and epistemological reasons. Forms of Buddhist 
meditation have been introduced in western clinical, secular settings in the late 20th 
century (Kabat-Zinn, 1982) and have received increasing scientific interest ever since. 
Meanwhile, neuroscientists, psychiatrists and psychologists were starting a fruitful 
and challenging dialogue with Buddhist scholars on topics of high relevance in both 
western and eastern philosophy, which resulted in the creation of the Mind and Life 
institute in 1987. As mentioned in the previous section, the focus on Buddhist practices 
has been motivated by an easiness of confrontation, in epistemological terms, with 
western science. Buddhist traditions have developed consistent and detailed theories, 
alongside a comprehensive description of the methodological aspects of the actual 
practice, in a manner that facilitates their implementation in neuroscientific studies. 
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2.2.1. Mindfulness and its operationalisation  
 
In the specific framework constituted by the interaction between scientific research 
and contemplative practices, meditation has been operationalised as a constellation of 
practices that share common aims and features such as 1) the production of a specific 
phenomenological state, 2) the relationship between state and trait development (such 
as changes in attention, emotional responses, perception) and 3) a progression in the 
practice from novice to expert (Lutz et al., 2007). Different practices can share or tap 
into different cognitive and emotional processes and are developed for various ends, 
including the cultivation of well-being and emotional balance.  
Not all Buddhist techniques have been object of scientific study as much as the so-called 
“mindfulness practices”. Research on mindfulness meditation has seen a dramatical 
increase in the last two decades (Van Dam et al., 2017). This is probably since 
mindfulness meditation includes a variety of practices that have been derived from 
Buddhist traditions but are applied in secular and clinical contexts. Mindfulness-based 
practices are described to share the aim of cultivating moment-to-moment awareness, 
by paying attention in a specific way, in the present moment, as nonreactively, 
nonjudgmentally, and openheartedly as possible (Kabat-Zinn, 2011). It is not the aim 
of this work to discuss differences between secular and Buddhist definitions of 
mindfulness (see Dunne, 2011 for a detailed account), nor to address the critiques on 
the spreading of mindfulness as a social phenomenon (Van Dam et al., 2017). 
Nonetheless, similarly to the term “meditation”, defining mindfulness as a single and 
broad process that encompasses different practices can be detrimental for its 
operationalisation in the context of scientific research (see chapter 4.2 – Protocol Study 
-  for a detailed account of this issue).  
To facilitate the scientific study of the neurophysiological mechanisms underlying 
mindfulness practices in expert and novice practitioners, a recent model has been 
proposed (Lutz et al., 2015). It is strongly based on the phenomenology of mindfulness 
practices and conceptualises it as “a variety of cognitive processes embedded in a 
complex postural, aspirational, and motivational context that contribute to states that 
resemble one another along well-defined phenomenological dimensions”. This account 
deconstructs mindfulness into specific processes that can be modulated by different 
states (not only associated to the practice of meditation) and levels of expertise. It also 
allows other families of meditative practices (Dahl et al., 2015) to be incorporated into 
a model of phenomenological categories. In the present wok, we tried to map some of 
these phenomenological dimensions into neurophysiological processes in expert and 
novice practitioners during different meditation states. In section 2.3 I provide an 
operational definition of the dimensions that are most relevant for the present work.  
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2.2.3. Limitations and challenges in the neuroscientific study of 
meditation 
 
The neuroscientific study of mindfulness meditation has developed together with the 
implementation of mindfulness-based interventions for the treatment of different 
psychological and psychiatric conditions. Programs such as mindfulness-based stress 
reduction (MBSR, Kabat-Zinn et al., 1992) and mindfulness-based cognitive therapy 
(MBCT, Segal et al., 2002) have been proven to be effective in the treatment of 
symptoms of several mood disorders (especially anxiety and depression), as well as 
chronic pain conditions (see Goldberg et al., 2018; Khoury et al., 2013; Veehof et al., 
2016 for recent meta-analytic reviews). 
The understanding of the neurocognitive processes underlying mindfulness-based 
practices has increased in the recent years. Neuroimaging studies on different practices 
and groups of practitioners have described the impact of meditation on 
neuroanatomical and neurophysiological markers of attention and emotion regulation 
(see Chambers et al., 2009; Lutz et al., 2008; Tang et al., 2015  for extensive reviews). 
Nonetheless, this young field of research is characterised by several open questions, 
challenges and limitations. I provide here a list of the most relevant issues, some of 
which have been discussed in a recent report (Van Dam et al., 2017): 
x Lack of consensus on the neural networks and biomarkers implicated in 
different practices and at different levels of expertise. 
 
x Limited understanding of the mechanisms underlying the observed changes in 
brain activity and anatomical structures. 
 
x Lack of uniformed groups of expert practitioners, selected on the basis of 
rigorous and universal criteria.  
 
x Lack of control groups, in cross-sectional studies, that are introduced to the 
practices through in-depth training programs. 
 
x Lack of a precise characterisation of subjective accounts of meditation 
experience and their correlation with neurophysiological and neuroanatomical 
measures. 
 
x Limited understanding of the neural correlates of highly advanced practices in 
expert meditators.  
In the present work, we implemented theoretical and methodological approaches to 
address these limitation and challenges.  
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2.3 Cognitive processes of mindfulness 
practices 
 
In the following section, I provide operational definitions of some of the proposed 
cognitive processes cultivated in mindfulness practices that are relevant for the 
present work. Other models of mindfulness meditation (e.g. Hölzel et al., 2011; Shapiro 
et al., 2006) have theorized mechanisms that partially overlap with those proposed in 
Lutz et al., (2015). However, the latter model presents two advantages: 1) the 
operationalisation of different processes is based on phenomenological accounts and 
2) it allows the mapping of different states and levels of expertise into different 
configurations of the relations between such processes.  
Altogether, these features permit the formulation of hypotheses on the modulation of 
different neural processes dimensional configurations (e.g. high level in one or two, but 
not other dimensions). Moreover, these hypotheses can be tested through the 
correlation between third-person data and measures of subjective experience during a 
specific task or practice. I chose to present here just few dimensions of the model 
(meta-awareness, dereification and clarity) to focus the reader’s attention on those 
processes that we tried to operationalise in terms of brain and bodily physiology in the 
present work. Surely, the operationalisation, empirical testing and eventual re-
formulation of additional processes is the general aim of a broader research agenda 
(Van Dam et al., 2017).  
 
2.3.1 Meta-awareness 
 
Meta-awareness has been defined as the cognitive function of being aware of the 
processes of consciousness (Smallwood et al., 2007). This definition comes from 
studies on “mind-wandering” and stimulus-independent thoughts (SIT), which 
highlight the role of meta-awareness in realising when one’s mind has wondered 
(Schooler et al., 2011). Persistence and recursiveness of mind-wandering, especially 
when focused on past and future events, has been associated to unhappiness 
(Killingsworth and Gilbert, 2010) and characterise psychopathological conditions of 
anxiety and depression (Ottaviani et al., 2013). Previous research has shown the 
validity of mindfulness-based practices as techniques to reduce the disruptive effects 
of mind-wandering (Jha et al., 2010; Mrazek et al., 2013). However, in the context of 
meditation, meta-awareness does not act solely on introspection (Lutz et al., 2015), but 
also on other processes of consciousness, including perception of external stimuli 
(Dahl et al., 2015). In meditation practices, meta-awareness is the capacity of 
developing monitoring processes in relation to a specific task set. This monitoring 
faculty, or “background awareness”, underlies noticing when attention has shifted from 
a specific object, but also the assessment of the quality of  attention in practices that do 
not have any specific object of focus (e.g. Dunne, 2011). The heightened monitoring of 
stimuli and processes while maintaining a specific task-set is supposed to produce a 
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shift in the experience of those processes and stimuli. Specifically, meta-awareness is 
in contrast with the concept of cognitive fusion, a term used to indicate when one is 
experientially “fused” with the content of experience (Hayes, 2004). This mode of 
experience has been proposed to play a crucial role in anxiety and depression (Hoge et 
al., 2015; Lo et al., 2014) and a downregulation of psychological processes related to 
experiential fusion was found in depressive patients undergoing mindfulness-based 
therapy (Bieling et al., 2012). To summarise, meta-awareness, in the form of 
monitoring the ongoing experience in relation to a specific task-set, is a key process 
cultivated in mindfulness practices and entails a shift in experience akin to cognitive 
defusion.  
 
2.3.2 Dereification 
 
When using the term dereification, we refer to “the degree to which thoughts, feelings, 
and perceptions are phenomenally interpreted as mental processes rather than as 
accurate depictions of reality” (Lutz et al., 2015). When thinking of a future stressful 
event such as a public speech, one can perceive the thoughts linked to this event as 
being an accurate representation of what will happen, to the point that a physiological 
response could arise. Similarly, the image of an attractive food can induce a salivary 
response (Papies et al., 2012). A higher degree of dereification would be represented 
by processes of perspective taking and creative thinking (Colzato et al., 2012), while at 
the highest degree “thoughts lose their representational integrity and are experienced 
simply as mental events” (Lutz et al., 2015).  
The process of dereification is thought to play a role in every style of mindfulness 
practice. It has also been termed as “phenomenological reduction” (Varela, 1996) or 
simply “mindful attention” (Papies et al., 2012). As for meta-awareness, dereification 
entails a shift in the way a phenomenological event is experienced. This change in 
experience is akin to what has been described as “decentring” (Williams, 2010). In fact, 
in the scientific literature, the processes of cognitive defusion and decentring are not 
entirely distinguished from one another (Fresco et al., 2007). Similarly, Buddhist 
accounts do not clearly differentiate meta-awareness from dereification, as meta-
awareness is sometimes understood to cause dereification (Lutz et al., 2015). This 
makes sense in the context of meditation practice: when one realizes that her/his 
attention has been captured by an event (whether a though, an external stimulus, a 
physical sensation), the meta-awareness of this shift can be accompanied by the insight 
on the mental nature of such event. The capacity to decentre from negative thoughts in 
relation to an emotionally challenging situation has been associated to positive 
outcomes in the treatment of  several psychopathological  conditions, such as 
depression and chronic pain (Fresco et al., 2007; McCracken et al., 2013). To 
summarise, dereification of perceptual, physical and mental phenomena is a key 
process in mindfulness meditation. It is often related to the specific attentional stance 
cultivated during the practice and, together with meta-awareness plays a crucial role 
in cognitive defusion and decentering.  
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2.3.3 Clarity 
 
Clarity refers to the degree of vividness with which an experience occurs, whether it is 
a perceptual stimulus or an internal event (e.g. an affective state)  (Lutz et al., 2015). 
Increased clarity characterises several styles of mindfulness meditation, especially in 
expert practitioners, and interacts with meta-awareness resulting in heightened and 
more vivid perception of non-object features of the experience, such as affective tones 
(Lutz et al., 2015). Keeping balance between meta-awareness and clarity is especially 
important for novice practitioners. In fact, a high degree of clarity can destabilize the 
mind of a beginner, and specific techniques were developed to modulate clarity 
(Namgyal, 2001). Interestingly, phenomenal ‘clarity’ (a translation from the Pali word 
‘Vipassana’) is also thought to arise, in the expert practitioner, together with insights 
about the delusional nature of phenomena (Schoenberg and Barendregt, 2016). This 
links perceptual clarity to the process of dereification. Very few studies have 
investigated this phenomenological dimension in the context of scientific research. 
However, the correlation between subjective reports on the degree of clarity during a 
specific practice and the neural activity in response to emotional stimuli have yielded 
interesting results before (Lutz et al., 2013).  
 
As mentioned above, the dimensions presented in this section are not an exhaustive 
representation of the processes involved in mindfulness meditation, but a smaller list 
that constitutes the framework of the present work. Additional categories have been 
termed “object orientation”, “stability” and “effort” (Lutz et al., 2015). Moreover, other 
models have introduced different processes, such as the temporal dynamics of 
attention (see Van Dam et al., 2017 for a detailed list).  Finally, these processes are 
cultivated, during and outside of the practice, with specific physical and motivational 
stances, such as equanimity and acceptance (e.g. Desbordes et al., 2014). In the present 
work, some of these dimensions have been considered implicitly, as they are mostly 
modulated by meditation expertise (e.g. stability and effort) but have not been 
operationalised in terms of putative neural mechanisms.  
From this short presentation, one could infer that meta-awareness, dereification and 
clarity are highly related processes. However, distinguishing between these 
dimensions is crucial for their operationalisation in the context of scientific studies. In 
fact, different states and levels of expertise can differ on the level of one single 
dimension or in the relation between them. Additionally, this finer categorisation 
allows to describe aspects of different and more advanced practices that are not taken 
into consideration by canonical models of mindfulness. In the next section, I will 
present the three practices that have been considered in the present work and try to 
enrich their description with an account of their impact on the processes described 
above.  
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2.4 Styles of mindfulness meditation 
 
Mindfulness-based practices have been categorized into two main styles, termed 
“focused attention” (FA) and “open monitoring” (OM), by theoretical and empirical 
research based on traditional Buddhist texts and their transposition into the cognitive 
and neuroscientific framework (Lutz et al., 2008, 2007). These broad categories differ, 
in terms of task-set, mainly in the way attention is anchored on a chosen object (in FA) 
or let rest in the moment-to-moment awareness without any specific focus (in OM). 
The practice of FA is often a preparatory step for OM, although that is not true in every 
tradition (Lutz et al., 2007). The practice of OM, in turn, is necessarily a precursor of 
more advanced practices that fall into the definition of non-dual mindfulness (Dunne, 
2011). For instance, in the present work we studied and extensively discussed the state 
of Open Presence (OP) as a paradigmatic case of non-dual meditation. The 
phenomenological states produced by the practices of FA and OM have been already 
mapped, as examples, into the dimensions presented in the previous section (meta-
awareness, dereification, clarity) (Lutz et al., 2015). However, the authors advised that 
this mapping is a theoretical proposition and should be confirmed in each study by 
empirical investigation of third-person data and accounts of practitioners’ subjective 
experience. The state of Open Presence, on the other hand, have been described by a 
previous model (Lutz et al., 2007) and is characterised not only by a different profile in 
terms of the processes that have been already described, but also by differences in the 
quality of subjective experience.  
 
2.4.1 Focused attention  
 
In FA practices, the practitioner narrows and maintains her/his attention on a chosen, 
single object. The main task-set consists in sustaining the attention on the object and 
becoming aware of when the mind has wondered, in order to bring attention back to 
the object. FA is one of the most common practices to be taught to novice practitioners. 
The instruction can vary slightly in different traditions, and so do the degree of 
narrowing of attention (Dahl et al., 2015). What distinguishes the practice of FA from a 
state of attentional absorption, such as watching an enthralling movie or being 
absorbed into an important conversation, is the presence of meta-awareness. Novice 
practitioners must develop enough meta-awareness to notice when they lost the 
attentional focus, as well as a degree of dereification to disengage from distractors and 
refocus on the object. The state of FA in expert practitioners is characterised by a 
higher degree of meta-awareness, which entails the capacity of monitoring 
perturbations of attention before they become distractions while maintaining the focus 
on the object. Dereification is also supposed to increase with training, permitting a 
rapid and effortless disengagement from distractors. Overall, the experience is 
supposed to be characterised by higher clarity in expert, compared to novice 
practitioners (Lutz et al., 2015).  
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2.4.2 Open monitoring  
 
OM practices can vary in their form and instructions but share a common key feature: 
the cultivation of meta-awareness without focusing on any specific object. The 
attentional scope is expanded to incorporate perceptions, affective states, thoughts 
and, in advanced practitioners, awareness itself. Several accounts of this practice (e.g. 
Dahl et al., 2015; Lutz et al., 2008; Namgyal, 2001) highlight its dependency on FA to 
attain a stable monitoring without “grasping”. In fact, a practitioner would firstly 
develop meta-awareness in relation to the task-set of focusing on a specific object, and 
then gradually release the attention from the object and rely solely on the monitoring 
process. In this sense, in the state of OM there is no distinction between foreground 
and background and different phenomenal features such as emotional tones or the 
quality of attention remain in the same “space” of awareness. These practices aim to 
develop a “reflexive awareness of the usually implicit features of one’s mental life” 
(Lutz et al., 2008), which would impact cognitive and emotional habits resulting in 
increased sensitivity to environmental and interoceptive stimuli, but decreased 
emotional reactivity. In terms of phenomenological dimensions, the state of OM would 
be characterised by increased meta-awareness, compared to FA, in both expert and 
novice practitioners (Lutz et al., 2015). However, Buddhist accounts do not distinguish 
between background awareness in relation to a specific task set and reflexive 
awareness, in the form of monitoring cultivated in OM (Dunne, 2015). This could 
indicate that, in expert practitioners, the same level of monitoring is reached during FA 
and OM, although the sense of aperture would be broader in OM. Finally, dereification 
would be higher compared to FA in both expert and novice meditators and experts 
would experience higher clarity compared to novices.  
 
2.4.3 Open presence  
 
OP can be described as a state that emphasizes the processes cultivated during OM to 
a stage where a practitioner “is aware of the Clarity or Awareness that makes all  
cognitions possible” (Lutz et al., 2007). The monitoring aspect of OM is transformed 
here into abiding in the implicit reflexivity of experience that is normally obscured by 
the subject-object duality in cognition. In the state of OP, the intentional structure 
involving the duality of object and subject is attenuated, and so are representational 
models of the self and the world. In this sense, practices that cultivate OP have been 
termed “non-dual” (e.g. Dahl et al., 2015). Nonetheless, recent theoretical works have 
highlighted a parallelism between OP practices and styles of mindfulness meditation 
that are taught in secular contexts (Dunne, 2011, 2015). The lack of explicit monitoring 
in OP meditation is the pivotal but finely grained difference from OM practice, and this 
distinction concerns the Buddhist notion of “reflexive awareness,” as discussed by 
Buddhist scholars (Coseru, 2015; Dunne, 2015). In OP practice, an awareness of 
whatever emerges in experience continues without the effortful vigilance that 
characterizes OM styles of practice. It is thought that only advanced practitioners can 
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attain this state, and even they may not be able to sustain it for more than a short period 
of time (Lutz et al., 2007). OP has not been mapped into the dimensions of the model 
proposed by Lutz et al., (2015), but previous literature suggests that this state should 
be characterised by a very high degree of clarity and meta-awareness (although, as 
mentioned, the phenomenal experience related to this process might be different 
compared to FA and OM). Dereification would also be higher than FA and OM. 
Additionally, we proposed in the present work that the suspension of subject-object 
duality could influence the perception of mental phenomena in terms of the how they 
related to one another and how the brain predicts this relationship.  
 
 
I presented here the styles of mindfulness meditation that were investigated in the 
present work, as well as their theoretical operationalisation in terms of cognitive 
functions, derived from their specific phenomenology. To better understand the 
mechanisms involved in these styles of practice and operationalise their related 
cognitive functions in terms of neural and bodily processes, we contrasted periods of 
practice with specific control states. In both Study 1 (chapter 5) and Study 3 (chapter 
7) control conditions were constituted by states that would absorb attention into a 
specific object, such as reading a newspaper or watching a movie. These states were 
used as active control conditions that could be operationalised in terms of differences 
in the phenomenological dimensions described in the previous section. More 
specifically, these conditions would entail a low degree of meta-awareness and 
dereification. Expert practitioners were explicitly instructed to undergo these 
conditions without “meditating” (e.g. watching a movie while in a state of monitoring). 
Finally, the distinction between OM and OP is mainly useful in the context of a 
comparison between expert and novice practitioners. In fact, the expert practitioners 
involved in the present work were consistently trained in practices aiming at the 
recognition and sustaining of the “nature of the mind” (Tib. Wylie, sems nyid or sems 
kyi rang bzhin) or one's “fundamental awareness” (Tib. Wylie, rig pa), to which OP 
belongs. Therefore, expert meditators were instructed to practice OP, while novices 
practiced OM. This difference is inevitable and relates to the degree of expertise in this 
style of mindfulness practice. If asked, novices could not practice OP and experts could 
probably not practice OM. Nonetheless, as I mentioned, sustaining the state of OP is 
highly difficult also for expert practitioners. As we did not implement measures that 
could explicitly tell if an expert was in such state the whole time of recordings, we 
hypothesise that some experts oscillated between OP and an advanced form of OM. 
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2.5 Processes of mindfulness-based 
practices: neuroscientific evidence 
 
The neuroscientific study of mindfulness-based practices is still in an early stage. An 
increasing number of studies have described the impact of meditation on the neural 
correlates of attention and emotion regulation, as well as documenting changes in 
brain structures and bodily physiology as a result of meditation training (see e.g. Cahn 
and Polich, 2006; Chambers et al., 2009; Tang et al., 2015 for extensive reviews). 
However, because of the limitations that have affected this field (see chapter 2.2.3), 
some studies report conflicting results on some topics. Moreover, very few studies have 
investigated the impact of more advanced states, such as OP, on brain activity (e.g. 
Josipovic, 2014). In this section, I review some studies that are relevant for the present 
work and highlight putative markers of the cognitive functions involved in mindfulness 
practices, especially meta-awareness and dereification. It is important to notice that 
most of these studies where not based on an operationalisation of the constructs 
described in the previous sections and did not implement first-person measures of 
subjective experience, except for rare cases.  
 
2.5.1 Meta-awareness  
 
Although not every study explicitly operationalised this construct, meta-awareness has 
been investigated in protocols measuring monitoring of mind-wandering, present-
centeredness, interoceptive awareness and the perturbation of attention by distracting 
stimuli. 
 Increased meta-awareness during mindfulness practices entails the capacity of 
detecting distractions and changes in the perceptual environment and in relation to a 
specific task set. In line with this hypothesis, Braboszcz and Delorme (2011) found that 
auditory deviance detection was enhanced during a breath-counting task (a form of 
FA) compared to mind-wandering. Specifically, they asked participants to report 
episodes of mind-wandering in relation to the task and used electroencephalography 
(EEG) to record brain responses to frequent and infrequent auditory stimuli. They 
found an increase in the mismatch negativity (MMN), a neuroelectric marker of 
deviance detection in the auditory environment, during breath-counting, compared to 
mind-wandering episodes. This evidence is supported by studies that used functional 
magnetic resonance (fMRI) and reported decreased activity in brain regions of the 
default mode network (DMN, Gusnard and Raichle, 2001) and increased activity in 
regions of the saliency network (SN, Seeley et al., 2007) during FA and OM meditation 
(Allen et al., 2012; Brewer et al., 2011). In brief, regions of the DMN has been associated 
to self-referential thoughts and mental activities such as projecting oneself in the 
future. The SN, on the other hand, would be involved in the processing of salient 
internal and external events in a bottom-up fashion, such as interoceptive signals 
related to affective states. Increased activity of regions related to the SN, such as the 
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anterior insular cortex, in meditation has been associated with a shift to a self-detached 
processing of interoceptive and external stimuli (Tang et al., 2015). For instance, Farb 
et al., (2007) found increased activity in the insular cortex and decreased connectivity 
with regions of the DMN in subjects who underwent a mindfulness-based intervention 
when asked to practice focusing on the present moment.  
Nonetheless, the hypothesis of increased interoceptive awareness as a result of 
mindfulness practice is still under debate. Some studies reported no difference in 
standard measures of interoception (i.e. heartbeat detection) (Daubenmier et al., 2013; 
Khalsa et al., 2008; Melloni et al., 2013) between expert and novice meditators. On the 
other hand, other research have found that meditators showed more interoceptive 
accuracy when measuring respiration (Daubenmier et al., 2013) and tactile sensitivity 
(Fox et al., 2012).   
Increased meta-awareness has also been linked to reduced elaborative processing of 
distractors and target stimuli. For instance, Slagter et al. (2007) found a reduction in 
the allocation of mental resources to the first of two target stimuli presented in a 
stream of distracters in a attentional blink task after an intensive three-months 
practice of OM. More specifically, they observed a decreased amplitude of the P3b 
component, a neuroelectric potential associated to attention allocation and stimulus 
processing, in response to the first target stimulus in meditators after the retreat and 
compared to a control group. This reduction in the brain response was also associated 
to higher detection rate of the second target. In a similar study, Cahn and Polich (2009) 
observed a reduction of the P3a in response to distracters during Vipassana meditation 
(a practice that can be ascribed to the OM style) in expert practitioners, compared to a 
control state. The strength of this reduction correlated with the reported number of 
hours of practice and, interestingly, was not present in those subjects that reported 
high drowsiness during the task.  
 
2.5.2 Dereification 
 
Processes akin to dereification have been investigated in studies that highlight the 
impact of this dimension on thoughts and perceptions associated to psychological and 
physical distress. For instance, a short training in mindfulness practices has been 
associated with reduced craving and activation of related regions in smokers 
(Westbrook et al., 2013) or to reduced approach bias towards images of attractive food 
(Baquedano et al., 2017; Papies et al., 2012). The faculty of decentring from self-related 
ruminative thinking is thought to represent a key element for the efficacy of mind-
fulness based interventions in preventing depression relapse (see Dimidjian and Segal, 
2015 for a review of clinical studies). Finally, the majority of studies on the impact of 
mindfulness-based intervention on pain processing found decreased pain intensity 
ratings after meditation training (Reiner et al., 2013).  
Despite these intriguing findings, little is known about the neurocognitive mechanisms 
involved in dereification. Most of the evidence on this topic come from studies that 
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focused on the activity of brain areas serving emotional processing in response to 
painful or emotional stimuli, or their anticipation. Short training in mindfulness-based 
practices has been shown to reduce the activity of the right amygdala in response to 
emotional pictures (Desbordes et al., 2012). Similarly, studies involving long-term 
practitioners and focusing on the processing of painful stimuli reported lower activity 
in the amygdala and higher activity in sensory regions, as well as lower pain 
unpleasantness compared to controls (Brown and Jones, 2010; Lutz et al., 2013). 
Interestingly, Lutz et al. (2013) reported decreased activity in the anterior insular 
cortex in the period preceding a painful stimulus. The authors related these findings to 
the idea that the cultivation of present-centred, non-judgemental awareness would 
downregulate anticipatory anxiety. (Lutz et al., 2015). 
 
 
The findings presented here are not an exhaustive representation of the neuroscientific 
research on mindfulness but are useful in the context of the present work. The mapping 
of cognitive processes involved in mindfulness meditation into specific 
neurophysiological models is still at its infancy. Even in the studies presented here, 
especially those focusing on the impact of mindfulness-based training on emotion 
regulation, the interplay between dereification and meta-awareness is not yet clear 
(Lutz et al., 2015). Additionally, only one study to this date have described a relation 
between subjective clarity and the intensity of neural activity (Lutz et al., 2013). Most 
importantly, very little is known about the actual mechanisms that underlie the 
observed modulation of neural activity in the healthy population and in clinical 
contexts. The main aim of the present work was to investigate whether we could map 
the cognitive processes, and related phenomenological dimensions, involved in 
mindfulness meditation into a specific theoretical and empirical model of brain activity 
and its related biomarkers. It represents a first attempt to identify the mechanisms of 
action of mindfulness-based practices in this specific neural framework. I will present 
the latter in the next section and argue for its validity in the neuroscientific study of 
mindfulness.  
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2.6 Predictive brain: definitions and context  
 
The need for cognitive neuroscience and experimental psychology to inform third-
person data with first-person accounts of mental phenomena, through the study of 
contemplative practices, was first highlighted by Francisco Varela in his 
epistemological standpoint, which has been termed “neurophenomenology” (e.g. Lutz 
and Thompson, 2003; Varela, 1996). As Pagnoni and Guareschi (2017) recently pointed 
out, a reason for the limited number of neuroscientific studies on meditation that 
implemented this crucial approach could be found in the lack of a coherent, general and 
detailed theory of brain functions that can explain different mental processes. In this 
sense, the neurocomputational theory of predictive coding under the free-energy 
principle (Friston, 2010) has gained, in the recent year, increasing attention of the 
neuroscience community. In brief, this theory postulates that every biological system 
is structured and functions in a way that tries to resist disorder and to maintain 
internal coherence (an account similar to the “autopoiesis theory”; Maturana and 
Varela, 1991). It would do so by minimizing the “surprise” between an embodied model 
of the world and sensory sensations, by either updating such internal model or acting 
on the environment. Free-energy represents an informational quantity that is tight to 
the parameters of the internal model and thus “minimizable” despite the lack of 
knowledge of all possible states of the environment. Within this framework, the brain 
operates as a predictive machine (Gregory, 1980) and constantly casts hypotheses on 
the upcoming sensory input based on internal models of the causes of sensory data. 
More specifically, the hierarchical structure and rich connectivity of the brain would 
allow for the creation and storage of internal representations encoding the statistical 
properties of the environment. These representations would result in expectations 
about the upcoming sensory data, which are tested against the data itself following 
Bayesian principles. Ultimately, a prediction error signal (i.e. the difference between 
the expected and actual sensory signal) would be propagated along the hierarchy to 
eventually update the internal models and account for the present state of the world, 
permitting subsequent predictions.  
Whereas these principles have been previously postulated in the so-called “Bayesian 
brain hypothesis” (Knill and Pouget, 2004), Friston and colleagues have drastically 
expanded this field with several works. For instance, they introduced the notion of 
precision-weighted prediction error signals, which highlights the role of attention in 
decreasing the uncertainty of sensory signals and increasing the probability of an 
internal model to be updated (Feldman and Friston, 2010). They provided 
neurocomputational models that are coherent with the hierarchical structure and 
connectivity between neuronal populations (Bastos et al., 2012; Friston, 2010) and 
could possibly explain the functional role of distinct brain oscillations in the context of 
top-down and bottom-up signalling (Friston et al., 2015). Finally, they applied the same 
computational and theoretical principles beyond perception and to the understanding 
of action (Friston et al., 2011). 
 
 
 
34 
 
2.6.1 Perceptual inference and learning  
 
As mentioned above, an organism can minimize free-energy by updating internal 
models or by acting on the environment. The first way is called “perceptual inference” 
and the second way “active inference”. In a process of active inference, an organism 
acts on the environment to match its predictions about sensory data, rather than 
changing its internal models (Friston et al., 2011). Perceptual inference, on the other 
hand, is the process of predicting sensory stimuli based on the neural representations 
of the statistical properties of the environment and selecting the best or updating the 
current internal model based on the sensory evidence (i.e. prediction error signals). 
Perceptual inference underlies the process of perception itself (Hohwy, 2012), which 
would consist in the rapid selection of the best internal model to match the sensory 
signal, given the information provided by a prediction error. Perceptual inference also 
underlies learning, which entails a change in parameters of an internal model. More 
generally, the notion of perceptual inference highlights some issues that are crucial for 
the present work. Most importantly, perception can be dissociated from sensation 
(Hohwy, 2012): it relies on internal models, hence on the interaction between a subject 
and a perceptual object. The act of perceiving depends on one’s previous knowledge 
about the world, which can be inherited or shaped by the experience. It is an act of 
learning, but the learning itself is based on how much one relies on previous knowledge 
and on the variety of phenomena that one can experience.  
 
 
The theory of predictive coding, especially in the form of perceptual inference and 
learning, represents a promising framework for investigating the neurocognitive 
mechanisms of meditation practices and their associated phenomenological 
dimensions. In fact, Pagnoni and Guareschi (2017) have discussed parallelisms 
between this view and Buddhist theories on perception, subjectivity and time-
perception, as well as the way meditation practice could act on these mechanisms. 
Moreover, predictive coding is a theory that is broad enough to encompass different 
mental phenomena. This comprehensive theory has been used to generate models on 
the mechanisms underlying conscious perception, attention and agency (Apps and 
Tsakiris, 2014; Hohwy, 2012; Rudrauf et al., 2017; Synofzik et al., 2013), affective states 
and interoception (Barrett and Simmons, 2015; Gebauer et al., 2015; Gentsch and 
Synofzik, 2014; Seth, 2013; Seth and Critchley, 2013), social interactions and theory of 
mind (Moutoussis et al., 2014; Ondobaka et al., 2017) and psychiatric conditions such 
as autism, depression and psychosis (Adams et al., 2013; Stephan et al., 2016; Van de 
Cruys et al., 2014). In the present work, we investigated whether some of the cognitive 
processes and changes in the quality of experience in meditation could modulate 
biomarkers of perceptual learning processes. In the next section, I present the most 
important of these markers, as well as evidence of the modulation of perceptual 
learning by cognitive processes and emotional contexts. 
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2.7 Mismatch negativity: a neural correlate of 
perceptual learning 
 
The mismatch negativity (MMN) is a stimulus-evoked electrophysiological response 
that has received a broad interest of the scientific community in several fields, since its 
first description by Näätänen and colleagues thirty years ago (Näätänen et al., 1978). It 
is elicited by a sudden change in a stream of repeating sensory stimuli and it is 
considered to reflect the fact that the brain has detected such change. Whereas 
evidence of mismatch detection has been reported in all sensory modalities (e.g. Krauel 
et al., 1999; Näätänen, 2009; Winkler and Czigler, 2012), most of the research on this 
neuroelectric response has been conducted using auditory stimuli, and so did we in the 
present work. Auditory MMN can be observed in paradigms consisting in sequences of 
repeating auditory stimuli perturbated by infrequent stimuli that can differ in terms of 
frequency, intensity, duration (to cite a few). This type of paradigm is termed “oddball 
task” and can be characterized by different configurations of stimuli and timing 
between them (e.g. Näätänen et al., 2004). In general, the MMN is obtained by 
subtracting the average response to the last “standard” stimulus before the “deviant” 
to the one of the “deviant” stimuli. It is a negative component of the obtained waveform, 
which peaks between 100 and 200 ms after stimulus onset (Sams et al., 1985) and is 
distributed over frontocentral scalp areas, with prominence in frontal regions (figure 
1). 
 
 
 
 Figure 1. MMN resulting from the subtraction between the response to standard and deviant stimuli. 
(left) An example of event-related responses to standard and deviant auditory stimuli and the resulting 
difference waveform at the electrode Fz. (right) Related scalp topography in the 90-180ms time-window.  
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2.7.1 MMN and predictive coding  
 
The “predictive coding” account of MMN asserts that the repeated presentation of a 
standard stimulus involves changes in both extrinsic (between-areas) and intrinsic 
(within areas) connections that underlie the update of an internal model through 
perceptual learning.  Predictions generated by models that are updated over time 
would become more efficient in suppressing the prediction error signal (PE) between 
predictions and bottom-up information conveyed by sensory data. This would lead to 
a reduction in evoked responses to standard stimuli over time. An MMN would emerge 
when a new, unlearned stimulus is presented, which would cause a higher PE (Garrido 
et al., 2009b). This view has been proposed as a comprehensive account of the 
mechanisms underlying the MMN and allows for the coexistence of previously 
contrasting hypotheses. Specifically, it conciliates evidence supporting the so-called 
model adjustment hypothesis, that considers the MMN to represent the modification of 
a perceptual model which predicts the next sensory input based on the memory trace 
of the previous one (e.g. Sussman and Winkler, 2001), and the adaptation hypothesis, 
that postulates the presence of different neuronal populations responding to the 
different stimuli, resulting in different degrees of neural habituation and thus a 
difference in response amplitude (Jääskeläinen et al., 2004). The predictive coding 
account of the MMN has been supported by different neuroanatomical and 
neurocomputational models that described the role of bottom-up and top-down neural 
connections in conveying predictions and PEs within a hierarchical structure that 
encompasses the auditory cortex as well as prefrontal brain regions (Garrido et al., 
2008; Wacongne et al., 2012). The MMN can thus be considered as a biomarker of 
perceptual learning processes. As such, the study of its modulation by the cognitive 
processes developed in meditative practices can lead to a better understanding of the 
neural mechanisms underlying mindfulness meditation, as well as providing insights 
over mechanisms of perceptual learning.  
 
2.7.2 Other components of the auditory evoked response 
 
The auditory MMN is one of several components of the auditory evoked response. 
When averaging several neuroelectric responses to the same type of auditory stimuli, 
we observe many deflections in the electroencephalography (EEG). These are 
components of the event-related potential (ERP) and are historically identified as 
different peaks in the signal after the onset of a given stimulus. Different components 
have been classified, based on their approximative peak latency, into early, middle and 
late-latency responses (Picton, 2010; Picton et al., 1974).  
For their contextualization in the present work, I will briefly introduce those 
components that are part of the late-latency responses (LLR). LLR comprise the P50 
component (also P1 or Pb), a positive deflection peaking around 50ms and the N1 (or 
N100, figure 1), a negative deflection at 100ms circa. Both components reflects sensory 
processing and have been related to sensory gating mechanisms (Boutros et al., 2011). 
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The P2 (or P200) component has its positive peak at around 200ms (figure 1). This 
component has been poorly studied and historically thought to be part of the N1-P2 
complex in response to auditory stimuli (Tremblay et al., 2014). Nonetheless, there are 
evidence indicating that N1 and P2 originate from different sources within the auditory 
cortex and likely serve different functions (Ross and Tremblay, 2009). It has been 
proposed that P2 reflects mechanism of stimulus attendance and classification, mostly 
related to excluding a stimulus from further processing or recognizing it as a target 
(see Crowley and Colrain, 2004 for a review). Finally, LLR comprise the P3a, which 
peaks around 300ms and reflects change detection in active tasks requiring attending 
to target stimuli (Escera et al., 2000).  
After 300ms, several studies have reported negative deflections that have been termed 
with different names (e.g. Bendixen et al., 2007; Naatanen, 1982; Recasens et al., 2015) 
. The functional significance of these components is probably related to attentional 
monitoring and stimulus attendance, but it is also influenced by the specific paradigm 
in which they are observed.  
 
 
 
2.8 Attention and emotions in perceptual 
learning 
 
In this section, I review some of the recent studies investigating the modulation of 
perceptual learning processes by attention and emotions. This literature will be useful 
for elucidating the impact of cognitive processes developed in mindfulness practices 
on perceptual learning. In fact, dimensions such as meta-awareness and dereification 
have already been shown to impact attentional and emotion regulation processes (see 
section 2.4.1 and 2.4.2). The studies presented here were mostly based on the 
investigation of the auditory MMN, as a marker of perceptual learning. Nonetheless, 
additional research on different markers (mainly mismatch-like processes) is included. 
One relevant message to retain from this brief introduction is that the MMN (and 
related phenomena) is an automatic response. MMN has been observed during sleep 
(e.g. Atienza and Cantero, 2001), anesthesia (Chennu and Bekinschtein, 2012), 
minimally conscious patients (Boly et al., 2011) and patients in coma (Morlet and 
Fischer, 2014). Therefore, any modulation of the MMN and perceptual learning 
processes by cognitive or emotional factors will not likely result in its absence.  
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2.8.1 Attention and perceptual learning 
 
A long-lasting debate has been focusing on whether the auditory MMN can be 
modulated by the amount of attentional resources allocated to the incoming auditory 
stimulation. Early studies suggested that the MMN amplitude was higher when 
participants were asked to attend, compared to ignore the auditory stimuli in an 
oddball task. For instance, Woldorff et al. (1991) showed that the MMN in response to 
intensity deviants was higher for attended, compared to unattended stimuli in a 
dichotic listening task. However, other studies pointed out that the true amplitude of 
the MMN could not be assessed in attend conditions (e.g. when subjects were asked to 
count auditory deviants) because the MMN overlapped with the N2b component, a 
negative deflection in response to infrequent targets (e.g. Muller-Gass et al., 2005; 
Shalgi and Deouell, 2007). Additionally, in few studies were the N2b component was 
dissociated from the MMN, no difference was found in the amplitude of the latter in 
attend, compared to ignore conditions (Sussman et al., 2004).  
Findings supporting an independent role of attentional engagement in modulating the 
amplitude of the MMN came from later studies. Haroush et al. (2009) found that 
increasing the visual load in an “attentional blink” task decreased the MMN amplitude 
in a concurrent auditory oddball sequence. The same decrease in amplitude was found 
following attentional shifts (i.e. errors in detecting the first visual target in a sequence). 
The authors discussed the results in the context of background attentional monitoring, 
which would decrease in response to increased cognitive demands in a task.  
The impact of task-set in modulating perceptual learning processes has been 
highlighted by studies that used complex auditory sequences and experimental 
conditions. Sussman et al. (2002) designed an oddball task characterized by patterned 
sound sequences with regular and rare deviant stimuli (e.g. AAAB ATAB AAAB) and 
asked the participants to either ignore the sounds, indicate when a rare deviant was 
present (but they were not instructed on the sequence patterns) or detect changes in 
the sequence patterns. They found that the MMN was not elicited for regular deviants 
if the goal of the task was to detect deviant sequences. They interpreted these findings 
highlighting the role of task goal in determining what constitute a deviation and thus a 
related mismatch. In accordance to previous studies, the MMN amplitude for the ignore 
condition was lower than when the auditory stream was attended. 
 In contradiction to these findings, Chennu et al. (2013) showed how expectation and 
attention interacted to modulate perceptual learning. In their research, subjects were 
asked to report changes in single tones or global sequences in a complex oddball task 
(e.g. AAAB AAAB AAAA). In this case, the MMN in response to local deviations was 
higher when subjects were asked to attend the global patterns, compared to when they 
were asked to attend each single tone. This finding was in line with previous evidence, 
coming from studies using magnetoencephalography (MEG), of the attenuation of early 
auditory responses to expected, compared to unexpected stimuli (Todorovic et al., 
2011; Todorovic and Lange, 2012). Additionally, the MMN was reduced when subjects 
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were ignoring the auditory stream compared to both the attend patterns and attend 
tones conditions.  
Within the predictive coding framework, the higher the match between a prediction on 
the upcoming sensory data and the actual sensory information, the lower the 
prediction error signal that is generated (i.e. lower MMN amplitude in the case of 
auditory oddball). On the other hand, attention is considered to increase the precision 
of the sensory prediction error signals (i.e. a reduction in the uncertainty or “noise” 
surrounding the incoming sensory data). This process is thought to be meditated by 
specific molecular mechanisms. In a within-subject crossover placebo-controlled 
double-blind design, Moran et al. (2013) found increased MMN and decreased 
attenuation of the response to repeating standard stimuli after the administration of 
galantamine, an enhancer of cholinergic neuromodulation. This result is in line with 
the hypotheses on the role of acetylcholine in boosting bottom-up attentional 
processes (Bentley et al., 2004). However, the way attention interacts with 
expectations and task-set in modulating perceptual learning is still unclear, with 
studies pointing to both antagonist (e.g. Chennu et al., 2013) and synergic interactions 
(e.g. Hsu et al., 2014; Kok et al., 2012). 
To summarize, auditory perceptual learning seems to be modulated by the amount of 
attentional resources allocated to the source of sensory data. This modulation would 
result in increased amplitude and weight of prediction error signals (i.e. the MMN). 
However, specific task-sets and expectations on the statistical properties of the 
auditory environment can interact with the attentional modulation in a way that is still 
unclear and possibly task-specific.  
 
2.8.2 Emotions and perceptual learning 
 
In everyday life, perception and learning cannot be dissociated from social and 
emotional factors. Studies on this topic can be divided into research on the effect of 
emotional stimuli or on stimulus processing in emotional contexts. In the second 
research field, an emotional context can be created by the task-related stimuli, or by 
mood induction within a paradigm with neutral stimuli.  
A contribution in the investigation of the modulation of perceptual learning processes 
by emotional stimuli comes from research on the MMN in various sensory domains. 
Previous studies have found increased MMN responses to emotional, compared to 
neutral deviants (Chang et al., 2010; Fan and Cheng, 2014; Vogel et al., 2015). For 
instance, in Vogel et al. (2015) participants underwent a visual oddball task where two 
pictures of neutral faces constituted a standard stimulus, while the second face of the 
pair changed in deviant stimuli. They found that the visual MMN was higher when the 
deviant face was expressing fear, compared to a neutral expression. They suggested 
that the increased saliency of the emotional stimuli could increase the amplitude of 
prediction error signals, as the information conveyed is more different, compared to 
the original prediction, than the one conveyed by a neutral stimulus. Supporting this 
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view, some studies have found that the effect of emotional deviants expressing sadness 
is decreased or absent in depressed patients (e.g. Chang et al., 2010; Pang et al., 2014). 
In this case, one could presume that sad deviants are somehow less “surprising” for 
people affected by this mood disorder. Finally, other studies did not observe any 
modulation of the MMN amplitude by emotional, compared to neutral deviants (e.g. 
Susac et al., 2004).  
Evidence that different emotional contexts impact the dynamics of perceptual learning 
processes come from studies that investigated repetition suppression of negative and 
positive stimuli. The term repetition suppression refers to the decrease in the amplitude 
of neural responses to repetitions of the same stimulus over time. Within the predictive 
coding framework, this process is considered to reflect the “minimising of prediction 
error through adaptive changes in predictions about the content and precision of 
sensory inputs” (Auksztulewicz and Friston, 2016). Ishai et al. (2004) used fMRI to 
investigate how this phenomenon is modulated by emotional contexts. They found that 
the repetition of fearful, compared to neutral faces, resulted in higher responses to the 
first repetition and greater decrease of activity over time in the visual cortex. They 
suggest that this result is due to the sharpening of representations of fearful stimuli in 
the visual cortex and that this effect could be meditated by a feedback from the 
amygdala. Differently, another study observed reduced repetition suppression for 
happy faces in the same brain regions (Suzuki et al., 2011), pointing to a possible 
differential effect of emotional valence in perceptual learning.  
Other evidence on the modulation of perceptual learning by emotional contexts come 
from studies that focused on associations between cues and outcomes. For instance, in 
Watanabe et al. (2013) participants learned associations between cues and monetary 
rewards in trials where the cue was preceded by a neutral or a fearful face. They 
showed that cue-outcome associations were learnt faster for those stimuli that were 
preceded by a fearful, compared to neutral faces. Moreover, the authors suggest that 
this change in learning rate could be caused by the higher reward prediction error 
signals (RPE; the activity in response to violated outcome predictions) observed in the 
ventral striatum and amygdala in trials starting with fearful faces. In accordance to 
these findings, Robinson et al. (2013) found increased RPEs in the ventral striatum 
when subjects underwent a stress induction procedure (i.e. threat of electric shock). 
However, this modulation was present only for aversive unpredicted outcomes (i.e. 
seeing an angry face when one was expecting a happy one). Thus, different emotions 
could play different roles also in the context of learning cues-outcome association. For 
instance, Bertels et al. (2013) found that the probabilities of cue-outcome association 
were not learned faster when participants underwent a sadness induction procedure 
(i.e. listening to sad stories before the task) compared to a neutral condition.  
Finally, there is a consistent body of literature concerning the impact of stress on the 
auditory MMN. Cornwell et al., (2017) has recently proposed a neurocomputational 
model of anxious hypervigilance, which would impede perceptual learning by 
increasing the synaptic gain of prediction error signals while down-regulating 
descending prediction pathways. These model builds upon previous evidence on the 
increase of the magnetic counterpart of the MMN (MMNm) during periods of electric 
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shock threat (Cornwell et al., 2007). Moreover, increased MMN amplitude has been 
observed in individuals affected by PTSD (Ge et al., 2011) and has been found to 
correlate with dispositional anxiety (Hansenne et al., 2003). Despite this evidence, 
contradicting results come from other research that elicited anxious states and used 
EEG: in these cases, a difference in the amplitude of the MMN was either not found 
(Ermutlu et al., 2005), observed only in response to a specific type of stimulus deviancy 
(Simoens et al., 2007) or found to correlate with state anxiety only in an emotionally 
negative context (Schirmer and Escoffier, 2010). The possible reasons underlying these 
contradicting studies are extensively discussed in Study 3 (chapter 5).  
To summarize, perceptual learning processes are not independent of emotions. Highly 
affective stimuli can modulate the amplitude of prediction error signals while 
emotional contexts can modulate repetition suppression and learning processes. It is 
unclear whether different types of emotions impact perceptual learning in different 
ways. However, it seems that negative and highly arousing emotions such as stress and 
fear could constitute an optimal framework for investigating these effects.  
 
2.8.3 Meditation and perceptual learning  
 
Up to date, no studies formally investigated the impact of meditation training and 
states on perceptual inference and learning processes. However, few studies reported 
an effect of meditation on the amplitude of the auditory MMN in neutral emotional 
contexts. Increased MMN was observed during FA meditation (Srinivasan and Baijal 
2007) and as a trait effect in expert practitioners (Biedermann et al., 2016). Nonetheless, 
these studies presented several limitations such as the lack of a control condition and 
the assessment of the MMN amplitude at unconventional scalp areas. Additionally, 
Braboszcz and Delorme (2011) found a reduction of the MMN amplitude during mind-
wandering, compared to an experimental condition akin to FA (i.e. breath-counting 
task). Finally, other studies have found a reduced startle effect in response to auditory 
probes (Levenson et al., 2012) and reduced habituation of startle responses (Antonova 
et al., 2015) in expert practitioners during the practice of OP. Overall, these findings 
indicate that biomarkers of perceptual inference and learning represent an interesting 
tool for the understanding of the neural mechanisms of mindfulness meditation. 
Nonetheless, none of the above-mentioned studies were empirical investigations of the 
neurocognitive processes of mindfulness practices, operationalised in terms of 
perceptual inference and learning. In the present work, we addressed this issue 
formulating specific hypotheses on the differential effects of mindfulness states and 
expertise on the auditory MMN in neutral and emotional contexts. These general 
hypotheses are presented in the next chapter.  
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Chapter 3 
Hypotheses 
 
 
 
3.1 General hypotheses 
 
The main hypothesis motivating this project was that the cognitive processes 
cultivated in mindfulness practices (i.e. meta-awareness and dereification) could 
modulate biomarkers of perceptual learning and downregulate the impact of emotions 
on these markers (see figure 1). These effects would be in line with the specific 
phenomenology of different practices and levels of expertise. More precisely, we 
considered the EEG mismatch negativity to be a common neural framework for 
studying attentional and perceptual profiles in neutral and emotional settings. 
Additionally, we predicted that other components of the auditory evoked responses 
would be modulated by different meditation states and expertise, especially those 
underlying attentional control and monitoring1. Finally, we expected that the 
modulation of neural processes could be predicted by moment-to-moment fluctuations 
in the degree and quality of specific dimensions of subjective experience. We tested 
this hypothesis by correlating first and third-person measures in different meditation 
states and groups of expert and novice practitioners.  
A secondary hypothesis was that a thoughtful and rigorous selection of expert 
meditation practitioners, the implementation of a well-defined variety of practices and 
a detailed training of a control group of participants would 1) reduce the degree of 
variability caused by the heterogeneity of meditation styles and ways to practice in 
different traditions and 2) provide a common linguistic framework for the study of 
specific dimensions of subjective experience. This hypothesis constituted a main 
feature of the larger research project from which this work is derived. As such, it is 
presented and discussed in detail in the Protocol Study (see chapter 4.2), which stems 
from this long-term collaborative work.  
 
 
 
 
                                                        
1 Analyses on the amplitude of different ERP components (e.g. auditory N1, P2, Late Frontal Negativity) 
have been a rich source of understanding in Study 1 and 3. However, they came from a posteriori 
hypothesis and are therefore not presented in this chapter.  
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3.2 Hypotheses for Study 1 
 
In Study 1, we investigated the impact of two styles of mindfulness meditation, Open 
Presence (OP) and Focused Attention (FA), in expert and novice practitioners on the 
neural correlates of perceptual learning and attention monitoring processes. We 
hypothesized that OP practice, in expert meditators, would downregulate the 
formation of perceptual habits while increasing the monitoring of the sensory 
environment. Differently, we expected the state of FA to increase monitoring of task-
unrelated events and enhance the brain responses to deviations of the auditory 
environment. These predictions were based on previous theoretical accounts of the 
two meditation styles (Lutz et al., 2015, 2007). In brief, both meditation states are 
thought to be characterized by higher meta-awareness, compared to a control 
condition, which would increase the saliency of prediction error signals in response to 
deviations in unpredictable sequences of auditory stimuli. However, during the state 
of OP, the suspension of the representational models of the self and objects in the world 
would result in a high degree of dereification of the auditory stimuli and a consequent 
downregulation of prediction error signals in response to deviations (figure 2).  
 
 
Mindfulness 
practices  
Perceptual 
learning 
Emotion 
regulation  
Emotional 
state (e.g. anxiety) 
Figure 1. Schematic illustration of the main hypothesis explored in the present work. This schema 
represents the hypothesis that mindfulness practices impact perceptual learning through meta-
awareness and dereification of sensory stimuli. Additionally, these same processes modulate emotional 
responses, downregulating the effect of emotional states on perceptual learning.  
Meta-awareness  
Dereification  
Study 1 Study 2 
Study 3 
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In terms of neurophysiological processes, we expected to observe a decrease in MMN 
amplitude in experts, compared to novice practitioners, during the practice of OP and 
compared to FA and a control state. On the other hand, the MMN amplitude would 
increase in experts, compared to novices, during FA and compared to a control state. 
For further details on the theoretical background of this specific hypothesis, as well as 
on the exploration of the interplay between the MMN amplitude and components of 
the auditory evoked response that putatively reflect attention monitoring processes, I 
invite the reader to refer to Chapter 4 of the present work, where Study 1 is presented.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Schematic illustration of degree of meta-awareness and strength of perceptual 
learning processes in expert and novice meditators during FA, OP and reading (RE). Here we 
try to characterize two styles of mindfulness practice in experts and novices in terms of strength of 
monitoring processes (y-axis) and strength of response to deviations in the auditory environment 
(x-axis).  
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3.3 Hypotheses for Study 2 
 
In Study 2 we tried to replicate previous findings on the modulation of perceptual 
learning processes by anticipatory anxiety in the context of unpredictable threat 
(Cornwell et al., 2017, 2007). For this aim, we analysed a subset of data from the 
paradigm presented in Study 3. The data was from novice practitioners during a 
control condition (see Chapter 5 for more details). The main hypotheses for this study 
were the following: 
x Skin conductance responses to auditory cues introducing periods of threat 
would be higher than those in response to cues introducing safe periods (where 
no shock is delivered). 
 
x The amplitude of skin conductance responses would correlate with the 
subjective experience of anticipatory anxiety, as measured by self-reports. 
 
x Early brain responses to auditory stimuli would be higher during periods of  
threat compared to safe periods. This modulation would be an index of 
increased sensory processing caused by anxious hypervigilance.  
 
x MMN amplitude would increase during periods of threat, compared to safe 
periods. This modulation would be an index of a biased perceptual learning 
during anxious states, as suggested by previous neurocomputational models 
(Cornwell et al., 2017).  
 
x MMN amplitude would correlate with measures of state and trait anxiety, as 
measured by self-reports and questionnaire, respectively.  
 
 
 
3.3 Hypotheses for Study 3 
 
In study 3, we investigated the modulation of auditory perceptual learning processes 
by two styles of mindfulness practice (FA, OP) and a control condition (silent movie, 
VD) in expert and novice practitioners in the context of unpredictable threat. In this 
paradigm, we used threat of unpredictable electric shocks to induce a state of 
anticipatory anxiety and recorded EEG and electrodermal activity during a passive 
auditory oddball task. We also collected self-reports on several dimensions of 
subjective experience during the different experimental conditions. Additionally, we 
explored a relation between questionnaires on cognitive defusion, interoceptive 
awareness and trait anxiety and brain and bodily physiology. 
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Our main hypothesis was that the specific cognitive processes instantiated by OP and 
FA in expert practitioners could impact the effect of anticipatory anxiety on biomarkers 
of perceptual learning (i.e. the MMN). More specifically, we expected a dissociation 
between physiological, adaptive responses to threat and the intensity of the experience 
of anticipatory anxiety in experts, especially during OP. We expected this dissociation 
to be related to, on one hand, an overall sensitisation of brain responses to auditory 
stimuli and autonomic responses during threat periods, but decreased intensity of the 
associated affective state, as a function of the degree of meta-awareness and 
dereification. Specific hypotheses on the modulation of the MMN amplitude and 
autonomic and affective responses to threat were the following (see figure 3 for a 
schematic illustration): 
 
 
x Skin conductance responses to auditory cues introducing periods of threat 
would be higher than those in response to cues introducing safe periods in both 
groups of participants and indiscriminately for meditation states and a control 
condition. 
 
x Expert meditators would report less anticipatory anxiety during meditation, 
especially during OP. This modulation would be predicted by measures of 
dereification and meta-awareness.  
 
x MMN amplitude would increase during periods of threat, compared to safe 
periods in the VD condition, but not during FA and OP in expert meditators. This 
effect would be especially strong during OP.  
 
x Early brain responses to auditory stimuli would be higher during periods of 
threat, compared to safe periods in both groups of participants and 
indiscriminately for meditation states and a control condition.  
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Figure 3. Schematic illustration of some of the main hypotheses for Study 3. The three graphs at 
the top describe the expected modulation of MMN amplitude by different states in the two groups 
during safe and threat periods. The two graphs at the bottom illustrate the expected effect of threat 
electrodermal activity (left) and subjective experience of anxiety (right).  
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Chapter 4 
General methods 
 
 
 
The experimental data presented in the present work are divided into three different 
studies. Whereas Study 1 stands alone in terms of subjects, materials and design, Study 
2 and Study 3 were part of a single experimental paradigm. More specifically, in Study 
2 we analysed data from novice practitioners during a control state, to investigate the 
effect of a mood induction procedure in control participants who were not engaging in 
meditation practices. Additionally, Study 2 and 3 were part of a broader project that 
investigated the effects of mindfulness meditation on cognitive and emotional 
processes in expert and novice practitioners throughout several experimental sessions 
and paradigms.  
This chapter is a general overview of some of the methods implemented in the present 
work. Specifically, I provide information on 1) the selection and profiles of expert 
meditation practitioners in Study 1 and 3, 2) the meditation and phenomenological 
training program attended by novice practitioners who participated in Study 2 and 3 
and 3) the use of electrodermal activity as a marker of stress. In all studies, 
electroencephalography (EEG) was used to investigate brain activity in the form of 
evet-related potentials (ERPs) and spontaneous oscillatory activity (Study 1). A general 
description of these electrophysiological methods is not provided here, since this topic 
has been treated in other and more detailed works (Buzsaki, 2006; Luck, 2014; 
Niedermeyer and Silva, 2005). Specific information regarding the methods of data pre-
processing and analysis are provided in the methodological sections of each study 
presented here. I opted to describe in this chapter only those methodological 
approaches that are novel or scarcely implemented in the field of neuroscientific 
research on meditation practices.  
Relevant information on the methods implemented in the studies presented in this 
work are outlined in figure 1. Detailed information on the inclusion procedures, 
experimental paradigms and main outcome measures of the broader project, to which 
Study 2 and 3 belong, are provided in Annex 1 of this manuscript (“ERC project 
manual”; available online at osf.io/dbwch)  
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4.1 Expert practitioners  
 
The expert meditation practitioners included in Study 1 and Study 3 were selected in a 
way that tries to address a common issue in the neuroscientific research on meditation, 
namely the lack of uniformed groups of expert practitioners.  
In Study 1, long-term practitioners were selected based on a criterion of at least 10000 
hours of formal meditation practice in the Nyingma and Kagyu traditions of Tibetan 
Buddhism, which have very similar styles of practice (sample mean: 28990 hours, SD: 
13885). The length of their training was estimated based on their daily practice and 
the time they spent in meditative retreats.  
The expert practitioners included in Study 3 were selected based on similar criteria: at 
least 10000 hours of practice (sample mean: 38466 hours, SD: 19439), having followed 
at least one 3-year meditation retreat and a daily practice of a minimum of 45 minutes 
over the year prior to the experiment. Most importantly, participants belonged to the 
same Tibetan traditions as for Study 1. Finally, before being selected they underwent 
an interview with a member of our time, who is equally experienced, regarding the 
quality of their everyday practice and motivation (see Annex 1 for additional details 
regarding selection process and inclusion criteria). 
 
 
 
Study 1 Study 2 Study 3
Subjects n = 15 novices ; 16 experts n = 36 novices n = 36 novices ; 30 experts
Paradigm auditory oddball auditory oddball under threat auditory oddball under threat
Conditions FA, OP, Reading Video FA, OP, Video 
Measures ERPs, oscillations ERPs, EDA, self-reports, questionnaires
Figure 1. Overview of the studies included in the present work. Information on subjects, 
paradigm, experimental conditions and main measures implemented in each study. Information 
highlighted in red indicate subjects and conditions shared by different studies. 
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4.2 Protocol study: meditation and 
experiential training  
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University, Lyon, France 
 
Abstract 
 
Empirical descriptions of the phenomenology of meditation states rely on 
practitioners’ ability to provide accurate information on their lived experience. We 
present a two-day meditation training protocol that was designed to equip meditation-
naive participants with a theoretical background and experiential knowledge that 
would enable them to share their experience with the experimenters. Subsequently, 
novices carried on with daily practice during several weeks before participating in 
experiments. Using a neurophenomenological experiment designed to explore two 
different meditation states (focused attention and open monitoring), we found that 
self-reported phenomenological ratings (i) were sensitive to meditation states, (ii) 
reflected meditation dose and fatigue effects, and (iii) were correlated with behavioral 
measures (variability of response time). Each of these three effects was better 
predicted by features of participants’ daily practice than by desirable responding. Our 
results provide evidence that meditation-naive participants can be trained to reliably 
report their experience along phenomenological dimensions. 
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1. Introduction 
This article aims to describe a meditation training protocol developed in the context of 
an empirical brain imaging, cross-sectional study that investigates the mechanisms of 
mindfulness and compassion meditations. The novelty of this protocol is to obtain a 
meditation active control group by training healthy, naive participants to verbally 
express their subjective experience of meditation practice using a multidimensional 
phenomenological space (Lutz et al. 2015). Phenomenological space refers here to the 
description of features of the field of experience, as it is lived and verbally expressed in 
the first person (e.g., Husserl 2008). This phenomenological matrix has been recently 
proposed as a framework to map different styles and levels of training in mindfulness, 
as well as heuristic tool to generate hypotheses for empirical research.  
The Brain & Mindfulness project is a European Research project (ERC Consolidator 
#617739-BRAINandMINDFULNESS) that attempts to practically apply this theoretical 
framework (for the study manual, see Abdoun et al. 2018). During the training 
participants were introduced to various styles of meditation practices and acquainted 
with phenomenological categories through various experiential exercises. These 
phenomenological dimensions were then investigated at neural, behavioral and 
physiological levels during the various cognitive and affective experimental paradigms. 
Such explicit use of first-person data to guide the analysis of third-person data is 
inspired by Francisco Varela’s research program of neurophenomenology (Varela 
1996; Lutz & Thompson 2003).  
The current training protocol attempts to pragmatically tackle three methodological 
and conceptual challenges. The first one is concerned with issues regarding the 
definition of mindfulness meditation in psychology and cognitive neuroscience. The 
second one pertains to epistemological and methodological issues related to the 
integration of first-person reports in an experimental protocol. The third one is related 
to the quality of control groups for cross-sectional studies of meditation expertise. 
 
1.1 Theoretical context: mindfulness as a dimensional, phenomenological state 
In experimental and clinical psychology, the construct of mindfulness is generally used 
with three different meanings that refer either to: (a) a mental trait or a dispositional 
inclination (e.g. the Five Facet of Mindfulness proposed by Baer and colleagues 
(2006)), (b) a soteriological or spiritual path conceived in therapeutic and health-
promotion terms (e.g. in the Mindfulness-Based-Stress-Reduction program), and (c) a 
single cognitive process trained and potentially brought to various human activities 
(e.g. like in “paying attention in a particular way: on purpose, in the present moment, 
and non-judgmentally”; see Kabat-Zinn 1994). While these meanings remain useful for 
many contexts, they are also problematic. Self-report questionnaires to study 
mindfulness as a trait lack specificity (Goldberg et al. 2016) and may even yield 
contradictory findings. For instance, Leigh and colleagues’ (2005) found that binge 
drinkers’ mindfulness scores were higher than those of participants in a mindfulness 
retreat. In addition, findings may be biased by social desirability, consistency effects, 
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or shared language between intervention instructions and scales (see Sauer et al., 
2013, Van Dam et al. 2012). Interpreting mindfulness as a soteriological process 
(meaning [b]) is often too broad to guide empirical research. Up to this point, 
discussions of mindfulness as a cognitive process (meaning [c]) makes it difficult to 
account for differences in practice styles and levels of expertise, while also lacking the 
specificity required to formulate mechanistic hypotheses. Because these meanings are 
too restrictive, with C. Saron, A. Jha and J Dunne, we have argued against formulating a 
single, universally applicable consensus definition of mindfulness (Lutz et al. 2015).   
Instead we favor reconceiving mindfulness through a family resemblance approach 
whereby it can be conceptualized as “a variety of cognitive processes embedded in a 
complex postural, aspirational, and motivational context that contribute to states that 
resemble one another along well-defined phenomenological dimensions” (Lutz et al. 
2015). This approach draws on previous efforts to conceptualize mindfulness 
(Chambers et al. 2009; Hölzel et al. 2011; Lutz et al. 2008) and the phenomenology of 
mindfulness practice. It is compatible with multiple explanatory and analytical 
frameworks from different subdisciplines, including contemplative theories, clinical 
frameworks and psychological and neuroscientific models. This approach is guided by 
a pragmatic inquiry: when one is formally practicing mindfulness, what observable and 
manipulable features of consciousness are the most relevant to report in an 
experimental setting? We identified seven features proposed in a bipartite 
phenomenological model (detailed in Lutz et al. 2015 and resumed here in table 1).  
The model assumes that these dimensions of experience are dynamic and manipulable 
in that they are affected—directly or indirectly—by different instructions of practice 
and/or by the level of expertise. This model was used to plot the hypothetical 
phenomenological characteristics of two styles of mindfulness, Focused attention (FA) 
and Open monitoring (OM) meditations, for both novice and expert meditators (Lutz 
et al. 2015). These plots have been created based on various instruction sets and 
descriptions. They should not be taken as actual plots of any individual’s 
phenomenology. The same set of mindfulness instructions could be mapped to 
different points in the phenomenological space. This is due to individual differences 
between practitioners in the manner in which they interpret and instantiate 
instructions. 
One aim of the Brain & Mindfulness project is to implement this heuristic model and to 
empirically test some of its assumptions. For instance, can we use self-report scales to 
reliably measure and monitor consistent changes in these features in response to 
different meditation instructions and training, congruent with the hypothetical plots 
previously published? 
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1.2 Epistemological limitations: Reliability of self-report data 
A second methodological aim arises from the first one: are the empirically-obtained 
plots of the different styles and levels of expertise reliable in this phenomenological 
space?  
 
1.2.1 The reliability of self-reports 
The perceived demise of early twentieth century introspectionism (Costall 2006) and 
the seminal review by Nisbett and Wilson (1977) questioned the ability of the 
participants to report the real causes of their behavior. Since then, introspective-like 
methods have been looked upon with distrust by many in the fields of psychology and 
Table 1 The seven phenomenological dimensions proposed in Lutz et al. 2015. Although primary 
dimensions are presented in an orthogonal Euclidean space, they can vary independently from one 
another. Within this multidimensional space, secondary dimensions represent features dependent on 
specific mental states and level of expertise. In addition, the model assumes four general features that are 
common across the family of practices associated to mindfulness, that are physical posture, nonaversive 
affect, axiological framework, and task-set maintenance. These common general features are necessary 
elements of mindfulness practice, but they are not explicitly depicted in the model because they are less 
significant in distinguishing styles of practice. In the present manuscript, these general features will not 
be explicitly discussed, even if they were measured during the experimental settings. For instance, we 
measure nonaversive affect dimension during a nociceptive paradigm, and we interviewed after this 
paradigm the participants about the relationship between pain and their worldview.  
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cognitive science. Contrastingly, others have warned against drawing general 
conclusions from these failures (Hurlbert and Heavey 2001). 
Devising ways to detect and/or limit the diverse types of self-reports distortions is an 
active field of methodological research. For example, self-administered questionnaires 
have long included validity scales designed to this effect (Baer et al. 2003). More 
recently, there has been a renewed interest for ‘first-person methods’ to study 
consciousness (see the three special issues of the Journal of Consciousness Studies on 
this question: Jack and Roepstorff 2003, 2004; Hasenkamp and Thompson 2013). First-
person methods refer to methods that allow an investigator to bring a participant close 
to their subjective experience2 (Petitmengin 2006), as well as to practices that subjects 
themselves can use to increase their sensitivity to their own experiences (Varela and 
Shear 1999; Depraz et al. 2003; Bitbol and Petitmengin 2013; Petitmengin et al. 2013). 
Meditation training has been proposed as a pragmatic response to this challenge due 
to its disciplined approach to examining experience. Approaching experience from this 
perspective allows for the refinement of first person categories' repertoire and 
strengthen the robustness of the relationship between first and third-person data 
(Varela 1996). However, this hypothesis remains to be thoroughly tested. Current 
available evidence includes the improvement of the congruence between implicit and 
explicit measures of self-views after brief mindfulness exercises (see Strick and Papies 
2017 for a study on affiliation motives and goals, and Koole et al. 2009 for a study on 
self-esteem). In contrast, measures of interoceptive awareness based on heartbeat 
perception in experienced meditators have yielded mixed and contradictory results 
(Khalsa et al. 2008; Melloni et al. 2013; Bornemann and Singer 2017). The 
inconclusiveness of these studies may be due to a lack of methodological validity 
(Zamariola et al. 2018), discrepancies in the experimental designs and/or in the extent 
of bodily focus in participants’ meditation practice.   
 
1.2.2 Demand characteristics and desirable responding 
In the context of phenomenological research on self-induced mental states (such as in 
meditation research), demand characteristics is a major source of confound that 
undermines the credibility of self-reports. Demand characteristics refer to “the totality 
of cues which convey an experimental hypothesis to the subject[s]” and which 
consequently “become significant determinants of subjects' behavior” (Orne 1962). 
Participants volunteering for scientific experiments have various motivations that 
may, consciously or unconsciously, incite them to play the role of the good participant 
and try to serve the experiment by producing the data that they think will confirm the 
(presumed) research hypothesis. To attenuate the confounding effects of demand 
characteristics, researchers commonly resort to the concealment of – if not the 
deception about – hypotheses, manipulations, dependent measures and independent 
variables. Another source of distortion of a participant’s behavior is her wish to present 
                                                        
2 Such techniques were sometimes dubbed ‘second person’ methods, because they rely on the critical 
interventions of an interviewer. 
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herself favorably to the experimenter, who may be perceived as an evaluator. This so-
called social desirability bias is related to the effect of demand characteristics, but not 
identical to it (Weber and Cook 1972). To eliminate this confound, some researchers 
advocate the use of scales developed to capture individuals’ inclination to self-
enhancement (Crown & Marlowe 1960; Paulhus 1984), as covariates in the models 
assessing the effects of interest.  
In the phenomenological study of meditation, demand characteristics lurk in the large 
overlap between the semantics of meditation instructions taught or familiar to the 
participants, and the phrasing of self-report scales aimed at measuring the 
phenomenological dimensions of interest (e.g. terms such as present-centered and 
nonjudgmental, see Van Dam et al. 2012). Consequently, the magnitude of self-reported 
phenomenological features of meditation remain overshadowed by doubt, even when 
shown to be highly specific (see for example Kok & Singer 2016). Unfortunately, the 
usual concealment strategies can hardly be applied in this context, considering that 
participants are necessarily aware of the manipulation in so far as they are asked to 
implement it through the practice of meditation. 
This is not to say that all self-report results from meditation studies are inexorably 
confounded by the effect of demand characteristics. Even when demand characteristics 
are difficult to attenuate, one can look for evidence that supports an interpretation of 
the effect beyond their impact. In this study, we adopt a strategy of comparing certain 
factors (which are unaffected by demand characteristics or desirable responding) with 
self-reporting effects. We will illustrate this general approach in two ways: (i) within-
subject, by testing whether fluctuations of phenomenological self-reports correlate 
with relevant behavioral measures, and (ii) across subjects, by testing whether 
participants’ amount and structure of daily practice predict the self-reported effects on 
phenomenological dimensions. 
 
1.3 Methodological issue: quality active control group 
A critical effort of the Brain & Mindfulness project was to refine the matching between 
the control group and expert meditators. This was done primarily by training novices 
in different styles of meditation practice and by familiarizing them to different 
phenomenological categories of interest. A prominent issue in the field of 
neuroscientific studies on mindfulness meditation is the relative paucity of high quality 
active control (Goldberg et al. 2017). This issue has been repeatedly raised and 
suggestions of improvement have been discussed in the context of longitudinal studies 
(Davidson and Kaszniak 2015; Kuyken et al. 2016). However, cross-sectional studies 
with long term practitioners have received less methodological attention. In such 
studies, an active control group is often lacking or too basic when present. Of the 
nineteen independent cross-sectional studies on the neurofunctional effects of long 
term meditation in a recent meta-analysis (Fox et al. 2016), only seven included an 
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active control3. In six of these studies, meditation-naive participants received written 
and/or oral instructions and were encouraged to sustain a daily practice for 7 to 10 
days until the moment of the experiment. In the remaining study, participants received 
a brief training session by an experienced teacher on the day of the experiment 
(Kalyani et al. 2011). These approaches, while clearly better than not including an 
active control group, have several limitations. First, limited possibility for feedback or 
the lack of guidance by an experienced and qualified instructor induces a high risk of 
misinterpretations and inadequate implementations of the practices. Second, the short 
duration of the training limits the opportunities to engage with the practice. Here we 
addresses some of these issues by: 1) formally training meditation-naive participants 
in practices from the same meditation background as the long-term practitioners, 2) 
letting this training be provided by a qualified instructor in a context with attention to 
sufficient opportunity for guided practice and feedback, and 3) encouraging 
participants to maintain a daily practice at home for a minimum of 20 minutes a day 
for an extended duration (6 to 22 weeks depending on the availability of participants 
and experimental resources). We contend that these adaptations make it more likely 
for participants to reach a refined understanding of the various practices and 
experiential dimensions at hand. This training has the potential of reducing the risk 
that any group differences are merely driven by confounding factors (e.g. 
misunderstanding practices and/or unfamiliarity with meditation terminology for 
novices but not experts), instead of reflecting the true effect of interest, i.e. meditation 
expertise.  
We will first report the specifics of our meditation training protocol. Then we will 
provide empirical evidence for its effectiveness in teaching meditation-naive 
participants to use first-person categories to describe their conscious experience and 
discriminate between phenomenological dimensions.  
 
2. Methods 
 
2.1 Participants 
The first stage of the research included a meditation training weekend comprising of 
42 healthy participants novice to meditation. These individuals were recruited for their 
interest to learn meditation and their willingness to sustain a regular practice for 
several months. After a preliminary inclusion procedure (see study manual for details, 
Abdoun et al. 2018), participants were invited to attend a weekend-long training 
program in the Lyon Neuroscience Research Center. The program looked to support 
participants in developing a refined understanding of the states of consciousness 
involved in the following experimental study. 
                                                        
3 One study by Lutz et al. (2009) included samples from two other studies in the meta-analysis and was 
not taken into account.  We excluded studies on yoga and chanting. 
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The expert group was comprised of 30 healthy long-term practitioners with more than 
10,000 hours of formal meditation in their life and trained in the Kagyu and Nyingma 
schools of the Tibetan Buddhism. 
Among these participants, 25 trained novice practitioners and 25 expert practitioners 
participated to the MEG experiment described below. The novice and expert groups 
were matched in gender (16 and 15 males, respectively), age (53.9±7.1 and 51.6±8.0 
years, respectively; independent two-sample t=.84) and education (3.88±2.15 and 
3.20±2.16 years of higher education, respectively; independent two-sample t=.46). 
 
2.2 Meditation training protocol 
General outline 
The training protocol was based on Joy of Living (Rinpoche & Swanson 2007; Tergar 
2018), a secular meditation program aimed at Western audiences authored by Yongey 
Mingyur Rinpoche, a renowned master of Karma Kagyü and Nyingma schools of 
Tibetan Buddhism. This program was selected for its shared background with experts’ 
training. In its original format, the program is divided into three stages, each lasting 
two days; in addition, there are minimal practice requirements to attend stages 2 and 
3. For our training protocol, we drew from the material of stages 1 and 2, condensing 
them in a two-day format, and included adaptations to emphasize the specific 
dimensions of experience of interest to the research program.  
The training was provided by a qualified instructor with thirteen years of practice 
under the guidance of Mingyur Rinpoche, and eight years of teaching experience with 
the Joy of Living program. The training included teachings with the support of 
instruction videos, guided meditations and experiential exercises, question and answer 
sessions, as well as sufficient time to reflect and share within the group.  
The training allowed a basic understanding of a few selected phenomenological 
dimensions eligible for an active comparison with expert practitioners. In particular, 
the program introduced participants to the following dimensions: effort, aperture, 
absorption vs. meditative awareness, foreground vs. background awareness, 
equanimity, clarity (see Table 1 and supplementary materials). The discernment of 
these dimensions was implemented by introducing the lived phenomenology of these 
states and creating occasions for a direct exploration of them. To access both the 
experience and the meaning of meditation the teacher devised specific exercises with 
connected theoretical principles. As a sommelier apprentice does in tasting, savoring, 
comparing and sampling different wines under the guidance of a sommelier, 
participants were invited to learn, practice and distinguish few states of consciousness 
under the guidance of a meditation teacher in order to become progressively familiar 
with some meditative phenomenological dimensions commonly described in 
contemplative traditions.  
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The training followed a specific day program (table 2) which will be briefly described 
here.  
 
Day 1 
Participants were first introduced to the notion of mental ‘effort’ in meditation through 
an experiential exercise that involved listening to sounds. The rest of the day was spent 
exploring the concepts of ‘absorption and meditative awareness’. This exercise was 
done first by using the breath as an anchor for meditative awareness. Participants were 
asked to restrict their attention to the breath, to notice when their mind had wandered, 
and to return their attention to the breath when this happened. Later during the day, 
they were also asked to gradually explore more open forms of awareness, by opening 
up to sense experiences from the environment (e.g. sounds and vision). While doing so, 
participants also engaged in two other experiential exercises that introduced the 
concepts of ‘object orientation and aperture’ and ‘foreground and background 
awareness’. 
 
Day 2 
At the beginning of the day, participants continued to explore meditative awareness of 
the environment with various exercises including a walking meditation in open 
awareness. Then the instructor asked participants to form small groups and share their 
personal experience of the weekend. After some time, the small groups gathered to 
share collectively the problems and difficulties which had emerged, so that the teacher 
could provide adequate feedback. Then the concepts of ‘empathy and compassion’ were 
introduced and the teacher asked participants to briefly cultivate feelings of self-
compassion. After lunch, participants engaged in an exercise that involved switching 
between focused attention on, and open monitoring of, pain. The rest of the afternoon 
was spent further elucidating concepts of empathy and compassion, including an 
experiential exercise that presented images of people’s suffering to participants. 
Finally, during the closing meditation session, the importance of the intention to 
practice was discussed and emphasized. Participants were asked to fully engage in 
their own practice. 
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                                  Table 2. Program of the training weekend. 
 
 
2.3 Experiential exercises 
Throughout the training weekend, subjects were prompted to familiarize themselves 
with the dimensions of subjective experience that were going to be of interest in the 
neuroscientific experiments. This familiarization was carried out by using experiential 
exercises. During each exercise, a dimension or process was introduced in a more or 
less explicit form. Some dimensions were experienced and described in the context of 
guided meditation sessions and teachings, while other exercises were implemented 
with the specific aim of familiarizing subjects with a phenomenological dimension. We 
refer the reader to the Supplementary Materials for a full description of these exercises.  
At the end of the weekend, subjects received a document that briefly described each 
phenomenological dimension and reminded them how it was introduced by 
corresponding exercises during the weekend. 
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2.4 Compliance and engagement with practice 
The minimal goal of the training weekend was to give novice participants sufficient 
understanding and confidence to carry on practice autonomously, thus deepening their 
familiarity with the practices under study. 
At the end of the weekend, participants received an explanation of what was expected 
of them in terms of homework practice. Participants were advised to practice for 20 to 
30 minutes on a daily basis and to give equal importance to each of the three practices 
they had learned. In addition, they were asked to report the type and amount of 
practice in a practice logbook that was provided at the end of the meditation training 
weekend. In order to ensure truthful reports, participants were assured that non-
compliance to these recommendations would not call into question their participation 
to the study.  
Participants were provided with three 15-minute-long audio recordings of guided 
meditations by their instructor to aid their practice (one recording for each of the three 
meditative practices). However, they were strongly encouraged to avoid relying 
exclusively on them and to get used to meditating unguided. Participants were also 
given excerpts from the book Joy of Living, summarizing most of the teachings received 
during the weekend: the physical posture, the mental attitude, as well as various 
meditative and experiential exercises examined during the weekend (Rinpoche & 
Swanson 2007).  
 
2.4.1 Practice metrics  
Four metrics were used to assess participants’ home practice and degree of 
engagement: the proportion of days involving practice (hereafter referred to as 
Frequency of practice or simply Frequency); the average amount of practice during days 
with practice (hereafter, Session length); the daily average amount of practice, all days 
included (Intensity of practice or simply Intensity); and the total amount of practice 
(Experience)4. Figure 1 describes how these four metrics relate to each other and how 
they were derived from the data contained in the practice logbooks. These metrics 
were also explored in relation to phenomenological ratings and behavioral measures 
from the experiments. 
In addition, we calculated an index of balance between focus and open styles of 
practice, the Focus/Open Balance Index (hereafter referred to as FOB) for each 
participant. FOB is defined as the absolute difference between OM practice and FA 
practice, normalized by the sum of the two5: 
                                                        
4 Capitals are used to distinguish these terms from their common definitions. 
5 Note that for the calculation of FOB, using Intensity or Experience as measures of practice produce 
exactly the same result because, for each participant, Intensity is equal to Experience divided by a time 
factor (the number of days between the training week-end and the experiment). This factor would be 
cancelled out in the ratio present in the formula of FOB. 
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2.5 Protocol of the MEG experiment 
One major purpose of the meditation course undertaken by novice participants was to 
train them in using phenomenological categories of interest in the study. In order to 
validate that they understood these categories as intended and used them 
appropriately, we analyzed the self-report data from a magnetoencephalographic 
(MEG) experiment with a hierarchical repeated measure design that included several 
periods of FA and OM meditations, along with a control (resting-state, RS) period (fig. 
2).  
The experiment started with a staircase visual threshold calibration, followed by a 7 
minutes baseline period. Then, participants practiced FA and OM twice each, in 
sequences of approximately 24 minutes (figure 3a). Each sequence opened with a 7 
minutes-long block of meditation only, during which participants were presented with 
a 1.5°-wide white dot in the middle of a black screen (figure 3b). The instruction was 
to keep the gaze steady on the white dot; in FA, participants were additionally 
instructed to use that disk as a support for the attention (see detailed instructions in 
Supplementary). This first block was followed by three blocks lasting approximately 
Fig. 1 Four interrelated metrics were used to assess commitment to home practice.  
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5.5 minutes each, during which participants were instructed to maintain the meditative 
state while performing a simple visual conscious report task using a threshold stimulus 
embedded in a passive visual oddball paradigm (figure 3c). After each block, 
participants were invited to rate their experience over 6 different dimensions, using a 
7-point Likert-type item (figure 3d): Capacity to apply the meditation instructions, 
Stability of the mind, Clarity of the mind, Aperture of the field of awareness (see Table 
1 for definitions), Awareness of bodily sensations, and Wakefulness. Here we will limit 
our analysis to the dimensions featured in the phenomenological matrix: Stability, 
Clarity and Aperture6. Rating scales were thus introduced: “Compared to your usual 
experience, how would you rate the last block in terms of Stability/Clarity/Aperture?”  
 
 
 
                                                        
6 Just like for practice metrics, capitals are used for phenomenological dimensions to distinguish the 
terms from their common definitions. 
Fig. 2 The neurophenomenological experiment MIMOSA, the self-report data of which is used in the current article. A. 
Hierarchical structure of the experiment. After an initial resting state period (RS), the experiment was divided in 2 sessions, 
with a 5 to 20-minute break in between. Each session was divided in 2 sequences: one of FA and one of OM, presented in a 
randomized order. Therefore, there were 4 different combinations for the state order across the experiment: FA-OM-FA-OM 
(illustrated here), OM-FA-OM-FA, FA-OM-OM-FA, OM-FA-FA-OM; state order was counterbalanced across each group of 
participants. Each sequence consisted of 4 blocks: a first 7-minute block of “meditation only” (block 0) followed by three ~6-
minute-long blocks of “meditation + task” with dynamic stimuli (blocks 1-2-3). During the "meditation only", a white disk was 
displayed on a black background and participants were instructed to either use it as a support of their attention (in the case of 
FA) or to maintain their gaze on it (in OM blocks). During subsequent blocks, participants had to maintain the state induced in 
block 0, while going through 41 trials of a visual conscious report task. B. One trial of the task. During the task, a black-and-
colored checkerboard was continuously displayed at the center of the screen. Each trial consisted in a series of checkerboard 
reversals, the last color of which was systematically deviant from the previous ones of the series (passive color oddball 
paradigm). A trial lasted 3 to 7 reversals. In 36 of the 41 trials, a gabor patch set at threshold contrast was flashed for 50ms. At 
the end of the trial, a question mark prompted the participant to report whether they had consciously seen it or not. C. After 
each of the 17 blocks of the experiment, participants rated 6 different dimensions of their experience using a Likert item. 
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2.6 Statistical analyses 
Factorial models. ANOVAs were of type 2. Post hoc tests were performed using one- 
or two-sample t-tests, adjusted for family-wise multiple comparison using Tukey’s 
honestly significant difference (HSD) method. One-sample and paired two-sample tests 
were performed using the non-parametric Wilcoxon signed rank test. 
Linear regressions. All linear regressions were ordinary least square (OLS) 
regressions. 
Correlation between scale ratings and variability of response times. Outlier trials 
were defined as trials for which response times were not within 3 standard deviations 
from the mean value, for each participant, state and response type (yes/no), and 
excluded. An index of RT variability was as defined for each block as the standard 
deviation of RTs. Finally, we computed for each participant the Pearson correlation 
coefficient between Stability ratings and RT variability. We did the same with Clarity. 
Correlation coefficients were z-transformed for the purpose of statistical modelling 
and are noted z hereafter. The data from one subject was removed because it had no 
variance in the Clarity scale (the subject responded 6 in all blocks). 
Model selection for multiple regression analyses. For each of the effects related to 
phenomenological rating scores, we considered several potential predictors: metrics 
of home practice (Intensity, Experience and the balance between focus and open styles 
of practice), and an index of desirable responding (the score to the Balanced Inventory 
of Desirable Responding, BIDR). Practice data was missing for one participant, who was 
therefore excluded from subsequent analyses. We used an information-based model 
selection to determine the most important predictors for our data (Burnham and 
Anderson 2002). Model selection is well suited to multiple regression analysis when 
the number of predictors is high compared to the number of data points; in addition, it 
virtually guarantees that no potential effect of interest is missed, as long as it is 
included in the variable set. We performed model selection in 2 steps, using glmulti for 
R (Calcagno and de Mazancourt 2010). Firstly, we fitted all possible models that 
contained a subset of the predictors mentioned above and their two-way interactions, 
and that satisfied the marginality constraint (i.e. included all interaction terms as main 
effects). We used the corrected Akaike information criteria (AICc) as a measure of the 
quality of fit, because it is well adapted to small sample sizes (Hurvich and Tsai 1989). 
Secondly, we selected models that were within two information criteria (IC) units of 
the best fitting model (Burnham and Anderson 2002) for further consideration. 
Detailed results of the model selection output are presented in the Supplementary 
Materials. These include the relative evidence weight, a measure of relative importance 
of each term across the entire model space (Calcagno and de Mazancourt 2010), 
comprised between 0 and 1. 
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3. Results 
3.1 Structure of home practice 
The duration of participation ranged from 41 to 163 days (99.4 ± 31.4 days) after the 
training weekend. Average daily practice (= Intensity) ranged from 1.3 to 30.5 minutes 
(15.9 ± 7.3 minutes; supplementary fig. 1a, top left), suggesting that many participants 
fell short of the recommended amount of practice (20 to 30 minutes a day). However, 
when average daily practice was calculated over the number of days with at least some 
practice (rather than all days), the obtained Session length was found to range from 
14.0 to 33.1 minutes (21.2 ± 5.5 minutes; supplementary fig. 1a, bottom right).  
Participants dedicated 45.2 ± 16.8% of their practice time to OM (Open Monitoring), 
33.4 ± 17.5% to FA (Focused Attention) and 21.4 ± 9.8% to CO (Compassion). A one-
way repeated measure ANOVA revealed a significant difference between the 
proportion of time dedicated to the different practices (F (2,80) =16.95, p<.0001, 
η²=.30). Post hoc paired t-tests revealed that all comparisons of pairs of practices were 
significant (supplementary fig. 1c). 
Intensity of practice decreased linearly over weeks (supplementary fig. 2a; R²adj=.87, 
p<.001, β=-.44, 95% CI [-.53, -.35]). A large portion of this drop (80.9%) is imputable 
to a sharp decline of Frequency of practice over weeks (supplementary fig. 2b; 
R²adj=.92, p<.001, β=-.14, 95% CI [-.16, -.12]). The remaining 19.1% is due to a slight 
shortening of practice sessions (supplementary fig. 2c; R²adj=.22, β=-.10, 95% CI [-.18, 
-.01]). 
Taken together, these results show that participants managed to follow the 
recommendation of 20-to-30-minute-long practice sessions throughout the study but 
failed to practice on a daily basis and were increasingly inclined to skip days. 
 
3.2 Efficacy of phenomenological training 
We tested three predictions that, if verified, could provide evidence that the 
phenomenological training was successful. We examined whether the responses of the 
novices to the rating scales in the MEG experiment i) were sensitive to the meditation 
state, in a way consistent with the known phenomenology of mindfulness practices 
(Lutz et al. 2015), ii) exhibited classic temporal dynamics such as dose and fatigue 
effects, and iii) were functionally informative, as would be suggested by correlations 
with behavioral measures. 
In each instance, we tested whether desirable responding and/or features of 
participants’ home practice predicted the effects observed on self-reports. 
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3.2.1 Effect of states on self-reports 
In the phenomenological model introduced in Lutz et al. 2015, Stability and Clarity are 
described as secondary qualities that are both increased when practicing either FA and 
OM (compared to mind-wandering), and even more so with expertise. In contrast, 
Aperture is hypothesized to increase specifically during the practice of OM.  
In order to test this prediction, we modeled the ratings per scale using a two-way 
ANOVA model with state (RS, FA, OM) as a within-subject factor and group (novices, 
experts) as a between-subjects factor (fig. 3). For Aperture, we found a main effect of 
state (F (2,96) =19.54, p<0.001). Post-hoc t-tests showed that there was no significant 
difference between RS and FA (p>.32), while Aperture was reported significantly 
higher in OM than in FA and RS (p<.0001). For both Stability and Clarity, a state by 
group interaction was found (F (2,96) =5.19, p=.007 and F (2,96) =10.22, p<.001, 
respectively). Further post-hoc t-tests showed that experts’ ratings differed 
significantly in both dimensions between the control condition and each of the two 
meditation states (all p<.0001), but not between FA and OM (both p>.92). In contrast, 
there was no difference in either Stability nor Clarity, across the 3 conditions, in the 
novice group (all p>.24). To summaries, participants’ ratings corroborated the 
hypothesized phenomenological pattern in the expert group for all three secondary 
dimensions tested, but only for Aperture in novices. 
 
 
 
 
Fig 3 Effects of meditation states on three dimensions of experience reported by the 
participants. Both novice and expert groups reported greater Aperture of the attentional field 
during OM compared to RS and FA. Experts also reported greater Stability and Clarity during 
meditation compared to RS, but not novices. 
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Predictors of the state effect on Aperture 
When participants are asked to rate the broadness of their attentional scope (i.e. 
Aperture) in two different meditation states referred to as “focus attention” and “open 
presence”, the fact that the expected response lies in the very names of the state 
conditions can hardly remain unnoticed. Thus, we cannot exclude the possibility that 
participants’ responses were influenced by their willingness to please the 
experimenter, and/or to show that they have correctly understood the meditation 
instructions. 
Another, non-trivial hypothesis is that novice participants develop the ability to 
differentiate a state of focus attention and a state of broader awareness by getting 
equally familiar with both attentional styles. Said otherwise, we expect participants 
who have had more practice in OM than in FA to have more ease opening (or more 
difficulty narrowing) their attentional scope than participants who have developed an 
equal familiarity of the two styles of practice. As a result, we would expect the latter to 
better differentiate FA and OM on the Aperture scale than the former. The same 
reasoning can be straightforwardly applied, mutatis mutandis, to participants who 
favored FA over OM. To test this prediction, we included an index of balance between 
FA and OM (FOB), along with other practice metrics (Intensity and Experience) and an 
index of desirable responding (BIDR) in the set of variables tested for model selection 
(see Methods, Variable selection). 
Three models survived the model selection procedure: the best one included a 
significant FOB-by-Experience interaction (model A1), while the other two contained 
a significant FOB-by-Intensity interaction (models A2 and A3; see details in 
supplementary table 1). BIDR was not present in any of these models, and its evidence 
across all models was found relatively low (.31). The FOB-by-Experience interaction 
had a higher evidence across model space than the FOB-by-Intensity interaction (.55 
and .31, respectively). To illustrate how the balance between focus and open styles of 
practice interacts with the amount of practice, we performed a Johnson-Neyman post-
hoc analysis of the interaction in model A1, using FOB as a predictor and Experience as 
a moderator. We found that for participants who had accumulated more than 23.9 
hours of practice, the FOB index positively predicts (p<.05) the self-reported difference 
in Aperture between FA and OM during the MEG experiment. 
 
3.2.2 Temporal dynamics 
The absence of effect on self-reported Stability and Clarity in novices over the 
experiment does not necessarily rule out the possibility that novice participants used 
these categories appropriately and informatively. For example, averaging ratings over 
the entire experiment could have occluded temporal effects. This is indeed what we 
have observed in our data (supplementary figure 3). We used a linear mixed model to 
account for the nested nature of the MEG experiment structure (blocks within 
sequences within sessions). The model included all possible interactions in fixed 
effects, as well as random subjects intercepts and by-subject random slopes across 
blocks, sequences and sessions. We found an effect of block on Stability ratings only 
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for the first sequence of each session (i.e. sequences 3 and 4; cf. fig. 2). The same 
model on Clarity ratings produces the same result. Post-hoc pairwise t-tests revealed 
a significant difference between blocks 1 and 3 in sequences 3 and 4, but no pairwise 
differences in other sequences.  
 
Predictors of the fatigue effect 
The decrease of self-reported Stability and Clarity in novices after four blocks (~ 24 
minutes) of meditation may reflect fatigue. This is not surprising considering that most 
novices were not used to meditate for more than approximately 20 minutes during 
their daily home practice (see supplementary fig. 1a). A corollary of this interpretation 
is that the longer and more frequently the participants were used to meditate, the less 
likely they should be to experience fatigue in the context of the experiment. We tested 
this prediction by modeling a fatigue index, defined for each participant as the 
difference between their ratings in block 3 and block 1 of sequence 17, averaged over 
the dimensions of Stability and Clarity. Five models were selected (supplementary 
table 2). Intensity was present in 2 of them as a main effect, and in 2 others in 
interaction with BIDR. Surprisingly, FOB was present as a main effect in 4 out of the 5 
selected models. Across all models, FOB and Intensity had the highest relative weighted 
evidence (.74 and .66, respectively) closely followed by BIDR (.60).  
The fact that FOB was found as important as Intensity suggests that the mitigating 
effect of practice Intensity on Fatigue is driven by the level of engagement in a specific 
style of practice. To explore this idea, we performed a second model selection where 
we replaced Intensity and FOBI by the two subcomponents of Intensity, Intensityfocus 
and Intensityopen, corresponding to the two styles of practice. For the sake of 
parsimony, we also removed Experience, which was already found of low importance. 
The only selected model from this variable space had a single regressor, IntensityFA 
(p=.034, β=.085, 95% CI [.007, .162]; supplementary table 3). 
 
                                                        
7 The same analysis based on data combining sequences 1 and 3 leads to te the same conclusions. 
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3.2.3 Correlation with behavioral measures 
Previous studies have reported intra-individual variability of performance (most 
notably response times) as a good predictor of whether the participant is on-task at a 
given moment or not (Batian and Sackur 2013; Seli et al. 2013). Based on this literature, 
we predicted that self-reported Stability, but not other dimensions, would be 
significantly correlated to variability of response times at the level of individual 
participants. We chose Clarity as a control dimension, for its similar pattern of 
sensitivity to state and group (see fig. 4). 
One sample Wilcoxon signed rank tests show that the RT variability correlated 
negatively with Stability (z=-.26, 95% CI [-.40, -.12], p<.0003) as expected, but also with 
Clarity (z=-.14, 95% CI [-.28, -.003, p=.046) (fig. 6a, left). However, a two-sample paired 
test between zstability and zclarity was found significant (p=0.041). Thus, even though self-
reported ratings of Stability and Clarity were strongly correlated within subjects 
(Wilcoxon signed rank test on z-transformed correlation coefficients: z=.77, 95%CI 
[.62, .94], p<.0001), the association with RT variability was significantly stronger for 
Stability than for Clarity. This suggests that although the phenomenological 
dimensions of Stability and Clarity tend to fluctuate naturally together, novices are able 
to differentiate them functionally in their reports, just like experts (fig. 6a, right).  
Fig. 4 Evolution of self-reported Stability and Clarity in novices during the four blocks of the first 
meditation sequence. (a) There was a two-stage temporal pattern; namely, a boost of Stability during 
the second block (Δ=.64, 95% CI [.03, 1.25], p=.036), followed by fatigue in subsequent blocks 
(Stability: Δ=-.68, 95% CI [-1.29, -.07], p=.023; Clarity: Δ=-.68, 95% CI [-1.20, -.16], p=.005). (b) This 
fatigue effect was reduced in those novices who engaged the most in focus (left) but not in open (right) 
styles of meditation. Errors bars are 95% confidence intervals. Significance levels: *: p<.05; **: p<.01 
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In order to further assess the specificity of these findings, we repeated the same 
analysis using mean RT (instead of RT variability). We found that neither Stability nor 
Clarity correlated significantly with mean RT (both p>0.1). 
 
Predictors of the phenomenological specificity 
Based on these results, we further hypothesized that this fine differentiation could 
have been implicitly trained in our novice group through the practice of meditation. 
Indeed, the reflexive quality cultivated in contemplative practices is expected to 
improve one’s familiarity with the specific phenomenal characteristics of different 
experiential dimensions. To test this prediction, we defined an index of 
phenomenological specificity as the difference between zstab, the z-transformed 
Pearson correlation coefficient between Stability ratings and RT variability, and zclar, 
the analogue measure for Clarity ratings. Only one model survived selection 
(supplementary table 4), and it contained a single regressor, Experience (p=.034, β=-
0.011, 95% CI [-.021, -.002]; fig. 6b). Across all models, Experience had by far the 
highest evidence weight (.84).  
 
 
Fig. 6 Self-reports from novices appear to be functionally relevant. (a, left) The variability of response 
times, for example, correlates negatively with self-reported stability. It also correlates negatively with 
clarity, but significantly less so, indicating that these two dimensions are properly differentiated by novice 
participants. (b) Functional differentiation of stability and clarity was higher in those participants with the 
highest amount of practice (right), while intensity of practice was not a reliable predictor (left). Errors bars 
are 95% confidence intervals. Significance levels: *: p<.05; **: p<.01; ***: p<.001 
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4. Discussion      
We described a meditation training protocol intended for naive candidates with no 
prior experience of meditation. We designed this protocol out of the need for a high-
quality control group for a neurophenomenological study on the effects of meditation 
state and expertise in meditation on brain, behavior and physiology. The aim of the 
training was twofold: 1) to provide participants with sufficient background knowledge 
and direct experience with three types of meditations so that they could sustain a 
regular practice for an extended period of time, and be comfortable to practice in the 
laboratory context for the experimental tasks of the study; 2) to establish a common 
ground of relevant phenomenological categories with the participants, in order to 
allow them to report their experience during meditation states reliably. 
Overall we found evidence that the phenomenological training was successful in the 
sense that participants’ self-reports: i) were reliable and sensitive to the meditation 
state manipulation, ii) exhibited expected temporal dynamics such as dose and fatigue 
effects, and iii) were functionally informative; in addition each of these effects was 
more strongly predicted by the amount and structure of participants’ practice than by 
desirable responding as indexed by the BIDR questionnaire.  
    
4.1 Motivation and compliance 
In meditation research, motivation is often discussed for its potential confounding 
effect that limits the interpretability of longitudinal studies (Eberth & Sedlmeier 2012). 
On the other hand, motivation of novice control participants can be considered a 
strength for the cross-sectional study of expertise as expert meditators, in so far as they 
dedicate a large of amount of time and resources to their training and practice, are 
expected to have strong motivation. Our study was highly demanding for the novices, 
as they had to engage in daily practice and participate in 6 to 8 experimental sessions 
over the course of several months. This, along with the multi-step recruitment 
procedure, acted as a filter for motivation.  
The high level of motivation of the novice participants was reflected in the satisfactory 
level of commitment to the practice maintained throughout their participation to the 
study. Three months after their training, they were still accomplishing more than half 
of the prescribed amount of practice, in the absence of any reminders or booster 
sessions. This even though they were assured that dropping the practice would remain 
without consequences for their participation to the study and financial compensation. 
This laxity given to participants, while having the effect of revealing their intrinsic 
motivation, is not without shortcomings. Compassion meditation, for example, was 
largely neglected. This might be related to the dense set-up of our initiation program, 
which attempted to train the participants in three different forms of meditation in just 
two consecutive days. In contrast, the original Joy of living program on which the 
training was based requires that practitioners first engage in 6 months of regular 
practice before they can receive teachings on compassion. However, this shortcoming 
has limited consequences for our study as the goal was primarily to get participants 
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accustomed to the concept and practice of compassion and sensitize them to its 
difference with empathic resonance. 
A large majority (75%) of participants favored the practice of OM at home. This may 
come as a surprise considering that in many Buddhist contemplative traditions, OM 
practices are considered more advanced and are approached only after some training 
in FA (Lutz et al. 2008). However, this bias towards OM is consistent with the deliberate 
stance adopted by Mingyur Rinpoche, author of the Joy of living program, whereby one 
is invited to enter the field of open awareness from the outset. 
 
4.2 Phenomenological proficiency 
During their training, novice participants were introduced to phenomenological 
categories with the help of practical, experiential exercises. Using rating scales and 
behavioral data from one of the experiments to which they later participated, we have 
described three effects that can be interpreted as reflecting an effect of practice, 
phenomenal training, or both. Based on both a priori considerations and control for 
desirable responding, we have systematically assessed the potential confounding effect 
of demand characteristics and limited support for it. We review the evidence (see also 
table 3) and discuss other potential alternate interpretations below. 
First, novice participants reported greater Aperture in OM compared to FA, just like 
experts, suggesting that they were able to distinguish the two practices. In addition, we 
found that for participants who practiced the most (more than 24 hours in total), their 
response on the Aperture scale was driven by their practice structure: the better they 
balanced focus and open styles of meditation, the larger the divergence in Aperture 
they reported. This finding suggests that equal familiarity with different states is 
important for their optimal dissociation, at least at a beginner level. 
Second, self-reported Stability and Clarity had a two-stage dynamic during a series of 
4 consecutive six-minute blocks of meditation, with a statistically significant decrease 
between the second and the last block. We interpret this phenomenon as a fatigue 
effect, rather than an effect of scale misuse. This is based on the observation that this 
decrease was negatively and specifically associated to participants’ Intensity of 
practicing focus attention. Interestingly, this specific association is consistent with the 
role of concentrative practices in Buddhist contemplative traditions. These practices 
are used as training to stabilize attention and other basic qualities such as clarity and 
effortlessness, before applying them to more advanced practices. However, this 
correlation is not necessarily indicative of an effect of training: it may be mediated by 
an individual trait (e.g. conscientiousness or stamina), present even before the 
meditation training, that could predict both sustained diligence in the practice of (the 
relatively effortful) focus attention, and endurance during meditation sessions in the 
MEG experiment. Regardless, the index of desirable responding was of lesser 
importance in comparison.  
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Predictors’ evidence 
across model space 
DV Interpretation Level of DC BIDR Practice 
ܽ݌ݎைெെܽ݌ݎி஺  Discrimination of states strong .31 .55 
FOB x 
Experience 
ݏݐܾଷ െ ݏݐܾଵ
ʹ
൅ ݈ܿݎ െ ݈ܿݎଵʹ  
Fatigue moderate .40 .74 Intensityfocus 
ݖோ்௏ǡ௦௧௕ െ ݖோ்௏ǡ௖௟௥  
Discrimination of 
phenomenological 
dimensions 
none .23 .84 Experience 
 
 
 
Third, we showed that participants’ ratings of the dimension Stability were 
functionally relevant, as they correlated with the variability of their response times. 
Using Clarity as a control dimension, we found that this functional relationship was 
specific. This finding suggests that participants were able to make fine distinctions 
between two close dimensions (this effect was true for both novice and expert 
practitioners). Regarding novices, we found that the more Experience they had at the 
day of the experiment, the sharper their phenomenological acuity. Here again, in the 
absence of longitudinal data, the correlation cannot be treated as direct evidence for a 
causal link involving learning. However, a noteworthy difference with the fatigue effect 
described above is that the practice metric that predicted phenomenological acuity 
(accumulated Experience) is not confounded with participants’ assiduity, because it 
depends as much on Intensity of practice as on the time elapsed between the training 
weekend and the experiment (which was variable and random across the group). 
Considering that Intensity of practice did not predict phenomenological acuity, it 
appears that a likely explanation of these results is that novice participants became 
Table 3 Summary of experimental results on self-reports of phenomenological dimensions during 
meditation states. All reported effects (discrimination of states, fatigue and discrimination of 
phenomenological dimensions) were associated to specific aspects of participants’ home practice. The 
importance of desirable responding score as a predictor was never higher than practice. DV: dependent 
variable; DC: demand characteristics; BIDR: Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding; FOB: focus/open 
practice balance index; Stb: Stability; Clr: Clarity; Apr: Aperture; RTV: response time variability. 
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more familiar with the phenomenal richness of their experience throughout the regular 
practice of meditation, and more proficient in reporting it with specificity and subtlety. 
Taken together, our data support the claim that the novices trained in our study had 
some phenomenological literacy and were able to report about qualities of their 
experience in an appropriate, meaningful and informative way, even though in some 
cases we could not conclusively rule out the possibility for an additional effect of 
demand characteristics. 
 
4.3 Training and practice 
We have introduced several metrics of practice beyond the oft-used total amount. 
Although these metrics are derived from each other, they are not entirely collinear. In 
particular, our study was able to dissociate Experience (= total amount of practice) 
from Intensity (= daily average of practice) by having a large variability in the time 
elapsed between the training and the experiment, across the novice group (from 27 to 
133 days; M = 79, SD = 29). Moreover, we showed that these two metrics could be 
functionally dissociated when correlated with subjective ratings or behavioral 
measures. Such dissociations could point to potentially different mechanisms of trait 
changes brought about by the practice of meditation. This observation is consistent 
with the finding that intensive retreat practice, but not routine daily practice is 
associated with reliable differences in resting respiration rate in experienced 
meditators (Wielgosz et al. 2016). Future investigation of the mechanisms of 
meditation would benefit from a systematic exploration of various practice metrics and 
their relation to experimental outcomes, for both novice and expert practitioners.  
What is the minimum amount of practice that should be required from novice 
participants for the quality of their phenomenological self-reports to match those of 
experts’, on the dimensions explored here? Based on our experimental results, we can 
provide tentative, rough estimates. In our samples of participants, 20 to 40 hours were 
necessary for novices to reach a level of phenomenal specificity comparable to the one 
of experts; a minimum of 20 minutes of practice per day on average and a high balance 
between practices (no more than 40% bias) enabled novice participants to 
differentiate different styles of meditation as well as expert practitioners. All these 
criteria are much higher than what most past cross-sectional studies of meditation 
expertise have required from their control participants (Fox et al. 2016) but are 
sufficiently low to be practically accessible and implemented in future studies. 
 
4.4 Self-rating scales 
We used self-rating scales as tools to help participants translate qualities of their lived 
experience into quantities that can be manipulated, transformed and statistically 
analyzed just like any other numerical measure. Such tools raise vexed issues: for 
example, how can we know that participants use the scales as intended? How can we 
know that participants, or groups of participants, are not construing a given scale in 
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widely different ways? How can we even be sure that a given participant is consistent 
in the way she uses a scale over time or across experimental conditions, for that 
matter? To take the example of stability of meditation states, we may argue that 
stability refers to qualitatively different experiences in FA and OM. In FA, stability 
reflects the sustained focus on a given object and therefore the stability of mental 
content. In contrast, OM stability reflects the absence of grasping and as such, should 
not be affected by variations in content. 
Our approach of phenomenological training pragmatically addresses the issue of 
interpretation by mapping linguistic definitions of categories onto features of lived 
experience induced and revealed by simple experiential exercises. Performing these 
exercises in the context of a group, under the guidance of an instructor and with the 
possibility to share their understanding and reflect collectively, has the potential to 
attenuate idiosyncratic apprehensions of the phenomenological categories. In addition, 
concerns related to the subjectiveness and incommensurability of self-reported ratings 
were pragmatically addressed using within-subject designs and analyses.  
Even if our results suggest that our methodological approach was effective in detecting 
phenomenological fluctuations, it is worth mentioning the low variance of our self-
rating data. As an example, 41 out of 50 of our participants used only three values out 
of the seven available in the Stability and Clarity scales; for Clarity, 18 out of 50 
participants used only two values. This suggests a limitation of our experimental 
design and/or our training program. For instance, the relatively short duration of 
laboratory experiments may not be sufficient to experience large fluctuations in these 
dimensions. Finer rating scales could be used as a compensation to increase data 
variance. Another possibility is that our training program was insufficient in 
developing participants’ fine-grained sensitivity to these scales. Further 
methodological work is needed to address these limitations.    
 
5. Conclusion 
The role of meditation practice for cognitive science was extensively discussed by 
Varela et al. (1991), becoming a part of their ‘enactive’ approach and then of Varela’s 
neurophenomenological program (Varela 1996). We have provided preliminary 
evidence that meditation experience improves the reliability of self-report data by 
improving the functional specificity of self-reports, and by shielding them from the 
effect of demand characteristics. However, several questions remain open and should 
be addressed by future research. 
First, the impact of training on the quality of first-person data should be more 
rigorously assessed using high-quality, longitudinal, randomized controlled trials. In 
particular, future work should tackle the open question of whether specific 
phenomenological training such as the one we implemented through experiential 
exercises is required to improve the quality of first-person data, or whether meditation 
practice is sufficient in itself. 
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In order to evaluate the confounding effect of demand characteristics on our first 
person-data, we have used an index of desirable responding. Unfortunately, the validity 
of the questionnaires designed for this purpose, including the one used in this study, 
has been frequently questioned as they are unable to distinguish between genuine 
personality traits and self-enhancement (Paulhus 2002). Special attention should be 
given to more recent efforts to overcome these limitations using alternative, and 
potentially complementary approaches (Paulhus et al. 2003; Kwan et al. 2004). 
We have provided evidence for reliable first person reports of the phenomenology of 
meditation experience. However, the generalizability of the phenomenal insight 
provided by meditation practice to other, non-meditation-related applications remains 
disputed (see Khalsa et al. 2008 for an example of negative result) and warrant more 
research. 
Rather than provide a standardized, validated, ready for use protocol, our intention 
was to raise methodological concerns pertaining to the quality of control groups used 
in cross-sectional studies of meditation, and to argue for the possibility of obtaining 
informative experiential self-reports from adequately trained participants. Although 
we described in detail the protocol that we designed to address these issues, including 
the experiential exercises used for the phenomenological training of the participants, 
we remain aware that our approach is tailored to the specific context of our study, and 
to a particular phenomenological model of meditation among others (Bodhi 2011; 
Lindahl et al. 2017; Van Dam et al. 2017). Still, we hope that the process, rather than 
the content, will inspire researchers in the field to further explore these critical issues. 
 
Ethics 
The entirety of the Brain & Mindfulness project, including the meditation training 
weekend and the MEG experiment, was approved by the local ethics committee (CPP 
Sud-Est III, authorization number 2015-A01472-47). All participants signed an 
informed consent prior to their participation to the meditation training. 
Acknowledgements 
The study was funded by an European Research Council Consolidator Grant awarded 
to Antoine Lutz (project BRAINandMINDFULNESS, number 617739). The 
magnetoencephalography experiment was partially funded by a Mind & Life Institute 
Varela Award 2018 granted to Oussama Abdoun. 
The authors would like to express their gratitude to Titi Tran for leading and guiding 
the meditation training, as well as Kristien Aarts, Kelly Assouly, Camille Fakche, Lili 
Mondragon, Eléa Perraud, Pascale Saulnier and Grégoire Verdelet for their help in 
organizing the training weekend. We also thank Romain Bouet and Charlie Vernot-
Rochey for fruitful discussions on statistical analysis and model selection, and Kristien 
Aarts for valuable comments on the manuscript. 
All the authors of the present paper declare no conflicting interests. 
 
 
77 
 
References 
 
Abdoun, O., Zorn, J., Fucci, E., Perraud, E., Aarts, K., & Lutz, A. (2018). Brain & Mindfulness 
project manual. OSF. Retrieved from https://osf.io/dbwch/ 
Baer, R. A., Rinaldo, J. C., & Berry, D. T. R. (2003). Self-Report Distortions (Including Faking, 
Lying, Malingering, Social Desirability). In Encyclopedia of Psychological Assessment (Vols. 1–
2, pp. 862–866). London: SAGE Publications Ltd. https://doi.org/10.4135/9780857025753 
Baer, R. A., Smith, G. T., Hopkins, J., Krietemeyer, J., & Toney, L. (2006). Using Self-Report 
Assessment Methods to Explore Facets of Mindfulness. Assessment, 13(1), 27–45. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1073191105283504 
Bastian, M., & Sackur, J. (2013). Mind wandering at the fingertips: automatic parsing of 
subjective states based on response time variability. Perception Science, 4, 573. 
https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00573 
Bitbol, M., & Petitmengin, C. (2013). On the possibility and reality of introspection. Kairos. 
Revista de Filosofia & Ciência, (6), 173–198. 
Bodhi, B. (2011). What does mindfulness really mean? A canonical perspective. Contemporary 
Buddhism, 12(1), 19–39. https://doi.org/10.1080/14639947.2011.564813 
Bornemann, B., & Singer, T. (2017). Taking time to feel our body: Steady increases in 
heartbeat perception accuracy and decreases in alexithymia over 9 months of contemplative 
mental training. Psychophysiology, 54(3), 469–482. https://doi.org/10.1111/psyp.12790 
Burnham, K. P., & Anderson, D. R. (2002). Model Selection and Multimodel Inference: A 
Practical Information-Theoretic Approach (2nd ed.). New York: Springer-Verlag. Retrieved 
from //www.springer.com/us/book/9780387953649 
Calcagno, V., & de Mazancourt, C. (2010). glmulti: An R Package for Easy Automated Model 
Selection with (Generalized) Linear Models. Journal of Statistical Software, 34(12). 
https://doi.org/10.18637/jss.v034.i12 
Chambers, R., Gullone, E., & Allen, N. B. (2009). Mindful emotion regulation: An integrative 
review. Clinical Psychology Review, 29(6), 560–572. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cpr.2009.06.005 
Costall, A. (2006). ‘Introspectionism’ and the mythical origins of scientific psychology. 
Consciousness and Cognition, 15(4), 634–654. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2006.09.008 
Crowne, D. P., & Marlowe, D. (1960). A new scale of social desirability independent of 
psychopathology. Journal of Consulting Psychology, 24(4), 349–354. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/h0047358 
Davidson, R. J., & Kaszniak, A. W. (2015). Conceptual and methodological issues in research 
on mindfulness and meditation. American Psychologist, 70(7), 581–592. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/a0039512 
Depraz, N., Varela, F., & Vermersch, P. (2003). On Becoming Aware: A Pragmatics of 
Experiencing. John Benjamins. 
 
 
78 
 
Eberth, J., & Sedlmeier, P. (2012). The Effects of Mindfulness Meditation: A Meta-Analysis. 
Mindfulness, 3(3), 174–189. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12671-012-0101-x 
Fox, K. C. R., Dixon, M. L., Nijeboer, S., Girn, M., Floman, J. L., Lifshitz, M., … Christoff, K. (2016). 
Functional neuroanatomy of meditation: A review and meta-analysis of 78 functional 
neuroimaging investigations. Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews, 65, 208–228. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2016.03.021 
Goldberg, S. B., Wielgosz, J., Dahl, C., Schuyler, B., MacCoon, D. S., Rosenkranz, M., … Davidson, 
R. J. (2016). Does the Five Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire measure what we think it does? 
Construct validity evidence from an active controlled randomized clinical trial. Psychological 
Assessment, 28(8), 1009–1014. https://doi.org/10.1037/pas0000233 
Goldberg, Simon B., Tucker, R. P., Greene, P. A., Simpson, T. L., Kearney, D. J., & Davidson, R. J. 
(2017). Is mindfulness research methodology improving over time? A systematic review. 
PLOS ONE, 12(10), e0187298. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0187298 
Hasenkamp, W., & Thompson, E. (2013). Examining subjective experience: advances in 
neurophenomenology. Research topic (articles published July–November). Frontiers in 
Human Neuroscience. 
Hölzel, B. K., Lazar, S. W., Gard, T., Schuman-Olivier, Z., Vago, D. R., & Ott, U. (2011). How Does 
Mindfulness Meditation Work? Proposing Mechanisms of Action From a Conceptual and 
Neural Perspective. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 6(6), 537–559. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1745691611419671 
Hurlburt, R. T., & Heavey, C. L. (2001). Telling what we know: describing inner experience. 
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 5(9), 400–403. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1364-6613(00)01724-
1 
Hurvich, C. M., & Tsai, C.-L. (1989). Regression and Time Series Model Selection in Small 
Samples. Biometrika, 76(2), 297–307. https://doi.org/10.2307/2336663 
Husserl, E. (n.d.). On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893–1917) 
(1991st Edition). Kluwer Academic Publishers. Retrieved from 
https://www.amazon.com/Phenomenology-Consciousness-Internal-1893-1917-
Husserliana/dp/0792308913/ref=mt_hardcover?_encoding=UTF8&me=&qid=&dpID=31wv
VExVSML&preST=_SY291_BO1,204,203,200_QL40_&dpSrc=detail 
Jack, A., & Roepstorff, A. (Eds.). (2003). Trusting the Subject? Part 1. Journal of Consciousness 
Studies. 
Jack, A., & Roepstorff, A. (Eds.). (2004). Trusting the Subject? Part 2. Journal of Consciousness 
Studies. 
Kabat-Zinn, J. (1994). Wherever you go, there you are: Mindfulness meditation in everyday life. 
Hyperion. 
Kalyani, B. G., Venkatasubramanian, G., Arasappa, R., Rao, N. P., Kalmady, S. V., Behere, R. V., … 
Gangadhar, B. N. (2011). Neurohemodynamic correlates of “OM” chanting: A pilot functional 
magnetic resonance imaging study. International Journal of Yoga, 4(1), 3. 
https://doi.org/10.4103/0973-6131.78171 
Kok, B. E., & Singer, T. (2017). Phenomenological Fingerprints of Four Meditations: 
Differential State Changes in Affect, Mind-Wandering, Meta-Cognition, and Interoception 
 
 
79 
 
Before and After Daily Practice Across 9 Months of Training. Mindfulness, 8(1), 218–231. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s12671-016-0594-9 
Koole, S. L., Govorun, O., Cheng, C. M., & Gallucci, M. (2009). Pulling yourself together: 
Meditation promotes congruence between implicit and explicit self-esteem. Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology, 45(6), 1220–1226. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2009.05.018 
Kuyken, W., Warren, F. C., Taylor, R. S., Whalley, B., Crane, C., Bondolfi, G., … Dalgleish, T. 
(2016). Efficacy of Mindfulness-Based Cognitive Therapy in Prevention of Depressive 
Relapse: An Individual Patient Data Meta-analysis From Randomized Trials. JAMA Psychiatry, 
73(6), 565–574. https://doi.org/10.1001/jamapsychiatry.2016.0076 
Kwan, V. S. Y., John, O. P., Kenny, D. A., Bond, M. H., & Robins, R. W. (2004). Reconceptualizing 
Individual Differences in Self-Enhancement Bias: An Interpersonal Approach. Psychological 
Review, 111(1), 94–110. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.111.1.94 
Lang, P. J., Bradley, M. M., & Cuthbert, B. N. (1997). International affective picture system 
(IAPS): Technical manual and affective ratings. NIMH Center for the Study of Emotion and 
Attention, 39–58. 
Leigh, J., Bowen, S., & Marlatt, G. A. (2005). Spirituality, mindfulness and substance abuse. 
Addictive Behaviors, 30(7), 1335–1341. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.addbeh.2005.01.010 
Lindahl, J. R., Fisher, N. E., Cooper, D. J., Rosen, R. K., & Britton, W. B. (2017). The varieties of 
contemplative experience: A mixed-methods study of meditation-related challenges in 
Western Buddhists. PLOS ONE, 12(5), e0176239. 
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0176239 
Lutz, A., Jha, A. P., Dunne, J. D., & Saron, C. D. (2015). Investigating the phenomenological 
matrix of mindfulness-related practices from a neurocognitive perspective. American 
Psychologist, 70(7), 632–658. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0039585 
Lutz, A., Slagter, H. A., Dunne, J. D., & Davidson, R. J. (2008). Attention regulation and 
monitoring in meditation. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 12(4), 163–169. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2008.01.005 
Lutz, A., & Thompson, E. (2003). Neurophenomenology: Integrating subjective experience 
and brain dynamics in the neuroscience of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 
10(9–10), 31–52. 
Melloni, M., Sedeño, L., Couto, B., Reynoso, M., Gelormini, C., Favaloro, R., … Ibanez, A. (2013). 
Preliminary evidence about the effects of meditation on interoceptive sensitivity and social 
cognition. Behavioral and Brain Functions, 9, 47. https://doi.org/10.1186/1744-9081-9-47 
Nisbett, R. E., & Wilson, T. D. (1977). Telling more than we can know: Verbal reports on 
mental processes. Psychological Review, 84(3), 231–259. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-
295X.84.3.231 
Orne, M. T. (1962). On the social psychology of the psychological experiment: With particular 
reference to demand characteristics and their implications. American Psychologist, 17(11), 
776–783. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0043424 
 
 
80 
 
Paulhus, D. L. (2002). Socially desirable responding: The evolution of a construct. In H. I. 
Braun, D. N. Jackson, & D. E. Wiley (Eds.), The role of constructs in psychological and 
educational measurement (pp. 61–84). Routledge. 
Paulhus, Delroy L. (1984). Two-component models of socially desirable responding. Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology, 46(3), 598–609. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-
3514.46.3.598 
Paulhus, Delroy L., Harms, P. D., Bruce, M. N., & Lysy, D. C. (2003). The over-claiming 
technique: Measuring self-enhancement independent of ability. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 84(4), 890–904. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.84.4.890 
Petitmengin, C., Remillieux, A., Cahour, B., & Carter-Thomas, S. (2013). A gap in Nisbett and 
Wilson’s findings? A first-person access to our cognitive processes. Consciousness and 
Cognition, 22(2), 654–669. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2013.02.004 
Rinpoche, Y. M., & Swanson, E. (2007). The joy of living: Unlocking the secret and science of 
happiness. New York: Harmony Books. 
Sauer, S., Walach, H., Schmidt, S., Hinterberger, T., Lynch, S., Büssing, A., & Kohls, N. (2013). 
Assessment of Mindfulness: Review on State of the Art. Mindfulness, 4(1), 3–17. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s12671-012-0122-5 
Seli, P., Cheyne, J. A., & Smilek, D. (2013). Wandering minds and wavering rhythms: Linking 
mind wandering and behavioral variability. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human 
Perception and Performance, 39(1), 1–5. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0030954 
Strick, M., & Papies, E. K. (2017). A Brief Mindfulness Exercise Promotes the Correspondence 
Between the Implicit Affiliation Motive and Goal Setting. Personality and Social Psychology 
Bulletin, 43(5), 623–637. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167217693611 
Tergar. (n.d.). What is the Joy of Living? Retrieved July 21, 2018, from 
https://tergar.org/programs/what-is-the-joy-of-living/ 
Van Dam, N. T., Hobkirk, A. L., Danoff-Burg, S., & Earleywine, M. (2012). Mind Your Words: 
Positive and Negative Items Create Method Effects on the Five Facet Mindfulness 
Questionnaire. Assessment, 19(2), 198–204. https://doi.org/10.1177/1073191112438743 
Van Dam, N. T., van Vugt, M. K., Vago, D. R., Schmalzl, L., Saron, C. D., Olendzki, A., … Meyer, D. 
E. (2018). Mind the Hype: A Critical Evaluation and Prescriptive Agenda for Research on 
Mindfulness and Meditation. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 13(1), 36–61. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1745691617709589 
Varela, F. J. (1996). Neurophenomenology: A methodological remedy for the hard problem. 
Journal of Consciousness Studies, 3(4), 330–349. 
Varela, F. J., & Shear, J. (1999). First-person methodologies: What, why, how. Journal of 
Consciousness Studies, 6(2–3), 1–14. 
Weber, S. J., & Cook, T. D. (1972). Subject effects in laboratory research: An examination of 
subject roles, demand characteristics, and valid inference. Psychological Bulletin, 77(4), 273–
295. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0032351 
Wielgosz, J., Schuyler, B. S., Lutz, A., & Davidson, R. J. (2016). Long-term mindfulness training 
is associated with reliable differences in resting respiration rate. Scientific Reports, 6, 27533. 
https://doi.org/10.1038/srep27533 
 
 
81 
 
Zamariola, G., Maurage, P., Luminet, O., & Corneille, O. (2018). Interoceptive accuracy scores 
from the heartbeat counting task are problematic: Evidence from simple bivariate 
correlations. Biological Psychology, 137, 12–17. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.biopsycho.2018.06.006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
82 
 
4.3 Electrodermal activity  
 
4.3.1 General definition 
 
The skin is the largest organ of the human body and its principal interface with the 
environment. It subserves processes spanning from thermoregulation and vitamin 
production to sensorimotor exploration and emotional communication (Critchley, 
2002). In general, we refer to electrodermal activity (EDA) to describe changes in the 
electrical properties of the skin that result from the activity of the sympathetic branch 
of the autonomic nervous system (ANS). EDA is considered a sensitive biomarker of 
psychophysiological processes, reflecting sympathetic arousal in the context of 
cognitive and emotional states. The most widely used methods for measuring changes 
in EDA apply either direct current (DC) or alternating current (AC) to the skin, known 
as exosomatic recording. When the voltage is kept constant in DC methods, we refer to 
the changes in EDA as skin conductance (SC) [Boucsein, 2012, Chapter 1]. Spontaneous 
fluctuations in SC that occur through time represent the tonic component of a typical 
recording and are defined as skin conductance level (SCL). An individual’s SCL can 
slowly vary over time depending on specific psychological states, hydration, skin 
dryness and autonomic regulation. On the other hand, skin conductance responses 
(SCRs) define changes in EDA in response to discrete environmental stimuli8. These 
phasic changes are identified as abrupt increases in SC occurring few seconds after 
stimulus onset. The common measure unit for both SCL and SCRs is the micro-siemens 
(μS). 
 
4.3.2 Historical background 
 
The first recordings of what was previously termed galvanic skin response date to the 
last two decades of the 19th century. Whereas a detailed account of the historical 
development of EDA recording can be found elsewhere (Neumann and Blanton, 1970), 
it is worth considering some specific issues that have been object of debate in the last 
century to help understanding the rationale and methodological choices of 
implementing this measure in our research.  
A first source of debate had been the general methodology of EDA recording. Working 
in the same laboratory as the famous neurology Jean Charcot, Féré (1888) discovered 
that the skin conductance increases in response to external stimuli when applying a 
small electrical current across two electrodes placed on the skin surface. However, few 
years later, Tarchanoff (1890) reported that the same changes in EDA could be 
                                                        
8 Non-specific skin conductance responses (NS-SCRs) have also been described in the literature. They 
occur in the absence of clearly identifiable eliciting stimuli and are supposed to represent changes in 
tonic EDA. 
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recorded without applying any electrical current. This gave rise to the distinction 
between exosomatic and endosomatic methods. In the present days, exosomatic 
recordings are the method of choice among researchers and the one we used in our 
research.   
An important issue that has been discussed in decades of research in physiology 
regards the mechanisms underlying the observed changes in EDA. Initially, contrasting 
theories posited that changes in EDA were associated to changes in blood flow 
(vascular theory) or to the activity of sweat glands (secretory theory) [Neumann and 
Blanton, 1970]. Subsequent research has proven the latter to be the most plausible 
theory of the peripheral mechanisms underlying EDA (see Fowles, 1986 for a review). 
Notably, this theory proposed the involvement of the sympathetic branch of the ANS, 
which innervates palmar and plantar sweat glands, in the EDA. Moreover, an 
evolutionary perspective on the SCRs in different emotional and cognitive contexts 
comes from the idea that “the function of the secretory activity of the palms is primarily 
to provide a pliable adhesive surface facilitating tactual acuity and grip on objects” 
(Darrow, 1937).  
Finally, studies in the last century has helped in elucidating aspects of a research topic 
that is still of central importance in psychophysiology: the functional significance of the 
EDA. While early research started to highlight the impact of emotional stimuli on SCRs 
(Neumann and Blanton, 1970), later studies have described the modulation of SCRs by 
cognitive factors such as attention and stimulus novelty (R.S. Woodworth and 
Schlosberg, 1954). The extensive research done on this topic thorough the decades is 
essential for developing paradigms that consider different aspects of psychophysiology 
and their differential impact on EDA.  
 
4.3.3 Anatomical and physiological basis  
 
There is a broad consensus on the involvement of eccrine sweat glands in the 
peripheral mechanisms underlying SCRs, and EDA in general. While the primary 
function of most of these glands is thermoregulation, those located in the palmar and 
plantar surfaces are thought to be related to grasping behaviour rather than sweating 
for evaporative cooling (Dawson et al., 2007). It is also known that eccrine glands 
receive mostly cholinergic afferences from the sympathetic branch of the ANS 
(Critchley, 2002). This relates EDA to autonomic arousal, which is associated with 
increased heart rate, blood pressure, sweating and diversion of blood from gut toward 
limb musculature. The aforementioned sympathetic activity is linked to stereotyped 
fight-flight responses and it is not surprising that increases in EDA accompany 
movements and motor preparation (Critchley, 2002).  
Whereas a variety of EDA phenomena can be explained, at the peripheral level, by the 
activity of sweat glands (Edelberg, 1993), the contribution of brain sources to the 
modulation of EDA is far more complex and still under debate. In fact, the production 
of SCRs could be modulated by three relatively independent pathways (Figure 2). A 
first pathway is constituted by the descending excitatory projections of neurons 
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located in the premotor cortex (Brodmann area 6), as well as excitatory and inhibitory 
efferences from the frontal cortex. A second level of control is delivered by the 
hypothalamus and limbic system, with excitatory influences from the amygdala and 
inhibitory activity form the hippocampus. A third level is constituted by the reticular 
formation, in the brainstem (for detailed reviews see (Boucsein, 2012; Dawson et al., 
2007).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.3.4 Emotional modulation and habituation  
 
As previously mentioned, the debate on the psychological processes reflected by 
measures of EDA has characterized a large part of its history. This debate was ascribed 
to a more general discussion on whether the activity of the ANS reflected general 
arousal or could be related to specific emotional states. A legitimation of the use of EDA 
in paradigms investigating emotional states came from the neurophysiologically-
ortiented emotion theory of Papez (Papez, 1937), which included the activity of the 
Figure 2. Regions of the central nervous system that underlie the control of electrodermal 
activity. Originally published in Boucsein et al. (2012) 
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ANS as part of the neural circuit underlying the formation and control of emotions. The 
prominent role of EDA in emotions has been subsequently confirmed by 
neurophysiological models of anxiety (Gray and McNaughton, 1982) and by several 
studies correlating subjective measures of emotional reactions to changes in EDA. A 
comprehensive description of the empirical evidence supporting the impact of 
different emotions on the EDA is out of the scope of this section (for an extensive 
account see Boucsein, 2012, Chapter 3). However, I provide a brief characterisation of 
the impact of anxiety on the EDA, as it is useful to understand its implementation in the 
present project.  
Another characteristic of the EDA, which is relevant for the studies we conducted, is its 
sensitivity to habituation. As for the impact of anxiety, I provide here a brief description 
of this effect.  
 
4.3.4.1 EDA and laboratory-induced anxiety 
Most of the studies investigating the effect of anxiety on the EDA in experimental 
settings rely on a common definition of stressor as “subjective and/or objective 
challenges exceeding a critical level with respect to intensity and/or duration” 
(Boucsein, 2012, Chapter 3). Such stimuli would induce a state of general arousal and 
negative, but unspecific, emotion. A reaction that attempts to re-establish the 
homeostasis at both physiological and psychological levels.  
Early studies observed increases in SCL when participants watched stressful scenes in 
movies (Lazarus, 1966). However, later research reported that the increase of EDA 
during the anticipation of a stressor is greater than that directly following the 
presentation of the stimulus. This effect was observed in studies that introduced the 
threat of electric shock as a stressor (e.g. Folkins, 1970) and it is of great relevance in 
paradigms that investigate anticipatory anxiety. Increase EDA was observed also 
during periods that anticipated public speaking, which has been shown to represent an 
even more powerful stressor than the threat of electric shock (Erdmann et al., 1984). 
Interestingly, EDA is also influenced by the degree of control that one exerts over the 
stressor, or by one’s perception of such control. For instance, Geer et al. (1970) showed 
that SCRs to electric shocks habituated faster in those participants who were told that 
answering to questions faster during the experiment could reduce the time of the 
shock.  
EDA is nowadays used as a biomarker of stress in response to different kinds of stress-
inducing stimuli and it is considered a valuable tool in this field of research (Boucsein, 
2012, Chapter 3). 
 
4.3.4.2 Influence of habituation  
The quantification and interpretation of habituation processes in the EDA depends on 
the definition of this phenomenon in a specific research framework. Habituation can 
be simply defined as a “decrease in response intensity with repeated stimulation” 
(Harris, 1943; Humphrey, 1930). Nonetheless, a decrease in amplitude of SCRs has also 
been investigated as a basic form of learning (i.e. “learning not to respond”, Boucsein, 
2012). In the context of the present project, we considered SCRs habituation 
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phenomena derived from the repetition of the same auditory cues within and between 
experimental blocks and sessions. We therefore adopted the former definition and 
general definition of habituation to control for and investigate repetition effects in our 
paradigm. EDA is one of the most used measures of habituation in human studies and 
a decrease in amplitude of SCRs from the first to the successive presentations of the 
same or similar stimuli can be determined by simple visual inspection.  
 
4.3.5 EDA measures in the present project  
 
Measures of skin conductance have been implemented in Study 2 and Study 3 of the 
present project. The theoretical rationale underlying this implementation is 1) to 
provide a reliable biomarker of anticipatory anxiety and do not rely solely on self-
reports and 2) to explore eventual dissociations between physiological activity and 
subjective experience in expert practitioners and during meditation states.  
The recoding of EDA has required to choose a specific methodological approach, in 
terms or type of measures (SCRs or SCL) and equipment. Additionally, the common 
experimental paradigm for Study 2 and Study 3 has been adjusted, in terms of structure 
and stimuli, to allow for a solid measurement of skin conductance. Specifically, we took 
advantage of a pre-existing task structure (see Cornwell et al., 2007) that was suitable 
for recording changes in skin conductance. The repetition of several ~30 seconds safe 
and threat periods within each block constituted an ideal time-window for the study of 
EDA, which is a relatively slow-changing measure. Within this framework, we opted to 
record SCRs to auditory cues introducing safe and threat periods. This allowed us to 
record clean SCRs, which happen within 1 to 5 seconds after stimulus onset (Society 
for Psychophysiological Research Ad Hoc Committee on Electrodermal Measures, 
2012). We chose to focus on phasic activity to maximise the signal to noise ratio (four 
measures per block for safe and threat periods) while avoiding confounds caused by 
other processes that could affect tonic activity (e.g. general level of stress, fatigue, 
physiological states, general relaxation during meditation). Additionally, we recorder 
SCRs in response to electric shock stimuli, which were spaced enough from one another 
to be able to isolate the electrodermal response. For further details on the specific data 
processing and statistical analyses of SCRs, see the Methods section of Study 2 and 
Study 3.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
87 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
88 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EXPERIMENTAL 
RESULTS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
89 
 
Chapter 5 
Perceptual learning in neutral 
settings 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.1 Study 1: The impact of open presence and 
focused attention meditation on perceptual 
learning and auditory processing in expert and 
novice practitioners  
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A B S T R A C T
Non-dual meditation aims to undo maladaptive cognitive and aﬀective patterns by recognizing their constructed
and transient nature. We previously found high-amplitude spontaneous gamma (25–40 Hz) oscillatory activity
during such practice. Nonetheless, it is unclear how this meditation state diﬀers from other practices, in terms of
perceptual information processing. Here, we hypothesized that non-dual meditation can downregulate the au-
tomatic formation of perceptual habits. To investigate this hypothesis, we recorded EEG from expert Buddhist
meditation practitioners and matched novices to measure two components of the auditory evoked response: the
Mismatch Negativity (MMN) and the Late Frontal Negativity (LFN), a potential observed at a latency sensitive to
attentional engagement to the auditory environment, during the practices of Open Presence (OP) and Focused
Attention (FA), as well as during a control state, in the context of a passive oddball paradigm. We found an
increase in gamma oscillatory power during both meditation states in expert practitioners and an interaction
between states and groups in the amplitude of the MMN. A further investigation identiﬁed the speciﬁc interplay
between the MMN and the LFN as a possible marker to diﬀerentiate the two meditation states as a function of
expertise. In experts, the MMN increased during FA, compared to OP, while the opposite pattern was observed at
the LFN latency. We propose that the state of OP in experts is characterized by increased sensory monitoring and
reduced perceptual inferences compared to FA. This study represents a ﬁrst attempt to describe the impact of
non-dual meditation states on the regulation of automatic brain predictive processes.
1. Introduction
We recently proposed a novel classiﬁcation system that categorizes
various styles of meditation into attentional, constructive, and decon-
structive families based on their primary cognitive mechanisms and
their speciﬁc impact on self-related processes and diﬀerent aspects of
well-being (Dahl et al., 2015). While attention-based meditation and
compassion-based practices (i.e., the constructive family) are increas-
ingly studied as tools for cognitive neurosciences, little is still known
about the basic neurophysiological and cognitive processes underlying
the so-called “deconstructive family” (Dahl et al., 2015). Deconstructive
style of meditation aims to undo maladaptive cognitive and emotional
patterns (e.g. rumination, neuroticism) by exploring the dynamics of
perception, emotion, and cognition and generating insights into one's
internal models of the self, others, and the world. This self-inquiry can
involve exploring self-related processes with discursive analysis, akin to
cognitive-based therapy, or by direct examination of conscious experi-
ence through phenomenological methods. This latter approach is
especially cultivated in so called non-dual forms of meditation, and
familiarity with the contemplative methods involved requires intensive
training. Contemplative traditions allege that non-dual meditation
practices are important for alleviating suﬀering, and such practices also
play a role in many contemporary mindfulness-based interventions
(Dunne, 2011). Apart from very few studies (e.g. (Josipovic, 2014)), the
clinical beneﬁts of this approach and its behavioral and neurophysio-
logical mechanisms are still largely unknown.
To explore this topic, we studied the meditative state of “Open
Presence” (OP) in Tibetan Buddhist traditions as a paradigmatic case of
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non-dual meditation. Styles of meditation that cultivate OP are de-
scribed as inducing a phenomenal experience where the intentional
structure involving the duality of object and subject is attenuated. In
this sense, such styles of contemplative practice are “non-dual” (Lutz
et al., 2007). One important phenomenological element of the state of
OP is a spontaneously occurring suspension of the representational
models of the self and objects in the world. At the same time, OP styles
of meditation are said to instantiate a state of relaxed lucidity, where
perceptual phenomena are experienced with more saliency and clarity,
without acting upon them or avoiding them. In such a way, perceptual
phenomena in OP spontaneously appear and vanish in the ﬁeld of
awareness like “patterns drawn on water” (Dowman, 1994).
Based on these phenomenological descriptions, we hypothesized
that OP practice downregulates the formation of perceptual habits
while increasing the monitoring of the sensory environment, mod-
ulating brain predictive processes in relation to a speciﬁc proﬁle of
spontaneous brain activity. As the stability of OP is considered to re-
quire extensive training, we expected this eﬀect to be present in expert
practitioners only. To test this hypothesis, we used electro-
encephalography (EEG) to study a well-characterized component of the
auditory-evoked potential, the Mismatch Negativity (MMN) (Näätänen
et al., 2004), which measures implicit perceptual learning processes.
The MMN reﬂects the violations of predictions that the brain casts over
the regularity of the auditory environment, following the presentation
of a “deviant” stimulus after several “standard” tones (Garrido et al.,
2009). We expected to observe a decrease in MMN amplitude in ex-
perts, compared to novice practitioners, during the practice of OP and
compared to a control state where attention is diverted from the au-
ditory stream. To characterize the speciﬁcity of OP meditation, we
compared this state to a control state of concentrative meditation, or
Focused Attention (FA) (Lutz et al., 2008). FA meditation requires the
practitioner to monitor ongoing distractors while maintaining attention
on the chosen object. During FA, we expected the increased monitoring
of task-unrelated events to enhance the brain responses to deviations of
the auditory environment, as measured by increased MMN amplitude.
Furthermore, we looked at later latencies (after 200ms) of the auditory-
evoked response to characterize diﬀerences between states and groups
in terms of monitoring and saliency of the sensory environment (e.g.
Escera and Corral, 2007; Chennu et al., 2013). As stated above, we
expected both meditation states to result in increased monitoring of the
incoming stimuli, but having a diﬀerent impact on brain predictive
processes. Previous studies have investigated biomarkers of diﬀerent
meditative practices, focusing especially on brain oscillatory activity
(e.g. Cahn and Polich, 2006 for a review). In the present study, we
aimed at conﬁrming previous ﬁndings in this domain, as well as in-
vestigating a putative functional relationship between speciﬁc oscilla-
tory proﬁles and the hypothesized modulation of predictive processes in
non-dual practices. More speciﬁcally, we predicted increased power of
oscillatory activity in the alpha (8–12 Hz) frequency range during
meditation, as a correlate of general relaxation and in line with pre-
vious studies (Cahn and Polich, 2006). In addition, we also predicted
that higher activity in faster oscillatory rhythms (i.e. 25–40 Hz) at
frontal scalp regions would underlie the state of high meta-awareness
and perceptual saliency in OP, a proﬁle previously identiﬁed during a
similar form of non-dual practice (Lutz et al., 2004).
2. Materials and methods
2.1. Ethics statement
All study and task details were approved by the UW-Madison Health
Sciences Internal Review Board. Participants provided written informed
consent for all study procedures.
2.2. Subjects
Sixteen long-term meditation practitioners (43.4 ± 9.4 years old,
12 males and 4 females) and ﬁfteen age-matched controls (42.4 ± 11.4
years old, 13 males and 2 females) participated in the study. Long-term
meditation practitioners were selected based on a criterion of at least
10,000 h of formal meditation practice in the Nyingma and Kagyu
traditions of Tibetan Buddhism, which have very similar styles of
practice (mean: 28,990 h, SD: 13.88). The length of their training was
estimated based on their daily practice and the time they spent in
meditative retreats. Ten hours of sitting meditation were counted per
day of retreat. Based on this criterion, these practitioners are referred to
as “experts” here for brevity. Control participants were recruited from
the local community and had no previous experience with any type of
meditation, but expressed interest in learning meditation. Subjects in
the control group were familiarized with the meditation instruction for
one week before the experiment and were guided by verbal instructions
during the practice.
2.3. Meditation practices and training
Open Presence (OP) styles of practice are found in both the
Mahāmudrā or Chagchen (Tibetan, phyag chen) and the Dzogchen
(Tibetan, Rdzogs chen) traditions of Tibetan Buddhism (Van Schaik,
2004). In this regard, these contemplative traditions overlap so sig-
niﬁcantly that Tsele Natsog Rangdrol, an inﬂuential Tibetan author
from the 17th century, combines the Tibetan terms for these two tra-
ditions into a single moniker, “Chag-zog” (2). The main focus for Chag-
zog styles of practice is to recognize the “nature of the mind” (Tibetan,
sems nyid or sems kyi rang bzhin) or one's fundamental “awareness”
(Tibetan, rig pa) and then to sustain that recognition. In this study, the
term “rigpa chok zhag” (Tibetan, rig pa cog bzhag)—literally, “placing
the mind directly in fundamental awareness”—was the term used for
OP practice, but various other terms for OP practice are also widely
known and are essentially synonymous (Lutz et al., 2007; Rangdrol,
2011). Referring to the Tibetan Chag-zog traditions as “systems of de-
ﬁnitive meaning,” Rangdrol describes the key features of OP practice in
this way:
“Let go into your natural state, with no need to cling or ﬁxate on
even the impetus or the attitude, “I meditate!” Without disturbing
yourself with any ambition, such as hoping for a good meditation or
fearing it won’t succeed, to let be in unfabricated naturalness free
from concepts is the meditation state of all the systems of deﬁnitive
meaning” (Rangdrol, 2011).
Based on its traditional presentation (Namgyal, 2001; Third
Dzogchen Rinpoche, 2008; DBaṅ-phyug-rdo-rje, 2009; Rangdrol, 2011)
and scholarly analysis (Lutz et al., 2007; Dunne, 2011, 2015), OP
practice is viewed here as an advanced form of Open Monitoring (OM)
practice (Lutz et al., 2008), in which practitioners might be found at
various levels of achievement. OP meditation consists theoretically of a
state where the qualities of eﬀortless openness and acceptance are vi-
vidly experienced with minimal control-oriented elaborative processes.
The lack of explicit monitoring in OP meditation is the pivotal but ﬁnely
grained diﬀerence from OM practice, and this distinction concerns the
Buddhist notion of “reﬂexive awareness,” as discussed by Buddhist
scholars (Coseru, 2012; Dunne, 2015). Brieﬂy, in OP practice, an
awareness of whatever emerges in experience continues without the
eﬀortful vigilance that characterizes OM styles of practice. For reasons
of simplicity, we will continue to use the term “monitoring” in this
scientiﬁc context to describe this aspect of OP, with the understanding
that this term takes a slightly diﬀerent meaning in OP and OM. In ad-
dition to the OP meditation of “placing the mind directly in awareness,”
practitioners also engaged in a Focused Attention (FA) style of practice
known as “one-pointed concentration” (Tibetan, rtse gcig ting nge’dzin;
see Namgyal, 2001). As with any FA style of practice, in one-pointed
E. Fucci et al. 1HXURSV\FKRORJLD²

concentration one maintains selective attention on a chosen object, and
in this case sustained attention was directed at a ﬁxation cross. This FA
style of practice is considered here as second meditation condition to
determine the speciﬁcity of eﬀects observed in the OP practice. Control
participants were given instructions written by a scholar who is familiar
with the practices (see Supplementary material 1), and then told to
practice at home 30min a day for 7 days prior to the experiment.
2.4. Auditory paradigm
Subjects underwent a passive auditory oddball task (Näätänen et al.,
2004), consisting of the variable repetition of a standard tone (1000 Hz;
60ms duration; 10 ms rise and fall; 80 dB SPL) followed by the pre-
sentation of a frequency deviant tone (1200 Hz; 60ms duration; 10ms
rise and fall; 80 dB SPL). Each block of the task contained 80% standard
tones (n=200) and 20% deviant tones (n=50) with a variable inter-
stimulus interval of 800–1200ms (block duration: 4m15s on average).
Each subject underwent three blocks per condition and three diﬀerent
conditions: Open Presence (OP), Focused Attention (FA), and Reading
(RE) as a control condition. The two meditative practices, OP and FA,
are described above. During the control condition (RE), subjects were
instructed to read a newspaper and ignore the auditory stimulation. The
order of blocks was randomised and each subject underwent the same
order, as follows: RE1 - OP1 - FA1, FA2 - OP2 - RE2, OP3 - FA3 - RE3.
2.5. EEG recording
EEG data were recorded at standard extended 10–20 positions with
a 128-channel Geodesic Sensor Net (Electrical Geodesics, Eugene, OR),
sampled at 500 Hz, and referenced to the vertex (Cz). Data were ﬁl-
tered, using an analogue band-pass ﬁlter, between 0.1 and 200 Hz. A
digital notch ﬁlter was applied to the data at 60 Hz to remove any ar-
tefacts caused by alternating current line noise. Bad channels were re-
placed by using spherical spline interpolation (Perrin et al., 1989).
2.6. Data pre-processing
Data were ﬁrst converted into EEGLAB software format (Delorme
and Makeig, 2004), which was used for the ﬁrst pre-processing steps.
Data were ﬁltered between 0.5 and 100 Hz and manually cleared of
large movement-related artefacts. Independent Component Analysis
(ICA) was applied to the raw data of each participant (on those chan-
nels that were not interpolated) using the Runica algorithm (Makeig
et al., 2002) to identify and remove artefacts caused by blink, saccades,
and cardiac (EKG) and muscular activity. We further investigated ICA
proﬁles to determine whether some speciﬁc components that are pre-
valently found in expert meditation practitioners, which are char-
acterized by a sustained peak of gamma activity distributed in several
locations over the scalp, had to be rejected as caused by muscular ac-
tivity or rather had to be kept in the EEG analysis as genuine con-
tributions to the brain signal (see Supplementary material 2.1 for a
detailed description of these proﬁles and the methods used to test their
contribution to the ERP). After ICA correction, data were re-referenced
oﬄine to the average of both mastoids, a non-causal band-pass 1–60 Hz
digital ﬁlter was applied, and two-second epochs centred on stimulus
presentation (− 1 to 1 s) were generated. For each subject and for each
state we generated a “deviant” condition, comprised only of epochs
centred on deviant tones, and a “standard” condition, comprised only of
epochs centred on standard tones that were presented just before a
deviant tone. After manually rejecting artefacts, the number of trials did
not diﬀer signiﬁcantly between states, conditions, and groups. Although
there was a trending diﬀerence between states (F (2, 58) = 3.38;
p=0.054 Huynh-Feldt corrected), we did not take it into account in
further data analysis, since the largest diﬀerence between states (FA –
RE) in the number of trials was only 3% (see Supplementary material
2.2 for descriptive statistics). The epoched data were baseline-corrected
by subtracting the mean value of the signal during the 100ms before
stimulus presentation.
2.7. Event-related potentials
We converted data from EEGLAB into SPM8 (Wellcome Department
of Imaging Neuroscience, London, UK) software format, which was
used for the following steps of event-related potentials (ERPs) analysis.
After conversion into SPM8, we generated ERPs for each subject, state,
block, and stimulus type using the robust averaging method im-
plemented in SPM8. We used this procedure as a complementary ar-
tefact-correction for any artefacts that were not removed by previous
artefact-rejection methods. Since robust averaging can re-introduce
high frequencies into the signal, we ﬁltered data again at 1–20 Hz and
reapplied baseline-correction. We then performed two streams of ana-
lysis to investigate diﬀerences between groups and states that appeared
in the MMN and later latencies, respectively. Statistical analyses were
performed using R software (version 3.4.2)(R core team, 2017).
To identify the MMN, we computed diﬀerence waveforms from the
grand average for each group and state, subtracting responses to stan-
dard stimuli from those to deviants. We used an a priori region of in-
terest (ROI) for the assessment of this component, basing our ROI on
previous literature (e.g. (Duncan et al., 2009; Näätänen et al., 2011)),
resulting in a frontal ROI comprised of twelve electrodes, including Fz
(see Fig. S1). Our selection of this ROI was conﬁrmed by observation of
the topography of the standard and deviant waveforms and diﬀerence
waveforms (MMN) across all subjects and states, as well as those for
each state and group taken separately.
We computed the mean amplitudes of MMN for each participant
and state over a time-window of 90–180ms after stimulus onset. This
time-window was in line with previous literature (e.g. (Opitz et al.,
2002)) and conﬁrmed through the observation of the time-course of the
MMN waveforms in the main region of interest. We then ﬁtted a linear
mixed-eﬀects model using the R package lme4 (Bates et al., 2014). The
model comprised the average MMN amplitude as dependent variable,
the interaction between STATE (FA, OP, RE) and GROUP (Experts,
Novices) as ﬁxed eﬀect, and subjects as random eﬀect. The model was
tested using an ANOVA analysis of variance (Type II Wald chi-square
test). Paired t-tests, corrected for multiple comparisons using Tukey
honestly signiﬁcant diﬀerence test (HSD), were used as post-hoc tests
comparing least-squared means.
As a second line of analysis that would focus on diﬀerences between
groups and states in late latencies (after 200ms), we looked for a time
window for which the signal in response to standard tones, within the a
priori ROI used for the MMN, was signiﬁcantly diﬀerent between the
meditation (both FA and OP) and control (RE) conditions, across
groups. We corrected for multiple comparison using a non-parametric,
permutation-based, cluster-level statistical test (Maris and Oostenveld,
2007) in MNE v0.14 (cluster-deﬁning threshold = 0.01; cluster-level
threshold = 0.05; 10,000 permutations). A temporal cluster was found
between 280 and 400ms post-stimulus. We used this time-window for
subsequent analyses of the late negative ERP component, henceforth
referred to as Late Frontal Negativity (LFN). We ﬁtted a linear mixed-
eﬀects model comprising the average LFN amplitude (combining stan-
dard and deviant stimuli) as dependent variable, the interaction be-
tween STATE and GROUP as ﬁxed eﬀect, and subjects as random eﬀect.
The model was tested using an ANOVA analysis of variance (Type II).
Paired t-tests, corrected for multiple comparisons using Tukey HSD,
were used as post-hoc tests comparing least-squared means.
Finally, we explored in a post-hoc analysis the interplay between
early (MMN) and late (LFN) components of the auditory evoked po-
tential as a mean of investigating diﬀerences between states and groups
in terms of monitoring and perceptual inference. Data from each par-
ticipant and state for the two ERP components was mean-centred by
subtracting to each observation the average of the corresponding
component across states and groups. Data were then entered in a two-
E. Fucci et al. 1HXURSV\FKRORJLD²

way repeated measures ANOVA (rmANOVA), with STATE (three levels:
FA, OP, RE) and COMPONENT (two levels: MMN and LFN) as within-
subject factors and GROUP (two levels: EXPERT, NOVICE) as a be-
tween-subject factor.
2.8. Spectral analysis
For spectral analysis, we used epoched data before conversion to
SPM8 (ﬁltered between 1 and 60 Hz), combining epochs derived from
all stimuli (all standard and deviant tones). We computed the power
spectral distribution for each electrode and for each 2-s epoch using
Welch's method (Welch, 1967), which averages power values across
sliding windows (window width = 500ms, overlap = 50%). We
averaged the results from all epochs to obtain the mean power spectral
density (PSD) for each experimental condition. We created two sets of
data by averaging and log-transforming PSD over two frequency bands:
alpha (8–12 hz) and gamma (25–40 Hz).
The aim of the spectral analysis was to investigate in two diﬀerent
brain rhythms the presence of: 1) main eﬀects of meditation states
across both groups, 2) diﬀerences between OP and FA meditation, and
3) whether these diﬀerences were speciﬁc to expert practitioners. For
this purpose, we ﬁrst entered log-transformed data in a comprehensive
general linear model with STATE (FA, OP, RE), FREQUENCY (alpha,
gamma), and ROI (frontal, occipital [see Fig. S2]) as within-subjects
and GROUP (Experts, Novices) as between-subjects factors. The model
was tested using repeated-measures analysis of variance (rANOVA). If
interactions were present, diﬀerent linear mixed-eﬀects models were
ﬁtted for each frequency and ROI. Paired and independent-samples t-
tests, corrected for multiple comparisons using Tukey HSD, were used
as post-hoc tests comparing least-squared means.
In some cases, and for illustrative purposes, we performed whole-
scalp statistical inferences to identify electrodes that showed signiﬁcant
eﬀects for contrasts of interest. We used a cluster-based approach to
control for multiple comparisons, and a permutation scheme to relax
the assumptions usually required by parametric methods. More speci-
ﬁcally, we used the threshold-free cluster enhancement strategy de-
veloped by Smith and Nichols (2009), which oﬀers better localization
than other cluster-based methods by performing inference at the elec-
trode level.
3. Results
3.1. Auditory event-related potentials
Fig. 1 B shows the topographies at the scalp level for the mean
amplitude of the MMN (90–180ms) for experts and novices, and for
each experimental condition. To test our hypothesis of a down-regula-
tion of the MMN during OP in expert meditators only, we tested a linear
mixed-eﬀects model at the frontal ROI (Fig. S1). In line with our pre-
diction, we found a signiﬁcant STATE by GROUP interaction (χ2 (2)
= 7.81; p=0.02), showing how diﬀerent meditative states modulate
the amplitude of the MMN diﬀerently for expert and novice practi-
tioners (Fig. 1A). More speciﬁcally, in the expert group, the MMN
amplitude marginally increased during FA, compared to RE (t-ratio (58)
=− 2.3; p= 0.06) while no diﬀerence was found between OP and RE
(t-ratio (58) =− 0.3; p= 0.94). Contrary to our hypothesis, the in-
crease in FA, compared to OP, was present only as statistical trend (t-
ratio (58) =− 1.9; p= 0.12) (Fig. 1C). In novice practitioners, the
MMN amplitude was marginally higher during OP, compared to RE (t-
ratio (58) = 2.2; p= 0.06), while no diﬀerence was observed between
Fig. 1. Meditation states modulate mismatch negativity (MMN) diﬀerently between expert and novice meditators. (A) Subtraction (deviant minus standard,
i.e. MMN) waveforms at frontal ROI (see Fig. S1) for FA, OP and RE conditions (FA: focused attention meditation, OP: open presence meditation, RE: reading a
newspaper) in experts (top) and novices (bottom). (B) Average voltage scalp maps of MMN between 90 and 180ms after stimulus onset for experts (top) and novices
(bottom) during FA, RE and OP. (C) Mean values of MMN from (B) at frontal ROI. Error bars represent standard errors of the mean. P-values indicate signiﬁcant and
marginally signiﬁcant diﬀerences within groups, between experimental conditions, as a result of paired t-tests (Tukey HSD corrected).
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FA and RE (t-ratio (58) =− 0.2; p= 0.95) and an increase in OP,
compared to FA, was observed only as statistical trend (t-ratio (58)
=− 1.9; p= 0.12) (Fig. 1C). We also explored diﬀerences in MMN
amplitude between groups for each state separately. We found a sig-
niﬁcantly higher MMN amplitude in experts, compared to novice
practitioners in the FA condition (t-ratio (62.4) =− 2; p= 0.04).
Contrary to our hypothesis, no group diﬀerence was found in OP (t-
ratio (62.4) =− 0.5; p= 0.5). In line with our prediction that reading
was a non-speciﬁc control state, there was no group diﬀerence RE
conditions (t-ratio (62.4) =− 0.9; p= 0.35).
Additional statistical analysis, performed separately on standard
and deviant stimuli, did not yield informative results regarding the
speciﬁc contribution of each stimulus type to the observed diﬀerences
in the MMN amplitude (see Supplementary material 2.3 for details).
We assessed diﬀerences in stimulus attendance and attentional
monitoring, between states and groups, that could have contributed to
the modulation of the auditory-evoked potential in the earlier latency
(MMN), by looking at later latencies of the evoked response (see
Methods section).
Fig. 2B shows topographies at the scalp level for the mean values of
the Late Frontal Negativity (LFN), combining responses to both stan-
dard and deviant stimuli, in the selected time window (280–400ms) for
experts and novices and for each experimental condition. The ANOVA
performed at the frontal ROI (Fig. S1) yielded a signiﬁcant eﬀect of
STATE (χ2 (2) = 16.7; p < 0.001; Fig. 2A). We further investigated
diﬀerences between each state (Fig. 2C). A signiﬁcant increase in the
amplitude of the LFN was found in OP and FA compared to RE (t-ratio
(58) =− 3.9; p < 0.001 and t-ratio (58) =− 2.711; p=0.02 re-
spectively), while no diﬀerence was found between FA and OP (t-ratio
(58) =− 1.7; p= 0,18).
To determine whether the interplay between attentional monitoring
and perceptual habits formation would represent a more sensitive
marker to diﬀerentiate the two practices in expert meditation practi-
tioners, we included data from the MMN and the LFN in an integrated
model. We performed an exploratory analysis on the interaction be-
tween MMN and LFN in expert and novice practitioners and between
experimental conditions (Fig. 3). A statistically signiﬁcant interaction
between STATE, COMPONENT and GROUP resulted from the repeated-
measures ANOVA (F (2, 58) = 3.42; p= 0.03). Given this interaction,
we investigated the two groups separately. A marginally signiﬁcant
interaction between STATE and COMPONENT was present in experts (F
(2, 30) = 3.07; p= 0.06), while a main eﬀect of STATE was present in
the novice group (F (2, 28) = 5.28; p= 0.01). We further tested in-
teractions between pairs of states and the two components in the expert
group to investigate the sensitivity of this combined measure to dif-
ferentiate each pair of states. An interaction between STATE and
COMPONENT was present when comparing FA and OP (F (1, 15) = 5.6;
p=0.03), showing how the LFN amplitude increased during OP while
the MMN amplitude increased during FA. An interaction between
STATE and COMPONENT was also present when comparing OP and RE
(F (1,15) = 3.8; p=0.06), showing an increase in the LFN but not in
the MMN amplitude during OP compared to RE. Finally, a main eﬀect
of STATE was present when focusing on FA and RE (F (1,15) = 11.08;
p=0.004) showing how the amplitude of both components increased
Fig. 2. Open Presence meditation modulates late auditory evoked-potential (Late Frontal Negativity, LFN) in expert and novice practitioners (A) Event-related
responses to standard (solid lines) and deviant (dashed lines) tones at frontal ROI (see Fig. S1) during FA, OP and RE in experts (top) and novices (bottom). (B)
Average voltage scalp maps, combining standard and deviants and the two groups, between 330 and 500ms after stimulus onset. (C) Mean values of LFN from (B) at
frontal ROI. Error bars represent the standard errors of the mean. P-values indicate signiﬁcant diﬀerences between experimental conditions, as a result of paired t-
tests (Tukey HSD corrected).
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during FA compared to RE. Altogether this composite analysis revealed
a double dissociation in experts between OP and FA and RE, respec-
tively.
3.2. Spontaneous Alpha (8–12 Hz) and gamma (25–40 Hz) EEG
oscillatory activity
Fig. 4A shows mean log-values of alpha and gamma power, in two
diﬀerent ROIs, for expert and novice practitioners; Fig. 4B shows the
topographical distribution of these oscillatory activities. A statistically
signiﬁcant interaction between STATE, FREQUENCY, ROI and GROUP
resulted from the main model tested (F (1.7, 49.9) = 3.87; p=0.03;
Huynh-Feldt corrected). Given the signiﬁcant interaction, we in-
vestigated the two frequency bands and ROIs separately.
A signiﬁcant eﬀect of STATE on average alpha power was present in
both the frontal and occipital ROIs (χ2 (2) = 43.1; p < 0.001 and χ2
(2) = 9.8; p=0.007, respectively). This analysis showed how alpha
power increases in both groups during meditation and how, between
the two practices, OP meditation is characterized by the most powerful
alpha oscillatory activity in the frontal ROI (OP vs RE: t-ratio (58)
= 6.4, p < 0.001; FA vs OP: t-ratio (58) =− 2.4, p= 0.05; FA vs RE:
t-ratio (58) = 4, p < 0.001). The main eﬀect of state observed at the
occipital ROI was mostly caused by the increased alpha power during
OP compared to RE (OP vs RE: t-ratio (58) = 3.1, p=0.008; FA vs RE:
t-ratio (58) = 1.6, p=0.24; FA vs OP: t-ratio (58) =− 1.4, p= 0.31).
As for the diﬀerences in gamma power, we found a signiﬁcant
STATE by GROUP interaction at the frontal ROI (χ2 (2) = 7.87;
p=0.02), showing how gamma oscillatory power increased during OP,
compared to RE, in experts only (t-ratio (58) = 3; p= 0.008) while no
diﬀerence was found between FA and RE, and OP and FA (t-ratio (58)
= 1.5; p=0.27 and t-ratio (58) =− 1.5; p= 0.28, respectively). No
diﬀerence between states was found in the novices. Between-group t-
tests highlighted a signiﬁcant increase in gamma oscillatory power in
experts, compared to novices, during OP and FA (t-ratio (42.8) = 3.3;
p=0.002 and t-ratio (42.8) = 2.1; p= 0.03, respectively), but not RE
(t-ratio (42.8) = 1.2; p= 0.23). At the occipital ROI, a signiﬁcant main
eﬀect of state was present (χ2 (2) = 45,3; p < 0001), showing how
gamma power increased during RE compared to OP and FA (t-ratio (58)
=− 6.4; p < 0.001 and t-ratio (58) =− 4.8; p < 0.001, respec-
tively). We did not ﬁnd a relationship between spontaneous gamma
activity and hours of meditation practice in expert practitioners. This
hypothesis was tested at the frontal ROI used in the present study, as
Fig. 3. Diﬀerent interplay between LFN and MMN amplitudes between
experimental conditions as a function of meditation expertise. Mean dif-
ference in microvolts, relative to the average across groups and conditions, of
MMN (full colour) and LFN (lines pattern) in FA (green), OP (red) and RE
(blue). P-values indicate signiﬁcant main eﬀects and interactions resulting from
repeated-measures ANOVAs. A signiﬁcant three-way interaction was found
between states, components and groups (F (2, 58) = 3.42; p= 0.03). (For in-
terpretation of the references to color in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred
to the web version of this article.).
Fig. 4. Meditation states diﬀerently modulate spontaneous oscillatory activity between expert and novice meditators. (A) Mean log-transformed values of
spectral power in alpha (8–12 Hz) and gamma (25–40 Hz) frequency bands at the frontal ROI and occipital ROI for experts and novice practitioners. Error bars
represent standard errors of the mean. P-values indicate signiﬁcant diﬀerences between groups and between experimental conditions within groups, as a result of
paired t-tests (Tukey HSD corrected). (B) Corresponding whole-scalp topographies for a few selected contrasts. Large dots indicate electrodes for which the contrast is
statistically signiﬁcant (p < 0.01, corrected for multiple comparisons: see Section 2).
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well as at the ROI used in a previous study, when a relationship was
found (Lutz et al., 2004).
3.3. Correlation between spontaneous oscillatory activity and auditory
evoked responses
Following the results obtained after the analysis of ERP components
and oscillatory power, we aimed to further characterize the relation
between state measures and brain responses to auditory stimuli (Fig. 5).
Firstly, we explored the relationship between the diﬀerence between
MMN and LFN amplitude and the frontal gamma activity, as both
measures exhibited a group by state interaction, particularly between
OP and RE, as both states diﬀered for experts only on these two mea-
sures. We found a signiﬁcant correlation between these two measures in
experts, but not novices (ρX,Y = 0.54; p=0.03 and ρX,Y = − 0.006;
p=0.98 respectively) and this correlation was marginally diﬀerent
between the two groups (z-score = 1.5; p=0.06 following (Cohen
et al., 2014)). Secondly, the common proﬁle of the state eﬀect found in
both LFN amplitude and frontal alpha activity suggested a possible
relationship between them, particularly in the contrast between OP and
RE (see Figs. 4 and 2). We found a negative correlation between the
increase in alpha power and the increase in LFN amplitude during OP,
compared to RE condition; this eﬀect was present across both groups
(ρX,Y = − 0.42; p=0.01).
4. Discussion
In the present study, we showed how an Open Presence style of
nondual meditation can be diﬀerentiated from a style of concentrative
meditation, named Focused Attention, in terms of the interplay be-
tween saliency and monitoring of the sensory environment and per-
ceptual learning processes as measured by a composite measure of EEG
ERPs. The observed patterns are in line with the speciﬁc phenomen-
ology of the two diﬀerent states. Moreover, both meditation states are
characterized by increased power of brain rhythms in the gamma fre-
quency range in experts compared to novices, and by increased power
in alpha frequency range for both groups. We also found some re-
lationship between meditation-induced changes in ERPs and medita-
tion-induced changes in brain oscillatory rhythms in both gamma and
alpha frequency bands.
Theoretical accounts of the MMN suggest that it is a neural correlate
of prediction error signals (Garrido et al., 2009; Lecaignard et al.,
2015). Elaborating on this notion, recent studies have highlighted the
role of attention in increasing the precision of such prediction errors,
resulting in an increase of the MMN amplitude (e.g. (Chennu et al.,
2013; Auksztulewicz and Friston 2015)). These studies are in line with
theoretical and experimental work on the role of attention in mod-
ulating prediction error signals in diﬀerent sensory domains (e.g.
(Feldman and Friston, 2010; Kok et al., 2012)). In the present study, we
found that two meditation practices and a control state diﬀerently
modulate the MMN amplitude in groups of expert and novice practi-
tioners. During the state of Focused Attention, the MMN amplitude
increases in experts compared to a control, Reading condition and
compared to novices. Contrary to our hypothesis, the MMN in OP was
not statistically diﬀerent from FA, even if there was a trend toward this
eﬀect. The increase in FA compared to RE could be related to the
speciﬁc task-set of focusing on and selecting a perceptual object, which
increases the saliency of task-unrelated stimuli and entails higher meta-
awareness of the sensory environment (Lutz et al., 2015). Previous
studies have reported an increase of the MMN during concentrative
meditation (Srinivasan and Baijal, 2007) and in expert practitioners
(Biedermann et al., 2016). Nonetheless, these studies presented several
limitations such as the lack of a control condition and the assessment of
the MMN amplitude at unconventional scalp areas. In line with our
ﬁndings, a previous study showed how the MMN increased during a
concentrative state (breath-counting task), compared to mind-wan-
dering (Braboszcz and Delorme, 2011). In the novice group, the MMN
amplitude increases during the practice of OP compared to RE, while a
diﬀerence between OP and FA was observed only as a statistical trend.
Higher MMN during OP meditation in novices could also reﬂect higher
attentional resources being allocated to the auditory stream of the
oddball paradigm, compared to Reading, in line with the recent
Fig. 5. Spontaneous oscillatory activity in the gamma and alpha range correlates with changes in the auditory evoked potential between OP and RE conditions. (A)
Scatter plot for single-subject mean values of diﬀerence in gamma (25–40 Hz) power between OP and RE (x-axis) and diﬀerence between MMN and LFN between OP
and RE (y-axis) for novice (grey) and expert (black) practitioners. Regression lines and relative equations, as well as R-squared values, show the direction of the
correlation for each group. (B) Scatter plot for diﬀerences in alpha (8–12 Hz) power between OP and RE (x-axis) and diﬀerence in LFN amplitude between OP and RE
(y-axis) across both groups. Regression line and relative equation, as well as R-squared value, show the direction of the correlation across subjects.
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literature on attention modulation of prediction error signals. This view
is corroborated by the eﬀect of meditation states on the late negative
component of the auditory evoked response, here referred to as Late
Frontal Negativity, which is highly similar, in terms of location and
latency, to previously observed components that have been linked to
stimulus attendance and attention orienting (e.g.(Karayanidis and
Michie, 1996; Bendixen et al., 2007)). The fact that there was no in-
crease in MMN in FA versus RE in novices could reﬂect a less stable
capacity to maintain attentional focus compared to experts.
Based on the results obtained from separate tests performed on the
two components of the auditory evoked potential, we sought to char-
acterise the interplay between attentional monitoring of the sensory
environment (indexed by the LFN amplitude) and the modulation of
predictive processes (reﬂected in the MMN amplitude). This ex-
ploratory analysis was driven by the interest in highlighting speciﬁc
proﬁles of perceptual information processing in line with our opera-
tional hypotheses regarding the two diﬀerent meditation states in ex-
pert practitioners. In this group, indeed, the practices of OP and FA
have a diﬀerent impact on the two ERP components, when compared
between them and to the RE condition. More speciﬁcally, the state of
OP increases the LFN amplitude, compared to RE, but not the MMN,
whereas during FA both components show a higher amplitude com-
pared to RE. Finally, compared to FA, the state of OP shows higher LFN
amplitude but lower MMN. As stated earlier, we hypothesized that the
distinct phenomenology of OP in expert practitioners would correlate
with a reduction of the interpretation of sensory information across
time by perceptual habits. The modulation of the strength of prior
predictions on the auditory environment could be, in this case, a sui-
table mechanism underlying this hypothesized process. This modula-
tion would be orthogonal to the increased saliency of perceptual sti-
muli. By contrast in novices, the dissociation between these two
processes was not found, as reﬂected by a state eﬀect but not by a state
by component interaction: increasing perceptual saliency during OP
condition (i.e. high LFN) was associated to increase in MMN, whereas
decreasing perceptual saliency during RE condition (i.e. lower LFN),
was associated to decrease in MMN (Fig. 3). In line with the phenom-
enological description, the speciﬁc pattern of auditory response in
MMN combined with LFN observed in expert practitioners represents a
key ﬁnding of the present study. Such modulation of predictive pro-
cesses could also explain results from a previous studies that found a
reduction of the auditory startle response in one expert meditator
during OP (Levenson et al., 2012) and a reduction of habituation to
startle stimuli in expert practitioners (Antonova et al., 2015).
Expert meditators also show increased gamma oscillatory power
over the frontal scalp region during both meditative states compared to
the control condition and to novices. These results are in line with a
previous study characterizing an increase in gamma power in experts
during a non-dual form of compassion meditation (Lutz et al., 2004)
and in contrast with a recent study that did not ﬁnd an interaction
between states and group, but rather a trait eﬀect in gamma power
(Braboszcz et al., 2017). Yet, in this last study, novice practitioners did
not engage in the same practice as the experts, and the inclusion criteria
for experts, as well as the type of practices, were diﬀerent from the
present study.
Fast frequency oscillatory activity (> 25Hz) is considered to play a
prominent role in a variety of mental processes, such as attention,
feature integration and conscious perception (e.g. Lachaux et al., 2012;
Fries, 2015). It has been previously hypothesized that, in the context of
nondual meditation states, modulation of endogenous gamma activity
could reﬂect changes in the quality of awareness, especially regarding
the chronometry of stimulus processing (Lutz et al., 2004). We explored
a possible relation between the diﬀerence in gamma power between OP
and RE in experts and the diﬀerence between the same states in mod-
ulating the interplay between MMN and LFN amplitude (Fig. 5). The
relationship we observed in expert practitioners between these two
measures points towards a putative link between spontaneous proﬁles
of oscillatory brain activity during meditation and the modulation of
information processing. Nonetheless, as no diﬀerence was found be-
tween OP and FA in the power of frontal gamma, this analysis remains
exploratory. Further studies should clarify whether a direct relationship
exists between spontaneous gamma and auditory predictive processes
in meditation.
Finally, an increase in alpha oscillatory power was found across
both groups during meditation, compared to the RE condition, and
especially during OP. Since early studies, increased alpha power during
meditation has been consistently reported (see (Cahn and Polich, 2006)
for a recent review) and linked to a general increase in relaxation as a
state eﬀect of numerous practices. Nonetheless, more recent theories
describe the prominent role of alpha oscillatory activity in inhibiting
task-unrelated stimuli when attention is sustained (Clayton et al., 2015;
Fries, 2015), as well as when it is redirected to a speciﬁc task-set
(Jensen et al., 2002), hence its involvement in working memory. In a
recent study, alpha power increased during the transition from mind-
wandering to breath-focus (Braboszcz and Delorme, 2011). Here we
found a correlation between the increase in alpha power and the in-
crease in LFN amplitude during OP compared to RE, across both groups.
This ﬁnding highlights a putative link between alpha oscillatory activity
in meditation and attentional processes (e.g. reorienting attention from
auditory stimuli to the main task-set of the practice).
This study presents some limitations: ﬁrst of all, while a complete
cessation of the MMN response would not be plausible (MMN has been
consistently observed during sleep and even in minimally-conscious
patients (Atienza and Cantero, 2001; Boly et al., 2011)), one might
expect OP meditation in experts to have a deeper impact on predictive
processes and to actually reduce the MMN amplitude, compared to a
control condition. The reason why we did not observe such modulation
could be due to the relatively small sample size and, most importantly,
to the various degrees at which the state of OP could be achieved and
maintained between experts and, within the same session, by the same
subject. This heterogeneity is also a possible reason why we did not ﬁnd
a signiﬁcative diﬀerence between FA and OP in MMN and frontal
gamma power in expert practitioners. When the state of OP is not fully
realised, some degree of concentration might be required, hence
sharing brain processes with the state of FA. On the other hand, once
the “nature of the mind” is realised, it will be always present to some
extent, therefor reducing the gap between OP and FA in terms of
spontaneous brain activity. Future studies should address diﬀerences in
the subjective experience of expert practitioners during advanced
nondual states, relating quantitative data to online self-reports and
qualitative accounts of single-subject proﬁles. Finally, future research
should explore the mechanisms underlying the modulation of the MMN
by OP meditation implementing trial-by-trial analysis of the auditory
responses, based on strong computational hypotheses and modelling
(e.g. (Lieder et al., 2013)).
Overall, the present study provides evidence of the brain processes
underlying a non-dual meditation practice and describes the impact of
meditation on predictive processes. This will foster the understanding
of the brain mechanisms involved in the formation of perceptual habits
and shed light on the mechanisms of meditation practices in clinical
settings.
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Chapter 6 
Perceptual learning in emotional 
settings 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.1 Study 2: Perceptual learning and auditory 
processing under threat of unpredictable 
electric shock 
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Auditory perceptual learning is not affected by anticipatory anxiety in the 
healthy population except for highly anxious individuals: EEG evidence 
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Abstract 
Objective: A recent neurocomputational model proposed that anxious hypervigilance 
impedes perceptual learning, a view supported by the frequently observed modulation 
of the mismatch negativity (MMN), a biomarker of perceptual learning processes, in 
PTSD patients. However, other studies found that anxious states sensitize brain 
responses to stimuli, with no impact on learning. The present research aimed at 
elucidating the impact of anticipatory anxiety on the neural correlates of early stimulus 
processing in the healthy population. Methods: We used electroencephalography 
(EEG) to investigate the impact of threat of unpredictable electric shocks on the 
amplitude of the MMN and other components of the auditory evoked response in 
healthy participants during a passive auditory oddball task. Results: We found no 
increase in the MMN amplitude during periods of threat, except for those participants 
that reported a high degree of anticipatory anxiety or scored high in dispositional 
anxiety. On the other hand, we found a general sensitization of early components of the 
auditory evoked response and changes in subjective and autonomic measures of stress 
during threat. Conclusion: Based on these results, we propose that anxiety, as 
dimensional construct, sensitizes early brain responses to unspecific environmental 
stimuli but affects perceptual learning processes unrelated to the thread only when an 
individual is located at the higher end of the spectrum of anxiety. Significance: This 
view might distinguish between an adaptive role of anxiety on processing efficiency 
and the detrimental impact on perceptual learning observed in psychiatric conditions. 
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1. Introduction  
 
The adaptive interplay between perception and emotional states is fundamental for 
optimal goal-oriented behaviour in complex and volatile environments. Essential to 
this process is the capacity to screen out irrelevant sensory information detect stimuli 
that are relevant or can constitute a threat. Anxiety serves this purpose via affective, 
cognitive and physiological changes that create a state of hypervigilance in response to 
unpredictable threats in novel and uncertain settings (Grupe and Nitschke, 2013). 
Evolutionary, anxiety increases the odds of survival in threatening situations (Kalin 
and Shelton, 1989), but it can become maladaptive if sustained over time and 
associated to otherwise innocuous stimuli. This is the case in psychopathological 
conditions such as PTSD and anxiety disorders (Cisler and Koster, 2010; Newport and 
Nemeroff, 2000). A putative disruptive effect of anxiety on cognitive functions, and 
related performance impairments, is also described in the healthy population by 
nowadays widespread and influential theories (Eysenck et al., 2007; Eysenck and 
Derakshan, 2011). In the framework of cognitive neurosciences, anxiety-induced 
hypervigilance is considered to impact sensory-perceptual processing through the 
sensitisation of neural responses to environmental stimuli (see Jafari et al., 2017; 
Robinson et al., 2011 for recent reviews).  
A recent study has proposed a neurocomputational model of anxious hypervigilance. 
The latter would impede perceptual learning by increasing the synaptic gain of 
prediction error signals while down-regulating descending prediction pathways. This 
mechanism is suggested to tap into early stimulus processing and could underlie the 
detrimental effects of anxiety on higher-order cognitive processes (Cornwell et al., 
2017). This model is ascribed to the predictive coding framework (Friston, 2009) and 
considers the mismatch negativity (MMN, e.g. Näätänen et al., 2004), a neuro-electric 
response to violations of statistical regularities in the sensory environment, as a 
marker of implicit perceptual learning processes in the form of precision-weighted 
prediction error signal (Garrido et al., 2009b). Several studies support the idea of an 
impact of anxiety on perceptual learning: increased MMN amplitude has been observed 
in individuals affected by PTSD (e.g. Ge et al., 2011) and correlates with dispositional 
anxiety (Hansenne et al., 2003). Moreover, a study using magnetoencephalography 
(MEG), has reported increased responses to stimulus deviance under threat of electric 
shock (Cornwell et al., 2007).   
Despite this evidence, contradicting results come from other research that elicit 
anxious states and use electroencephalography (EEG): in these cases, a difference in 
the amplitude of the MMN was either not found (Ermutlu et al., 2005), observed only 
in response to a specific type of stimulus deviancy (Simoens et al., 2007) or found to 
correlate with state anxiety only in an emotionally negative context (Schirmer and 
Escoffier, 2010). Additionally, several studies reported higher brain responses to 
environmental stimuli at early and middle latencies of the sensory event-related 
potential (ERP) during anxious states in the auditory and visual domains, 
independently of the stimulus type (e.g. Ermutlu et al., 2005; Qi et al., 2018; Scaife et 
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al., 2006; Shackman et al., 2011). However, these studies did not use threat of electric 
shock to induce anticipatory anxiety  as in Cornwell et al. (2017) or their focus did not 
encompass both general sensory processes and perceptual learning markers (i.e. the 
MMN).  
In the present study, we tried to shed light on the ambiguous findings concerning the 
effect of anticipatory anxiety on perceptual learning and early stimulus processing. 
Specifically, we used EEG to measure the amplitude of the MMN under threat of electric 
shock during a passive oddball task (as Cornwell et al., 2017, 2007), as well as the 
amplitude of early components of the auditory-evoked response. In addition to 
subjective self-reports, which are commonly used in the above-mentioned studies, we 
measured changes in the electrodermal activity in response to periods of threat to 
provide a marker of the autonomic response to the anxiety-induction procedure 
(Folkins, 1970; Nomikos et al., 1968). Finally, we investigated whether an anxious state 
had a different impact on perceptual learning and early sensory processing than the 
one of anxiety measured as a trait. We  hypothesized that the observed modulation of 
perceptual learning in psychiatric conditions could be due to the dimensional aspect of 
anxiety and be present in those healthy individuals that are located on a higher position 
in the spectrum (Endler and Kocovski, 2001).  
 
 
2. Materials and Methods  
 
2.1 Subjects  
Thirty-six healthy individuals (52±7.6 years old, 17 females) participated in the study. 
Subjects were recruited from the local community to participate as controls in a 
broader project that investigated the effects of mindfulness meditation on cognitive 
and emotional processes. For a detailed description of the recruitment procedure, as 
well as inclusion and exclusion criteria, readers can refer to the project manual 
(Abdoun et al., 2018; available online at osf.io/dbwch). Regarding the present study, 
relevant exclusion criteria were the following: use of psychoactive meditation, history 
of neurological or psychiatric conditions, history of chronic pain or other conditions 
involving sensitisation to pain, personal or family history of epilepsy, severe hearing 
loss. All participants were affiliated to social security, provided written informed 
consent before the start of the study and were paid for their participation. Ethical 
approval was obtained from the appropriate regional ethics committee on Human 
Research (CPP Sud-Est IV, 2015-A01472-47). Each subject completed the trait subscale 
of the State Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI, [Spielberg, 1970]) before participating in 
the experiment. 
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2.2 Task design and stimuli  
Subjects underwent a passive auditory oddball task (e.g. Näätänen et al., 2004), 
consisting of the variable repetition of a standard tone (880Hz; 80ms duration ; 10ms 
rise and fall) followed by the presentation of a frequency deviant (988Hz; 20% of all 
auditory stimuli) presented binaurally (fix Inter-stimulus interval [I.S.I] = 500ms). The 
overall paradigm consisted of six blocks over two experimental sessions with three 
different experimental conditions: two different meditation practices and one control 
condition (one block per condition in each session). In the present report, we analysed 
data from the control condition only. The sequence of blocks was randomised within a 
session and the block order has been considered in the statistical analysis. During a 
block, subjects were asked to watch a silent documentary and ignore the auditory 
stimuli. As in Cornwell et al. (2007), short oddball sequences were embedded in 
alternating 30s periods (8 periods per block) in which participants were informed of 
the possibility of receiving an electric shock (threat periods, n = 4) or that no shocks 
would have been delivered (safe periods, n = 4). The information was conveyed by 
auditory cues at the beginning of each period, before the oddball sequence. The same 
amount of standard and deviant stimuli was delivered during safe and threat periods 
(n = 56 deviants and n = 224 standards when combining four periods). After each block, 
participants were asked to answer, on a 7-point Likert-item, how much anxiety they 
felt during threat and safe periods, as well as how much they were distracted during 
the block and how much they were listening to the auditory stimuli (see 
Supplementary Information 1 for the specific questions asked). 
 
2.3 Electric-shock stimuli and intensity work-up procedure 
In line with the procedure described in Schmitz and Grillon (2012), electrodes from a 
direct current stimulator were placed on the participant’s lower wrist. Participants 
were asked to rate delivered electric stimuli on a scale from 1 to 5 (1 = barely felt, 5 = 
very uncomfortable). Stimuli were presented at intensities starting from 2mA and up 
to 16mA (duration = 100ms), until the participant rated the stimulus 4 out of 5 on the 
scale. If the subject’s threshold reached 16mA, stimuli were delivered at this maximal 
intensity. In our sample, the mean shock intensity was 8.29mA (SD = 4.41). Five shocks 
were delivered randomly throughout the two blocks. No more than two shocks were 
delivered during the same threat period. Subjects were told that the number of 
delivered shocks could vary randomly and that the experimenter had no control over 
their frequency.  
 
2.4 EEG recordings and pre-processing 
EEG was recorded at 512 Hz using the ActiveTwo system (BioSemi, Amsterdam, 
Netherlands), consisting of 64 active electrodes that were placed in an EEG cap 
according to the standard 10/20 system. The horizontal and vertical EOG was 
measured by placing electrodes on the outer canthi and above and below the subject’s 
left eye.  
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Pre-processing was done using EEGLAB (Delorme and Makeig, 2004) and in-house 
Matlab scripts (version R2015a). The EEG signal was downsampled to 250Hz and re-
referenced offline using the electrodes placed at the level of the mastoids (average 
activity of the two channels). Data were visually inspected to identify bad channels, 
which were marked for successive interpolation. Independent Component Analysis 
(ICA) was applied, separately for the two sessions, to the continuous data using the 
Runica algorithm (Makeig et al., 2002). Recordings that underwent ICA were manually 
cleared of big artefacts, filtered between 1 and 20Hz and did not comprise channels 
that would have been subsequently interpolated. Resulting ICA matrices were then 
transferred to the original raw data and ICA components were visually inspected to 
remove blinks and saccades. Data were high-pass filtered at 2Hz to avoid 
contamination of slow frequencies and drifts in the signal caused by sweating during 
the stress periods. Previously marked bad channels were interpolated and 50Hz noise 
was removed using the CleanLine algorithm. Epochs were created between -200 and 
500ms after stimulus onset for standard and deviant stimuli and baseline-corrected (-
100ms baseline). The epoched data were visually inspected with the help of a -/+ 70mV 
amplitude threshold and epochs including artefacts were removed. All outer ring 
channels were rejected due to consistent high-frequency noise, leading to 41 channels 
remaining (see Figure S1 for a visual layout). For each subject, epoched data from one 
session was removed if the number of deviants, after rejection, was lower than thirty-
five for the safe or threat condition. All data from two subjects, and the second session 
from one subject, were excluded from further analysis because of not enough epochs 
after pre-processing. Finally, a low-pass filter of 20Hz was applied to the epoched data 
for the analysis of the evoked responses.  
 
2.6 Event-related potentials 
Statistical analyses were performed using R Studio (version 3.4.2 [R core team, 
2017]).For the analysis of event-related potentials (ERPs), only standard stimuli that 
directly preceded a deviant were considered. The average number of standards was 
52.25 and 51.42 for safe and threat conditions (SD = 6.06 and 5.70 respectively) and 
the average number of deviants was 52.24 and 51.62 (SD = 6.03 and 5.43).  
To identify the MMN, we computed difference waveforms from the grand average 
across all subjects, separately for each of the two experimental sessions. We used an a 
priori region of interest (ROI) that included the channel Fz and four surrounding 
channels (see Figure S1 for a visual layout), consistent with previous literature (e.g. 
Duncan et al., 2009; Näätänen et al., 2011). The MMN amplitude was calculated based 
on a 20ms time-window centred around the most negative peak of the difference 
waveform for each condition (safe and threat) and session between 90 and 200ms after 
stimulus onset. Amplitude values for each subject were extracted within this identified 
time-window.  
Additionally, we performed analysis on the amplitude of classical auditory ERP 
components, such as the N1 and P2 (Picton et al., 1974), on the frontal ROI. Single-
subject amplitudes for each condition (safe and threat), session and stimulus (standard 
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and deviant) were extracted from a 20ms time-window centred around the most 
negative peak between 90 and 200ms for the N1, and around the most positive peak 
between 160 and 300ms for the P2. 
For each of the three components of interest (MMN, N1, P2) we tested the effect of 
condition (threat and safe periods) and stimulus type (for N1 and P2) using linear 
mixed-effects models (R package lme4, [Bates et al., 2014]) that allow for unbalanced 
designs (e.g. missing data from one session for a subject) and the inclusion of random 
effects such as, in the present case, session and block order information for each 
observation. Mixed-effects models were evaluated using an ANOVA analysis of 
variance (Type II Wald chi-square test). Paired t-tests, corrected for multiple 
comparisons using Tukey honestly significant difference test (HSD), were used as post-
hoc tests comparing least-squared means. We report, in the results section, estimates 
of effect size in the form of pseudo-R2 as proposed by Nakagawa and Schielzeth (2013). 
Notice that the calculation of effect sizes in linear mixed models is not unambiguous 
and should be handled with consideration.  
Finally, we performed an additional analysis looking for time-electrode pairs where 
the MMN amplitude differed significantly between safe and threat periods. We 
corrected for multiple comparison using a non-parametric, permutation-based, 
cluster-level statistical test as implemented in the Matlab toolbox Fieldtrip (Oostenveld 
et al., 2011) (cluster-defining threshold = 0.001; cluster-level threshold = 0.05; 10,000 
permutations). 
 
2.7 Skin conductance data acquisition and analysis 
For the recording of electrodermal activity, two passive electrodes were placed on the 
participant’s non-dominant hand, on the volar surface of the distal phalange of the 2nd 
and 3rd fingers. Data were recorded using the 16Hz coupler provided with the 
ActiveTwo system (BioSemi, Amsterdam, Netherlands) with a sampling rate of 250Hz. 
Data were down-sampled at 25Hz and analysed with the Matlab software Ledalab V 
3.4.9 (www.ledalab.de) applying Continuous Decomposition Analysis (Benedek and 
Kaernbach, 2010), separating the tonic electrodermal activity throughout a block from 
the phasic activity. Our measure of interest was the event-related phasic activity after 
the onset of auditory cures preceding safe and threat periods. Data were visually 
inspected and sessions where very weak or no phasic response was present were 
excluded from further analysis. Following this inspection, three subjects and six single 
sessions were excluded due to lack of data (equipment failure) or the lack of phasic 
responses. Subsequently, skin conductance responses (SCRs) were calculated for each 
subject and session over a 1 to 5 seconds window after stimulus onset (threat or safe 
cue) with a minimum threshold of 0.1 microSiemens (μS). A log-transformation was 
applied to raw SCRs to normalize values between and within subjects.  
Statistical analyses were performed using R Studio (version 3.4.2 [R core team, 2017]). 
We used linear mixed models to test the effect of condition (safe and threat) and 
session on the log-transformed SCRs. The information about block order and auditory 
cue order within a block were entered in the model as random effects. Mixed-effects 
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models were evaluated using an ANOVA analysis of variance (Type II Wald chi-square 
test). Paired t-tests, corrected for multiple comparisons using Tukey honestly 
significant difference test (HSD), were used as post-hoc tests comparing least-squared 
means. 
 
2.8 Self-reports and regression analysis  
Statistical analyses were performed using R Studio (version 3.4.2 [R core team, 2017]). 
The analysis of condition (safe and threat) and session effects on self-reported anxiety 
was performed using linear mixed models and treating Likert items as interval data. As 
in previously described models, the information on block order was entered as a 
random effect.  
Finally, we investigated the relationships between answers to self-report questions 
and third-person variables (e.g. ERP components amplitude and SCRs), as well as 
between trait (STAI questionnaire scores) and state measures. To minimize the 
number of statistical tests and allow for unbalanced designs (e.g. SCR or EEG data 
missing for some subjects), we used linear mixed models entering independent 
variables and factors as fixed effects, as well as session and block order information as 
random effects for all the fitted models. Eventual interactions between an independent 
variable and levels of a factor were explored post-hoc comparing the regression slopes 
between each factor level using the function “lstrends” (R package "lsmeans", Lenth, 
2016). In the context of interactions, we tested whether a specific slope for one factor 
level was different from zero using the function “sim_slopes” ( R package “jtools” , Long, 
2018). 
 
 
3. Results  
 
3.1 Manipulation of anxiety 
Participants underwent two experimental sessions (2 to 3 hours apart) where they 
were exposed to two conditions during the EEG recordings. A THREAT condition, when 
the participant was informed of the possibility of receiving an electric shock, and a 
SAFE condition, when no shock was delivered, were alternated during the block. Self-
reported anxiety was significantly higher during THREAT, compared to SAFE condition 
(χ2 (1) = 72.54; p < 0.001) and was generally lower in the second session (χ2 (1) = 11.54; 
p < 0.001) [Figure 1.A; Pseudo-R2 = 0.56, Pseudo-R2 (fixed effects) = 0.26]. No 
interaction was present between condition and session. For some sessions (16 out of 
72) participants reported no difference in anxiety between conditions. We decided to 
keep these observations in further analyses because in several sessions (8 out of 16) 
self-reported anxiety was higher than 1. Nonetheless, additional analyses on the MMN 
amplitude were performed excluding these observations (see results section 3.2). 
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Skin conductance responses (SCRs) were significantly higher during THREAT, 
compared to SAFE condition (χ2 (1) = 5.3; p = 0.02) and were lower in the second 
session (χ2 (1) = 35.45; p < 0.001) [Figure 1.B; Pseudo-R2 = 0.45, Pseudo-R2 (fixed 
effects) = 0.06]. No interaction was present between condition and session. Higher self-
reported anxiety significantly predicted higher SCRs (χ2 (1) = 15.23; p < 0.001; β = 0.22 
[ 95% c.i. = 0.11, 0.34]) [Figure 1.C; Pseudo-R2 = 0.45, Pseudo-R2 (fixed effects) = 0.11]. 
Lower subjective discomfort thresholds to the electric shocks predicted higher SCRs 
(χ2 (1) = 6.64; p = 0.009; β = -0.07 [ 95% c.i. = -0.13, -0.02]) [Figure 1.C; Pseudo-R2 = 
0.47, Pseudo-R2 (fixed effects) = 0.08]. For the last two regression models, condition 
and session were entered as random effects.  
Figure 1. Threat of electric shock increases anticipatory anxiety as measured by self-reports and 
skin conductance responses. (A) Mean values of self-reported anxiety during threat and safe periods 
(left) and during session 1 and 2 (right). (B) Mean amplitude of log-transformed skin conductance 
responses (SCRs) after threat and safe cues (left) and on average during session 1 and 2 (right). For (A) 
and (B), error bars represent standard errors of the mean. (C) Scatter plot for single-subject mean values 
of self-reported anxiety and SCRs amplitude. The regression line and coefficient β are derived from a 
linear mixed model including SCRs and condition (safe, threat) as fixed effects and session, block order 
and subjects as random effects. (D) Scatter plot for single-subject subjective pain threshold and mean 
SCRs amplitude. The regression line and coefficient β are derived from a linear mixed model including 
threshold and condition (safe, threat) as fixed effects and session, block order and subjects as random 
effects. For (C) and (D) the grey area around the regression line indicates 95% confidence intervals. ***: 
p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05 as a result of paired t-tests (Tukey HSD corrected). 
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3.2 MMN amplitude  
Our main question was to investigate whether the MMN amplitude was modulated by 
the threat of electric shock. As no interaction between condition and session was found 
on self-reported anxiety or SCRs, we did not test this interaction in the model on the 
MMN amplitude, but rather included session as a random effect. Figure 2.A and 2.B 
show the time-course of the mean amplitude of the difference waveforms, across 
Figure 2. Threat of electric shock does not modulate neural correlates of perceptual learning, except 
at high degrees of anxiety. (A) Subtraction (deviant minus standard, i.e. MMN) waveforms at frontal ROI 
(see fig. S1) for safe and threat conditions. (B) Average voltage scalp maps of MMN in safe and threat 
conditions at 30ms around peak latencies (safe = 130-150ms; threat = 110-130ms). (C) Mean values of 
MMN from (B) at frontal ROI. Error bars represent standard errors of the mean. (D) Scatter plot for single-
subject mean values of self-reported anxiety and MMN amplitude (left) and mean SCRs and MMN amplitude 
(right) in safe and threat conditions. Regression lines and coefficients β for both plots were derived from 
linear mixed models that included self-reported anxiety (left) or SCRs (right) and condition as fixed effects 
and session, subject and block order as random effects. The grey and red areas around the regression lines 
indicate 95% confidence intervals for safe and threat conditions, respectively. ***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: 
p < 0.05 as a result of paired t-tests (Tukey HSD corrected). 
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participants and sessions, and topographies at the MMN time-window for the SAFE and 
THREAT conditions. There was no effect of condition on the MMN amplitude when all 
observations where included (χ2 (1) = 7 x 10-4; p = 0.97) [Figure 2.A; Pseudo-R2 = 0.04, 
Pseudo-R2 (fixed effects) = 0], as well as excluding observations with no difference in 
self-reported anxiety (χ2 (1) = 0.03; p = 0.84) [Pseudo-R2 = 0.04, Pseudo-R2 (fixed 
effects) = 0]. To rule out a possible bias from focusing on a frontal ROI, as well as to 
explore a possible effect of condition on the MMN in unconventional scalp locations, 
we performed an electrode-wise cluster-based analysis in time and space dimensions. 
We did not find any significant cluster of electrodes that showed a difference between 
the two experimental conditions at any time point of the difference waveform. 
Additionally, we explored a possible relation between self-reported anxiety and the 
MMN amplitude. In this case, we found a significant interaction between anxiety and 
condition (χ2 (1) = 3.75; p = 0.05) showing that higher self-reported anxiety predicted 
lower MMN amplitude in the SAFE condition and higher MMN amplitude in the 
THREAT condition [Figure 2.D; Pseudo-R2 = 0.06, Pseudo-R2 (fixed effects) = 0.03]. 
Nonetheless, none of the two slope coefficients were significantly higher than zero (β 
= 0.31 [95% c.i. = -0.02, 0.63]; p = 0.2 and β = -0.09 [95% c.i. = -0.33, 0.15]; p = 0.51 for 
SAFE and THREAT conditions respectively). Finally, we explored a relationship 
between the SCRs and MMN amplitudes. No main effect or interaction between SCRs 
and MMN resulted from this regression model (Figure 2.D). 
 
3.3 N1 and P2 amplitude  
We investigated the impact of threat of electric shock on components of the auditory 
evoked response that are related to early sensory processing for standard and deviant 
stimuli. Again, we included session as a random effect in the tested models. Figure 3.A 
shows the time-course of the auditory evoked responses across participants and 
sessions for standard and deviant stimuli during THREAT and SAFE condition. Figure 
3.B shows the respective topographies at the N1 and P2 time-windows. The best fitting 
model at the N1 latency showed how the N1 amplitude increases during THREAT, 
compared to the SAFE condition (χ2 (1) = 11.16; p < 0.001). A main effect of stimulus 
was present, representing the MMN (χ2 (1) = 67; p < 0.001), while there was no 
interaction between stimulus and condition [Figure 3.C; Pseudo-R2 = 0.71, Pseudo-R2 
(fixed effects) = 0.08]. At the P2 latency, the best fitting model resulted in an interaction 
between stimulus and condition (χ2 (1) = 6.07; p = 0.01) [Figure 3.D; Pseudo-R2 = 0.39, 
Pseudo-R2 (fixed effects) = 0.02]. At this latency, the amplitude of the evoked response 
increases during the THREAT condition only for deviant stimuli (t-ratio (231) = -2.33; 
p = 0.02 for deviants and t-ratio (231) = 1.15; p = 0.25 for standards) and a difference 
between standard and deviant stimuli is present during the SAFE condition only (t-
ratio (231) = 2.84; p = 0.004 for safe and t-ratio (231) = -0.64; p = 0.52 for threat 
conditions). Additionally, we tested whether self-reported anxiety and the amplitude 
of SCRs mediated the effect of condition on the N1 amplitude. In this case, we did not 
find any relation between self-reported anxiety, or SCRs, and N1 amplitude during 
threat or safe conditions.  
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3.3 Modulation of MMN and N1 amplitude by trait anxiety and attention  
 We investigated the relation between trait anxiety, derived from the STAI 
questionnaire scores, and the amplitude of the MMN and N1 components of the 
auditory evoked response during SAFE or THREAT conditions. Averaged trait anxiety 
scores across participants were 39.39 (SD = 9.06). We found a significant interaction 
between STAI scores and condition in predicting the MMN amplitude (χ2 (1) = 4.54; p 
= 0.03) [Figure 4; Pseudo-R2 = 0.07, Pseudo-R2 (fixed effects) = 0.03]. As for the 
interaction between self-reported anxiety and MMN amplitude, a higher score in trait 
anxiety was related to decreased MMN amplitude in the safe condition and increased 
amplitude in the threat condition. Nonetheless, when the two slopes coefficients were 
Figure 3. Threat of electric shock increases the amplitude of neural correlates of early sensory 
processing. (A) Event-related responses to standard (solid lines) and deviant (dashed lines) tones at 
frontal ROI (see fig. S1) during safe and threat conditions. (B) Average voltage scalp maps of standard and 
deviant stimuli in safe and threat conditions at 30ms around peak latencies for the N1 (30-200ms) and P2 
(160-300ms) components of the auditory evoked response. (C) Mean values of N1 amplitude from (B) at 
frontal ROI for safe and threat conditions, combining standard and deviant stimuli. (D) Mean values of P2 
amplitude from (B) at frontal ROI for safe and threat conditions and separately for standard and deviant 
stimuli. For (C) and (D), error bars represent standard errors of the mean. ***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 
0.05 as a result of paired t-tests (Tukey HSD corrected). 
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tested, none was significantly different than zero (β = 0.03 [95% c.i. = -0.01, 0.08]; p = 
0.23 and β = -0.03 [95% c.i. = -0.08, 0.01]; p = 0.24 for SAFE and THREAT conditions 
respectively). As for the self-reported anxiety, no relation was found between STAI 
scores and N1 amplitude.  
Finally, we explored whether a modulation of the MMN and N1 amplitude was related 
to self-report measures of distraction and attention to sounds. More specifically, 
participants were asked, at the end of each block, to which degree they have got 
distracted from the task (i.e. watching a movie) and to which degree they were listening 
to sounds during the task. No interaction or main effect was present when we tested 
whether attention to sounds or general distraction during the block predicted higher 
MMN or N1 amplitude.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. High degrees of trait anxiety 
modulate the neural correlates of 
perceptual learning under threat of electric 
shock. Scatter plot for single-subject mean 
values of trait anxiety (T-STAI score) and MMN 
amplitude in safe and threat conditions. The 
regression lines and coefficients β are derived 
from a linear mixed model including T-STAI 
score and condition (safe, threat) as fixed 
effects and session, block order and subjects as 
random effects. The grey and red areas around 
the regression lines indicate 95% confidence 
intervals for safe and threat conditions, 
respectively. ***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 
0.05 as a result of paired t-tests (Tukey HSD 
corrected). 
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4. Discussion  
 
The main aim of the present study was to clarify the impact of anticipatory anxiety on 
early sensory processing. We investigated whether an induced anxious state affects 
brain correlates of perceptual learning (i.e. the MMN amplitude) or results in a general 
sensitisation of neural early stimulus processing. Contrary to previous EEG studies, we 
relied on threat of electric shock as a well-established state anxiety manipulation 
procedure, to provide results that are comparable with recent findings (Cornwell et al., 
2017) and account for limitations of other methods (Robinson et al., 2013 for a review). 
Participants reported higher levels of anxiety during periods of threat, compared to 
safe periods. Additionally, electrodermal activity was affected by electric shock threat, 
resulting in higher skin conductance responses (SCRs) to auditory cues introducing 
threat, compared to safe periods. These results confirm the involvement of the 
sympathetic branch of the autonomic nervous system in the anticipation of 
unpredictable noxious stimuli (Epstein and Roupenian, 1970). Moreover, SRCs and 
self-reports of state anxiety were strongly related in this paradigm, highlighting a high 
degree of specificity of electrodermal activity compared to other physiological 
measures. In a previous study, for instance, measures of salivary cortisol, a widely used 
marker of stress, did not correlate with subjective ratings (Simoens et al., 2007).  
Both the average self-reported anxiety and SCRs decreased from the first to the second 
experimental session. Despite a well-known relation between repetitive exposure to 
stressors and habituation of electrodermal activity (Epstein, 1971), an alternative 
explanation for these results could be found in an effect of general fatigue and in the 
fact that the second session took place within an hour after lunch. However, the general 
decrease in anxiety between the first and second session did not modulate or disrupt 
the induction of an anxious state during the threat periods.  
Although we can maintain, based on the above-mentioned results, that the 
experimental paradigm effectively manipulated levels of anticipatory anxiety, we did 
not find a difference in the amplitude of the MMN between safe and threat periods. This 
result held true regardless of whether a difference in MMN amplitude was tested in a 
canonical frontal ROI or using an electrode-wise cluster-based approach. No effect of 
the experimental manipulation was found when subjects that did not report any 
difference in anticipatory anxiety between conditions were excluded from the analysis. 
The findings are in line with previous studies that either did not find differences in 
MMN amplitude to frequency deviants at the level of scalp EEG (Ermutlu et al., 2005; 
Simoens et al., 2007) or found that state anxiety modulates differences in MMN in 
negative, but not neutral contexts (Schirmer and Escoffier, 2010). Our results 
contradict previous studies that reported increased brain responses to auditory 
deviants after the induction of an anxious state (Cornwell et al., 2017, 2007; Elling et 
al., 2011). Elling et al. (2011) used EEG to measure the MMN amplitude during a cold 
pressure task (CPT); the MMN increased right after the application of the stressor. 
Beside the ambiguity on the CPT effectiveness in inducing anticipatory anxiety (e.g. 
Robinson et al., 2013), the statistical analysis implemented in this study is 
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questionable. The MMN amplitude after the stressor application was compared, using 
an a priori contrast, to the average amplitude of measures at other nine time-points 
combined. This approach can increase the probability of false positives since the two 
conditions tested differ in terms of signal-to-noise ratio. Cornwell et al. (2007) used 
MEG to locate brain regions of increased response to stimulus deviance under threat 
of electric shock. Greater activity in several regions was found to correlate with 
differences in self-reported anticipatory anxiety. Nonetheless, a relatively lax threshold 
for detecting regions of activity was used (at least two contiguous voxels with the 
probability of the average t statistic p < 0.05, with no correction for multiple 
comparisons). Cornwell et al. (2017) replicated the previous MEG results, but 
restricting the analysis on a priori regions of interest that are part of a neuroanatomical 
model of the MMN (Garrido et al., 2009a). Within specific sources, they found an 
interaction between treatment (benzodiazepine) and condition (safe and threat) on 
the magnetic equivalent of the MMN. The authors, however, do not report results on 
the direction of the interaction and one could presume that the response to deviants 
was higher in threat, compared to safe periods, in the placebo condition, whereas the 
opposite was true when subjects underwent a pharmacological treatment.  
A possible reason underlying the different results between the present EEG study and 
previous MEG studies could come from the role of attention in modulating the size of 
prediction error signals, described in different sensory domains (Feldman and Friston, 
2010; Kok et al., 2012b). In the cited research, subjects underwent a passive oddball 
task, but were not instructed to ignore the auditory stimuli (the information is not 
present in the reports). In the present study, participants were instructed to watch a 
silent movie and ignore the auditory stimulation. However, we did not find any 
significant relation between self-reported attention to the auditory stimuli and the 
MMN amplitude. As we did not conceive the paradigm to elucidate this question, we 
can hypothesize that attentional shifts during the oddball session were not that 
consistent to determine a modulation of the MMN. 
A further explanation could be found in the different statistical power and sensitivity 
between a source-based approach using MEG and the analysis of electric currents at 
the scalp level with EEG. Previous MEG studies did not report statistical analysis on 
sensors, hence no comparison with the present findings is possible at the scalp level. 
In spite of this, previous researches have described a considerable degree of 
correspondence between sources of MEG activity and electric MMN responses 
(Huotilainen et al., 1998).  
Despite the lack of replication of studies that propose a general effect of anticipatory 
anxiety on perceptual learning, we hypothesize that this effect could be present for 
subjects with high degrees of state or trait anxiety. Specifically, we found a different 
modulatory effect of self-reported, as well as trait anxiety, on the MMN amplitude in 
the threat and safe conditions. The observed interactions point towards a possible 
difference in the MMN during threat, compared to safe periods, in subjects that scored 
high in the trait anxiety measure, as well as in those who reported high levels of state 
anxiety. This is in line with views of anxiety as a dimensional construct (Endler and 
Kocovski, 2001) and neurophysiological accounts of disfunctions in executive 
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networks related to high levels of trait anxiety (Sylvester et al., 2012). The putative 
impact of anxiety on perceptual learning as a function of the degree of trait and state 
severity can also explain the relative consistency found in studies that investigated the 
modulation of MMN amplitude by anxiety-related psychopathologies and dispositional 
anxiety  (e.g. Bangel et al., 2017; Chen et al., 2016; Ge et al., 2011; Hansenne et al., 2003). 
The present findings raised a methodological consideration: when explored separately, 
no relationship was found between state or trait anxiety and the amplitude of the MMN 
in either safe or threat conditions. This result suggests that the MMN could be used as 
a marker of trait-anxiety only when one is contrasting the modulatory effect of trait-
anxiety in a neutral compared to an anxiogenic state.  
An interesting hypothesis is that state anxiety is generally linked to alerting and hyper 
vigilance and doesn’t necessarily impact more complex processes such as perceptual 
learning, unless high levels of state or trait anxiety are reached (Pacheco-Unguetti et 
al., 2010). In the present study, we found an impact of the experimental manipulation 
on the amplitude of early neural responses to auditory stimuli. Similarly to previous 
studies (Ermutlu et al., 2005; Scaife et al., 2006b; White et al., 2005) we found an 
increased auditory N1 during threat, compared to safe periods. These results are also 
in line with research that reports an impact of mild stress on the sensitisation of early 
sensory processing in other domains (Qi et al., 2018; Shackman et al., 2011a). In the 
auditory domain, the increase in N1 amplitude has been related to an increase in 
noradrenergic activity, affecting the ability to filter out irrelevant sensory information 
(Ermutlu et al., 2005). Here we found that the modulation of neural correlates of early 
sensory processing by anticipatory anxiety is present for all stimuli at the N1 latency 
but is limited to auditory deviants at the P2 latency. A possible explanation is that, at 
later stages of sensory processing, only stimuli that are characterised by a higher 
degree of saliency are affected by the experimental manipulation. Nonetheless, this 
hypothesis remains exploratory.  
Finally, contrary to the MMN, the modulation of the N1 amplitude by the experimental 
conditions was not mediated by self-reported or trait anxiety. In this sense, we can 
affirm that the sensitisation of early sensory processing by a state of hypervigilance is 
a robust phenomenon, which impacts brain responses even at a mild degree of anxiety.  
To summarise, in the present study we sought to elucidate the influence of anticipatory 
anxiety on early sensory processing. We found that, contrary to recent findings, state 
anxiety does not modulate a common neural marker of perceptual learning, but rather 
sensitises early brain responses to auditory stimuli. Perceptual learning processes 
seem to be affected only at high levels of state and trait anxiety. Such a scenario is 
plausible if we consider anxiety as a dimensional construct. At mild levels of anxiety, 
brain responses to otherwise irrelevant stimuli are increased, an adaptive feedback to 
unpredictable threats in uncertain environments. However, when a state of anxiety is 
highly intense, or sustained across time, it affects the way the brain makes sense of the 
environment and learns about its features. Ultimately, such view distinguishes 
between an adaptive role of anxiety on processing efficiency and the detrimental 
impact on perceptual learning observed in psychiatric conditions. 
 
 
115 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.2 Study 3: Perceptual learning and emotion 
regulation in expert and novice practitioners 
during threat of electric shock  
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Abstract  
The impact of mindfulness meditation on emotional responses and emotion regulation 
has been widely explored. Nonetheless, little is known about the neurocognitive 
mechanisms underlying mindfulness practices in emotional contexts and their relation 
to a practitioner’s subjective experience. In this work, we investigated the effect of 
anticipatory anxiety on auditory perceptual learning and early stimulus processing 
during different meditative states in expert and novice meditators. We used 
electroencephalography to study the mismatch negativity (MMN), a neural marker of 
perceptual learning processes. Previous studies suggested that the MMN can be 
modulated by anxiety. We hypothesized that this modulation would not be present in 
experts during meditation states and that this effect would be related to specific 
phenomenological configurations. We found that the MMN amplitude increased during 
periods of unpredictable threat only in individuals with high dispositional anxiety 
during a control state, but not during meditation. Additionally, expert meditators 
showed a dissociation between physiological responses to threat and subjective 
measures of anxiety. This dissociation was predicted by the experts’ specific subjective 
experience, characterised by higher phenomenal clarity and meta-awareness, 
compared to novices. These two dimensions also predicted higher amplitude of a later 
component of the auditory evoked response during meditation, associated to 
attentional monitoring processes, compared to a control state. Overall, the present 
work provides empirical evidence of the mechanisms underlying emotion regulation 
in expert meditation practitioners.  
 
 
Keywords: MMN, perceptual learning, anxiety, mindfulness, emotion regulation, 
subjective experience  
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1. Introduction  
 
In everyday life, cognitive functions are intertwined with emotional and motivational 
states (Lazarus, 1982; Pessoa, 2008). This interaction applies also to perceptual 
learning, the process of casting predictions on the state of the sensory environment 
and comparing them with the incoming sensory evidence, in the form of prediction 
error signals (Friston, 2003). Within this framework, recent studies have shown that 
reward prediction errors (i.e. the difference between expected and observed 
outcomes) are modulated by emotional contexts (Robinson et al., 2013a; Watanabe et 
al., 2013). Emotions can also impact the perception of stimuli that are unrelated to the 
causes of the emotional state itself and are otherwise neutral. It is the case of anxiety, 
which instantiates a state of hypervigilance in response to unpredictable threats in 
novel and uncertain settings (Grupe and Nitschke, 2013). It is know that anticipatory 
anxiety impacts sensory-perceptual processing through the sensitisation of neural 
responses to environmental stimuli (see Jafari et al., 2017; Robinson et al., 2013b for 
recent reviews). Whereas anxiety maintains an evolutionary meaning in increasing the 
odds of survival in threatening situations (Kalin and Shelton, 1989), such state can 
become maladaptive if sustained over time and associated to otherwise innocuous 
stimuli. In fact, according to a recent neuroanatomical model, anticipatory anxiety can 
impede perceptual learning processes (Cornwell et al., 2017); a view supported by the 
research on anxiety-related psychopathologies, such as PTSD, and dispositional 
anxiety (e.g. Cisler and Koster, 2010; Newport and Nemeroff, 2000). 
The effect of mindfulness meditation on emotional responses and emotion regulation 
has been widely investigated (see Hölzel et al., 2011; Keng et al., 2011; Tang et al., 2015 
for recent reviews). Several studies have shown that meditation training 
downregulates the activity of brain regions underlying affective responses to 
emotional stimuli (e.g. Desbordes et al., 2012; Kral et al., 2018; Taren et al., 2015) and 
anticipatory processes of nociceptive triggers (Lutz et al., 2013). Interestingly, reduced 
affective responses to nociceptive stimuli after meditation training is not caused by 
decreased sensitivity. In fact, activity in brain regions related to stimulus saliency 
increases in response to nociceptive triggers in expert practitioners (Lutz et al., 2013). 
This evidence points towards a role of meditation training in dissociating the encoding 
of emotional stimuli from its related affective experience. The mechanisms underlying 
the regulation of emotional responses by meditation are still unclear and they possibly 
rely on top-down or bottom-up processes, depending on the amount of practice and 
expertise (Chiesa et al., 2013). Theoretical accounts suggest that the cultivation of 
meta-awareness, the cognitive function of being aware of the processes of 
consciousness, could play a crucial role in reducing the degree of experiential fusion 
with one’s emotional experience, promoting cognitive control and non-judgmental 
acceptance (Dahl et al., 2015).  
No previous studies have explored the effect of mindfulness meditation on anticipatory 
anxiety of unpredictable threat stimuli and little is known about the interplay between 
the specific attentional and motivational stance cultivated during meditation and the 
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neurocognitive processes affected by emotional states. Recent findings suggest that 
neural perceptual learning processes can be regulated by different mindfulness 
practices, as a function of meditation expertise, in a neutral environment (Fucci et al., 
2018). It is unknown, however, whether meditation has an impact on perceptual 
learning in emotional contexts. 
In this research, we investigate the effect of anticipatory anxiety on perceptual learning 
and early stimulus processing and its modulation by different meditative states in 
expert and novice practitioners. Specifically, we used EEG to measure the amplitude of 
the mismatch negativity (MMN), which reflects implicit perceptual learning processes 
(Garrido et al., 2009b), and the amplitude of early components of the auditory-evoked 
response under threat of electric shock during a passive auditory oddball task (as in 
Cornwell et al., 2017, 2007).  We expected an overall sensitisation of brain responses 
to auditory stimuli during threat periods in both groups of participants and 
indiscriminately for meditation states and a control condition. Differently, we 
hypothesised that the MMN amplitude would have been affected by threat during a 
control condition but not during meditation, as results of the regulation of threat by 
the meditation practice, especially in experts compared to novice practitioners. In 
experts, we expected to observe a dissociation between physiological responses to 
threat and the intensity of the experience of anticipatory anxiety. This dissociation 
would downregulate the impact of threat on learning processes and would be related 
to the specific attentional and motivational stance cultivated during mindfulness 
practices. Finally, we hypothesized that this downregulation would be stronger during 
a state of nondual mindfulness (Open presence, OP; Lutz et al., 2007), compared to a 
state of concentrative meditation (Focused attention, FA; Lutz et al., 2008) due to the 
higher degree of meta-awareness and dereification of subjective experience that 
characterises the former practice.  
We implemented a neurophenomenological approach, integrating self-reports of 
different dimensions of subjective experience during meditation with measures of 
bodily physiology (i.e. electrodermal activity) and components of the auditory evoked 
response. More precisely, we collected reports on the degree of meta-awareness and 
clarity during FA and OP meditation [open monitoring (OM) for novices; see Methods 
section 2.2] and a control condition. Clarity refers to the degree of vividness with which 
an experience occurs and it is linked to meta-awareness and expertise in different 
styles of mindfulness (Lutz et al., 2015). Additionally, we explored the relationship 
between self-reports and trait measures of interoceptive awareness and cognitive 
defusion (Forman et al., 2012; Mehling et al., 2012).  
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2. Materials and Methods  
 
2.1 Subjects  
Thirty expert meditation practitioners (52±7.8 years old, 13 females) and thirty-six 
control healthy individuals (52±7.6 years old, 17 females) participated in the study. 
Meditation naive participants were recruited locally through flyers and posters in 
public places, on mailing lists, Facebook and notifications to research participant 
databases. Expert practitioners were recruited from multiple meditation centres, 
predominantly in France but also internationally, with the help of a long-term 
practitioner with extensive contacts within the Nyingma and Kagyü meditation 
community. The present study was part of a larger research project that included 
several experimental sessions. A detailed description of the general inclusion and 
exclusion criteria for expert and novice practitioners, as well as the inclusion process 
is provided in a separate document (Abdoun et al., 2018; accessible online at 
osf.io/dbwch). All participants were affiliated to social security, provided written 
informed consent before the start of the study and were paid for their participation. 
Ethical approval was obtained from the appropriate regional ethics committee on 
Human Research (CPP Sud-Est IV, 2015-A01472-47). 36 novices and 23 experts 
completed the trait scale of the State Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI, [Spielberg, 1970]) 
before participating in the experiment. Additionally, 24 novices and 23 experts 
completed the Drexel Defusion Scale (DDS, Forman et al., 2012) and the 
Multidimensional Assessment of Interoceptive Awareness (MAIA, Mehling et al., 2012).  
 
2.2. Meditation practices and training 
The distinction between focused attention (FA) and open monitoring  (OM) styles of 
meditation has been extensively discussed in previous theoretical work (Lutz et al., 
2008). In the present study, during the FA condition, participants were asked to 
concentrate on a fixation cross as the object of meditation. The choice of this specific 
object was done to allow an unbiased comparison with the control condition, when 
subjects watched a silent documentary on the same screen. A fixation cross was 
present on the screen in the OM practice as well and subjects were asked to keep their 
eyes opened. Practicing meditation with eyes opened is a common feature of the 
Nyingma and Kagyü schools, which all expert practitioners who participated in this 
research belonged to. It is also suggested in the training program proposed to the 
control subjects, which derives from the same Buddhist traditions. In the present study, 
keeping the eyes opened helped avoiding the contamination of the EEG signal by alpha 
oscillatory activity. 
It is important to notice that novice and expert practitioners differ in their style of 
practicing objectless meditation. Specifically, the present group of expert meditators 
was intensively trained in practices related to the “realization of the nature of mind” 
(Tib. rig pa). In their case, practicing meditation without object is related to 
maintaining a state previously referred to as open presence (e.g. Lutz et al., 2007). 
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Within this state, an awareness of whatever emerges in experience continues without 
the effortful vigilance that characterizes OM styles of practice (see the notion of 
“reflexive awareness” in previous works; e.g. Coseru, 2015; Dunne, 2015). However, as 
we mentioned in previous research (Fucci et al., 2018), the state of OP is characterised 
by a high degree of variability between subjects and within a specific session. In the 
present study, experts were engaged with such practice for few minutes within each 
experimental session and there was no way to tell whether the participant’s subjective 
experience was more akin to OM or OP.  
Novice practitioners were introduced to the practice of meditation during a weekend-
long training program. During the program, they not only familiarised with the specific 
practices, but were introduced to the terminology used to describe dimensions of the 
subjective experience in the context of research in contemplative science. This was 
done to create a common linguist framework between the researchers and the 
participants and to allow for an accurate description of the participant’s subjective 
experience. In a separate report (see Protocol Study), we provide a comprehensive 
account of this methodological approach, as well as empirical data supporting the 
assumption that novice practitioners were indeed familiar with specific 
phenomenological categories that are related to meditation practice.  
Novices were asked to practice at home during the period preceding the experiment 
(see Abdoun et al 2018 for a detailed account of subjects’ degree of compliance to the 
home practice).  
 
2.3 Task design and stimuli  
Subjects underwent a passive auditory oddball task (e.g. (Näätänen et al., 2004)), 
consisting of the variable repetition of a standard tone (880Hz; 80ms duration ; 10ms 
rise and fall) followed by the presentation of a frequency deviant (988Hz; 20% of all 
auditory stimuli) presented binaurally (fixed I.S.I = 500ms). The overall paradigm 
consisted in six blocks over two experimental sessions with three different 
experimental conditions (figure 1): focused attention meditation (FA), open presence 
meditation (OP) and a control condition (VD) during which subjects were asked to 
watch a silent movie and ignore the auditory stimuli. The sequence of blocks was 
randomised within each session and the block order has been considered in the 
statistical analysis. Each block started with a 2 minutes period with no auditory stimuli. 
During this time, subjects were asked to meditate or watch the silent movie, depending 
on the block. Subsequently, short oddball sequences were embedded in alternating 30s 
periods (8 periods per block) in which participants were informed of the possibility of 
receiving an electric shock (threat periods, n = 4) or that no shocks would have been 
delivered (safe periods, n = 4)[ as in Cornwell et al., 2007]. The information was 
conveyed by auditory cues at the beginning of each period, before the oddball 
sequence. The same amount of standard and deviant stimuli was delivered during safe 
and threat periods (n = 56 deviants and n = 224 standards when combining four 
periods). After each block, participants were asked to answer, on a 1 to 7 Likert-item, 
how much anxiety they felt during threat and safe periods. Additional questions were 
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asked after each block, to be answered using the same response format. Questions 
verted upon different dimension of the participant’s subjective experience during the 
block and were not specific for safe and threat periods (see Supplementary Information 
1 for the specific questions and response scales). 
 
 
 
 
 
2.4 Electric-shock stimuli and intensity work-up procedure 
In line with the procedure described in Schmitz and Grillon (2012), electrodes from a 
direct current stimulator were placed on the participant’s lower wrist. Participants 
were asked to rate, on a scale from 1 to 5 (1=barely felt, 5=very uncomfortable), 
delivered electric stimuli. Stimuli were presented at intensities starting from 2mA and 
up to 16mA (duration = 100ms), until the participant rated 4 out of 5 on the scale the 
currently delivered stimulus. If the subject’s threshold reached 16mA, stimuli were 
delivered at this maximal intensity. In our sample, the mean shock intensity was 
8.29mA (SD = 4.41) and 8.41mA (SD = 5.1) for the novices and experts group, 
respectively. A total of five shocks were delivered randomly throughout the two blocks 
of each experimental condition (FA, OM, VD). No more than two shocks were delivered 
during the same threat period. Subjects were told that the number of delivered shocks 
could vary randomly and that the experimenter had no control over their frequency.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Schematic illustration of the experimental paradigm. Each experimental block started with a 
2 minutes baseline period, followed by auditory oddball sequences embedded in safe and threat periods. 
Participants underwent three blocks, in a random order, during focused attention (FA) and open presence 
(OP) meditation and a control condition in which they were instructed to watch a silent movie and ignore 
auditory stimuli (VD). After each block, they answered questions on a 7-points Likert-like item. The 
paradigm consisted of two sessions including three blocks each. 
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2.5 EEG recordings and pre-processing  
EEG was recorded at 512 Hz using the ActiveTwo system (BioSemi, Amsterdam, 
Netherlands), consisting of 64 active electrodes that were placed in an EEG cap 
according to the standard 10/20 system, with CMS-DRL serving as the reference-
ground. The horizontal and vertical EOG was measured by placing electrodes on the 
outer canthi and above and below the subject’s left eye.  
Pre-processing was done using EEGLAB (Delorme and Makeig, 2004) and personal 
Matlab scripts (version R2015a). The EEG signal was downsampled to 250Hz and re-
referenced offline using the electrodes placed at the level of the mastoids (average 
activity of the two channels). Data were visually inspected to identify bad channels, 
which were marked for successive interpolation. Independent Component Analysis 
(ICA) was applied, separately for the two sessions, to the continuous data using the 
Runica algorithm (Makeig et al., 2002). Recordings that underwent ICA were manually 
cleared of big artefacts, filtered between 1 and 20Hz (using eegfiltnew function, which 
applies a Hamming windowed sinc FIR filter. High-pass and low-pass filters were 
applied separately. High-pass 1Hz order = 1650; low-pass 20Hz order = 166) and did 
not comprise channels that would have been subsequently interpolated. ICA was 
applied only on recordings from the control video condition. This choice was made to 
be able to clearly identify saccades and blinks across all experimental conditions while 
allowing for faster calculations. Resulting ICA matrices were then transferred to the 
original raw data of each experimental condition within a session. Subsequently, ICA 
components were visually inspected to remove blinks and saccades. Data were high-
pass filtered at 2Hz (filter order = 414) to avoid contamination of slow frequencies and 
drifts in the signal caused by sweating during the stress periods. Previously marked 
bad channels were interpolated and 50Hz noise was removed using the Cleanline 
algorithm. Epochs were created between -200 and 500ms after stimulus onset for 
standard and deviant stimuli, and baseline-corrected (-100ms baseline). The epoched 
data were inspected and bad epochs were removed. All outer ring channels were 
rejected due to consistent noise, leading to 41 channels remaining (see figure S1 for a 
visual layout). For each subject, epoched data from one block was removed if the 
number of deviants, after rejection, was lower than thirty-five for the safe or threat 
condition. Following this procedure, one expert practitioner was excluded from further 
analysis. Additional data from specific experimental conditions and blocks were 
excluded (see Supplementary Information 2.2 for a summary table). Finally, a low-pass 
filter of 20Hz was applied to the epoched data for the analysis of the evoked responses.  
 
2.7 Event-related potentials 
Statistical analyses were performed using R Studio (version 3.4.2 [R core team, 
2017]).For the analysis of event-related potentials (ERPs), only standard stimuli that 
directly preceded a deviant were considered (see Supplementary Information for a 
summary of the mean number of epochs in each session separately for group, state, 
condition and stimulus type).  
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To identify the MMN, we computed the difference waveforms from the grand average 
between all subjects, separately for each group, state (FA, OM, VD), condition (safe, 
threat) and session. We used an a priori region of interest (ROI) that included the 
channel Fz and four surrounding channels (figure S1). The ROI was consistent with 
previous literature (e.g. Duncan et al., 2009; Näätänen et al., 2011). Nonetheless, we 
performed additional exploratory analysis on the MMN amplitude at the channel Cz, to 
investigate a possible effect of threat periods on unconventional MMN sites. The MMN 
amplitude was calculated based on a 20ms time-window centred around the most 
negative peak of the difference waveform for each condition (safe and threat), session, 
state and group between 90 and 200ms after stimulus onset. Amplitude values for each 
subject were extracted within this identified time-window.  
Additionally, we performed analysis on the amplitude of classical auditory ERP 
components, such as the N1 and P2 (Picton et al., 1974) on the frontal ROI. Single-
subject amplitudes for each condition (safe and threat), session, state, group and 
stimulus type were extracted from a 20ms time-window centred around the most 
negative peak between 90 and 200ms for the N1, and as the average amplitude 
between 180 and 280ms for the P2. 
For each of three components of interest (MMN, N1, P2) we tested the effect of 
condition, group, state, and stimulus type (for N1 and P2) using linear mixed-effects 
models (R package lme4, [Bates et al., 2014]) which allow for unbalanced designs (e.g. 
missing data from one block for a subject) and the inclusion of random effects such as, 
in the present case, session and block order information. Mixed-effects models were 
evaluated using an ANOVA analysis of variance (Type II Wald chi-square test). Paired 
t-tests, corrected for multiple comparisons using Tukey honestly significant difference 
test (HSD), were used as post-hoc tests comparing least-squared means. We report, in 
the results section, estimates of effect size in the form of pseudo-R2 as proposed by 
Nakagawa and Schielzeth (2013). Notice that the calculation of effect sizes in linear 
mixed models is not unambiguous and should be handled with consideration.  
 
2.8 Skin conductance data acquisition and analysis 
For the recording of electrodermal activity, two passive electrodes were placed on the 
participant’s non-dominant hand, on the volar surface of the distal phalange of the 2nd 
and 3rd fingers. Data were recorded using the 16Hz coupler provided with the 
ActiveTwo system (BioSemi, Amsterdam, Netherlands) with a sampling rate of 250Hz. 
Data were downsampled at 25Hz and analysed with the Matlab software Ledalab V 
3.4.9 (www.ledalab.de) applying Continuous Decomposition Analysis (Benedek and 
Kaernbach, 2010), separating the phasic from the tonic electrodermal activity in a 
block. Our two measures of interest were 1) the event-related phasic activity after the 
onset of auditory cures preceding safe and threat periods and 2) the event-related 
phasic activity in response to the electric shock stimuli. Data were visually inspected 
and sessions where very weak or no phasic response was present were excluded from 
further analysis. Following this inspection, three control subjects and ten single 
sessions were excluded due to missing data (equipment failure) or lack of phasic 
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responses. Subsequently, skin conductance responses (SCRs) were calculated for each 
subject and session over a 1 to 5 seconds window after stimulus onset with a minimum 
threshold of 0.1 microSiemens (μS). As previously mentioned, three types of stimuli 
were included: cues preceding safe and threat periods, and electric shock stimuli. A log-
transformation was applied to raw SCRs to normalize values between and within 
subjects.  
Statistical analyses were performed using R Studio (version 3.4.2 [R core team, 2017]) 
using linear mixed models. We tested 1) the effect of condition (safe and threat), state, 
group and session in response to the auditory cues and 2) effect of group, state and 
session in response to the electric shocks on the log-transformed SCRs. The 
information about block order and auditory cue order within a block were entered in 
the model as random effects. Mixed-effects models were evaluated using an ANOVA 
analysis of variance (Type II Wald chi-square test). Paired t-tests, corrected for 
multiple comparisons using Tukey honestly significant difference test (HSD), were 
used as post-hoc tests comparing least-squared means. 
 
2.9 Self-reports and regression analysis  
Analyses were performed using R Studio (version 3.4.2 [R core team, 2017]). The 
analysis of condition (safe and threat), state, group and session effects on self-reported 
anxiety was performed using linear mixed models and treating Likert items as interval 
data. An integrative model including all items was used to investigate group, state and 
session effects on the different scales of self-report questions (see Supplementary 
Information 1 for each specific question). As in previously described models, the 
information on block order was entered as a random effect.  
We investigated the relationships between self-reports and third-person variables (e.g. 
ERP components amplitude and SCRs), as well as between trait (STAI, MAIA and DDS 
questionnaires scores) and specific state measures. To minimize the number of 
statistical tests and allow for unbalanced designs (e.g. SCR or EEG data missing for 
some subjects), we used linear mixed models entering independent variables and 
factors as fixed effects, as well as session and block order information as random effects 
for all the fitted models. Eventual interactions between an independent variable and 
levels of a factor were explored post-hoc comparing the regression slopes between 
each factor level using the function “lstrends” (R package "lsmeans", Lenth, 2016). In 
the context of interactions, we tested whether a specific slope for one factor level was 
different from zero using the function “sim_slopes” ( R package “jtools” , Long, 2018). 
Finally, when an interaction between two continuous variables was present, we 
analysed Johnson-Neyman intervals, which provide cut-off values of one continuous 
variable at which the conditional slope between the other continuous variable and the 
dependent variable is statistically significant (Johnson and Fay, 1950).  
For all the linear regression models, session was entered as a random effect together 
with info on block order. The relationship between MAIA and DDS was assessed 
separately by a linear regression model using DDS scores as dependent and MAIA 
scores as independent variable. 
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3. Results  
 
3.1 Dimensions of subjective experience  
At the end of each block, participants were asked to answer questions about aspects of 
their subjective experience during the paradigm. Questions tapped into the following 
dimensions:  sound awareness and sound attention (i.e. listening to the auditory 
stimuli), distraction and clarity of mind (see Supplementary information 1 for the 
specific questions). When pulling together questions form all the scales, we found a 
group by scale interaction on the overall ratings (χ2 (3) = 101.3, p < 0.001) which 
showed how expert and novices differed for some but not all scales. A scale by session 
interaction was also present (χ2 (3) = 17.2, p < 0.001) [model Pseudo-R2 = 0.52, Pseudo-
R2 (fixed effects) = 0.47]. Subsequently, we explored group and session effects on each 
separate dimension (however, we considered sound awareness and sound attention to 
pertain to the same dimension of “relation to sounds”). We found a group by scale 
(sound awareness, sound attention) interaction (Figure 2.A; χ2 (3) = 32.08, p < 0.001) 
showing that experts and novices were equally aware of sounds during a block (t-ratio 
(92.09) = 0.07, p = 0.93) but experts were listening less to sounds, compared to novices 
(t-ratio (92.09) = -4.56, p < 0.001) [model Pseudo-R2 = 0.61, Pseudo-R2 (fixed effects) 
= 0.47]. Expert practitioners reported less distraction (Figure 2.B; χ2 (1) = 10.75, p = 
0.001) and more clarity of mind (Figure 2.C; χ2 (1) = 9.7, p = 0.002) during a block. For 
both scales (distraction and clarity) a main effect of session was present (Figure S2; χ2 
(1) = 10.75, p = 0.001 and χ2 (1) = 10.75, p = 0.001 for distraction and clarity 
respectively) [distraction model: Pseudo-R2 = 0.36, Pseudo-R2 (fixed effects) = 0.09; 
clarity model Pseudo-R2 = 0.56, Pseudo-R2 (fixed effects) = 0.09].  
Furthermore, we explored whether the difference in clarity between groups mediated 
the difference observed in the degree of distraction between groups, as well as the 
difference between sound awareness and attention. We found that high clarity 
predicted less distraction in general (Figure 2.D; χ2 (1) = 56.37, β = - 0.39 [95% c.i. = -
0.63, -0.15], p < 0.001; model Pseudo-R2 = 0.42, Pseudo-R2 (fixed effects) = 0.21). More 
clarity during a block also predicted a higher difference between sound awareness and 
sound attention (Figure 2.E; χ2 (1) = 15.9, β = 0.31 [95% c.i. = 0.16, 0.46], p < 0.001; 
model Pseudo-R2 = 0.69, Pseudo-R2 [fixed effects] = 0.09).  
Finally, we investigated whether self-reported clarity was related to the degree of 
cognitive defusion, measured as a trait through the DDS questionnaire. We found that 
higher DDS scores predicted higher clarity across all states and participants (Figure 
2.F; χ2 (1) = 4.37, β = 0.07 [95% c.i. = 0.02, 0.12], p = 0.03; model Pseudo-R2 = 0.62, 
Pseudo-R2 (fixed effects) = 0.16). DDS scores were predicted by the degree of 
interoceptive awareness, as highlighted by a linear regression model including the 
MAIA scores as independent variable (F (3,42) = 16.13, p < 0.001, β = 0.29 [95% c.i. = 
0.13, 0.45]). 
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3.2 Self-reported anxiety and skin conductance responses 
A group by condition (safe, threat) interaction was present on self-reported anxiety 
(Figure 3.A; χ2 (1) = 49.6, p < 0.001). Specifically, expert practitioners reported being 
less affected by the threat condition, compared to novices (Safe minus Threat: experts 
estimate = -0.58, t-ratio (714) = -6.16, p < 0.001; novices estimate = -1.47, t-ratio (714) 
= -17.2, p < 0.001). Additionally, expert practitioners reported less anxiety than novices 
in both conditions, but especially during threat periods (Experts minus Novices: safe 
period estimate = -0.48, t-ratio (81) = -2.57, p = 0.01; threat period estimate = -1.38, t-
ratio (81) = -7.3, p < 0.001). Differently, skin conductance responses (SCRs) were 
significantly higher during threat, compared to safe periods, among all groups and 
Figure 2. Differences in dimensions of subjective experience between expert and novice practitioners 
and relationship between clarity and other state and trait measures. (A) Mean values of self-reported 
sound awareness and attention to sounds in experts and novices. (B-C) Mean values of self-reported 
distraction and clarity in experts and novices. For A, B and C, error bars represent standard errors of the 
mean. (D-E) Scatter plots for single-subject mean values of self-reported clarity and distraction and clarity 
and Δsound (sound awareness – attention). (F) Scatter plot for single-subject DDS scores and mean values of 
self-reported clarity. In D, E and F, the regression lines and coefficient β are derived from linear mixed models 
including state and group as fixed effects and session, block order and subjects as random effects. The grey 
area around the regression line indicates 95% confidence intervals. ***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05. 
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states (Figure 3.B; χ2 (1) = 95.53; p < 0.001). Additionally, a state by group interaction 
was present on the SCRs across conditions (Figure 3.C; χ2 (1) = 13.53; p = 0.001). SCRs 
were higher during OM, compared to VD in experts (t-ratio (2575) = 2.67, p = 0.02), 
while the opposite pattern was observed in novices (t-ratio (2575) = - 2.46, p = 0.03). 
A main effect of session was present both on self-reported anxiety and SCRs (χ2 (1) = 
29.1, p < 0.001 and χ2 (1) = 303.33, p < 0.001, respectively. See figure S2) [ Self-reported 
anxiety model: Pseudo-R2 = 0.58, Pseudo-R2 (fixed effects) = 0.32; Skin conductance 
responses model Pseudo-R2 = 0.53, Pseudo-R2 (fixed effects) = 0.08].  
We observed an increase in electrodermal activity after threat cues among both 
groups, but a different impact of threat on subjective anxiety in experts, compared to 
novices. To further understand this differential interplay, we investigated the relation 
between these two measures in each group. We found an interaction between SCRs 
amplitude and group in predicting subjective anxiety (χ2 (1) = 7.49; p = 0.006) [Figure 
3.D; Pseudo-R2 = 0.61, Pseudo-R2 (fixed effects) = 0.13]. The interaction pointed 
towards a direct relation between SCRs and self-reported anxiety in novice, but not 
expert practitioners. However, none of the two slope coefficients were significantly 
higher than zero (β = 0.01 [95% c.i. = -0.17, 0.19], p = 0.91 and β = 0.18 [95% c.i. = -
0.01, 0.37], p = 0.25 for experts and novices respectively).  
Furthermore, we explored whether differences in self-reported anxiety between 
groups were mediated by the difference in self-reported clarity, and whether the latter 
was also a mediating factor for the observed dissociation between SCRs amplitude and 
self-reported anxiety in expert practitioners. We found that higher clarity predicted 
less anticipatory anxiety in general (Figure 3.E; χ2 (1) = 13.08, β = - 0.15 [95% c.i. = -
0.22, -0.07], p < 0.001; model Pseudo-R2 = 0.61, Pseudo-R2 [fixed effects] = 0.12). 
Moreover, a significant interaction between clarity and SCRs was present among both 
groups (χ2 (1) = 8, p = 0.004; model Pseudo-R2 = 0.62, Pseudo-R2 [fixed effects] = 0.15).  
In this case, Johnson-Neyman interval analysis showed that a significant relation (p < 
0.05) between SCRs amplitude and self-reported anxiety was present only for those 
observations when reported clarity was less than 5.5 out of 7 (Figure S3). For those 
observations where subjects scored less than 5.5 in clarity, the slope coefficient 
diminished as the reported clarity increased. This analysis confirmed that the 
dissociation between physiological responses and the subjective experience of 
anticipatory anxiety was mediated by the degree of clarity reported by a participant in 
a block. For some blocks, participants reported no difference in anxiety between 
conditions (the participant scored 1 both in safe and threat periods). Specifically, 130 
out of 360 blocks for experts and 40 out of 432 blocks for novices. We decided to keep 
these observations in further analyses because: 1) the decreased subjective anxiety in 
experts represented an effect of interest, rather than a bias (especially considering the 
dissociation between SCRs and self-reported anxiety), 2) the effect of threat on the N1 
amplitude was present when the subjects reporting no difference in anticipatory 
anxiety were considered separately (see Results section 3.3). However, we performed 
an additional analysis on the modulation of the MMN amplitude by electric shock 
threat, excluding these observations (see Results section 3.3).  
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3.3 MMN amplitude  
Our main question was to investigate whether the MMN amplitude was differently 
modulated by the threat of electric shock between groups and states. As no interaction 
between condition and session was found on self-reported anxiety or SCRs, we did not 
test this interaction in the present model and session was included as a random effect. 
Figure 4.A shows the time-course of the mean difference waveforms, across 
participants and sessions, during threat and safe conditions and during FA, OP and VD 
separately for expert and novice participants. Figure 4.B shows the respective scalp 
topographies of the mean MMN peak amplitude for the above-mentioned conditions 
Figure 3. Subjective and physiological measures of anxiety are dissociated in expert 
meditators and this effect is mediated by self-reported clarity. (A) Mean values of self-reported 
anxiety in experts and novices during safe and threat periods. (B) Mean amplitude of skin 
conductance responses (log-transformed) to auditory cues introducing threat and safe periods, in 
experts and novices. (C) Mean amplitude, across safe and threat periods, of skin conductance 
responses (SCR; log-transformed) to auditory cues in experts and novices during FA, OP and VD 
blocks. For A, B and C, error bars represent standard errors of the mean. (D) Scatter plot for single-
subject mean values of self-reported anxiety and mean amplitude of SCRs in novice (black) and 
expert (grey) practitioners. (E) Scatter plot for single-subject mean values of self-reported anxiety 
and clarity across both groups. (F) Interaction plot between mean values of self-reported anxiety and 
SCRs as a function of clarity (+/- 1SD). In D, E and F, the regression lines and coefficient β are derived 
from linear mixed models including state, group and condition (safe, threat) as fixed effects and 
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and groups. We did not find a significant interaction between group, state and 
condition (safe, threat) on the MMN amplitude when all observations where included 
(χ2 (2) = 0.07; p = 0.78) [Figure 4.C; Pseudo-R2 = 0.14, Pseudo-R2 (fixed effects) = 0.01] 
and excluding observations with no difference in self-reported anxiety (χ2 (2) = 1.85; p 
= 0.39) [Pseudo-R2 = 0.14, Pseudo-R2 (fixed effects) = 0.02]. A main effect of condition 
was not present either. The same model tested at the electrode Cz did not yield any 
significant interaction or main effect of condition.  
Additionally, we explored a possible relation between self-reported anxiety, as well as 
levels of trait anxiety, and the MMN amplitude during FA, OP and VD in expert and 
novice practitioners. In the former case, we did not find any significant relation 
between self-reported anxiety and MMN amplitude. Regarding the relation between 
trait anxiety and MMN amplitude, we found a significant interaction between T-STAI 
questionnaire scores, state (FA, OP, VD) and condition (safe, threat) in predicting the 
MMN amplitude (Figure 4.D; χ2 (2) = 6.67; p = 0.03) [Pseudo-R2 = 0.17, Pseudo-R2 (fixed 
effects) = 0.04]. Specifically, higher degrees of trait anxiety predicted a difference in the 
MMN amplitude between safe and threat periods among both groups but only during 
VD (t-ratio (583.32) = 2.25, p = 0.02 for VD; t-ratio (583.32) = 0.67, p = 0.5 for OP; t-
ratio (583.32) = -1.22, p = 0.22 for FA). Nonetheless, none of the two slope coefficients 
(safe, threat) during VD were significantly higher than zero (β = 0.03 [95% c.i. = -0.02, 
0.08], p = 0.12 and β = -0.03 [95% c.i. = -0.07, 0.01], p = 0.18 for safe and threat 
conditions respectively). 
A secondary aim of this study was to replicate previous findings that indicated a 
differential modulation of the MMN amplitude between experts and novices and 
between states. To investigate this hypothesis, we tested a linear mixed model where 
condition (safe, threat) was entered as random effect. We did not find a significant 
interaction between groups and states in modulating the MMN amplitude (χ2 (2) = 
0.59; p = 0.74). For possible interpretations of the lack of interaction between group 
and states in this specific paradigm, see the Discussion section of this report.  
 
 
Figure 4. MMN amplitude is not modulated by threat of shock or meditation states and expertise, 
except for subjects with high trait anxiety. (A) Subtraction (deviant minus standard, i.e. MMN) 
waveforms at frontal ROI (see fig. S1) for safe and threat conditions during FA, OP and VD in experts (top) 
and novices (bottom). (B) Average voltage scalp maps of MMN in safe and threat periods during FA, OP and 
VD, in experts and novices, at 30ms around the peak in a fixed latency window (90-180ms). (C) Mean values 
of MMN from (B) at frontal ROI. Error bars represent standard errors of the mean. (D) Interaction plot 
between STAI scores and self-reported anxiety in threat (grey lines) and safe (black-dashed lines) periods 
during FA, OP and VD. The regression lines and coefficients β are derived from the same linear mixed model 
including state, group and condition (safe, threat) as fixed effects and session, block order and subjects as 
random effects. ***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05. 
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3.4 N1 and P2 amplitude  
We investigated the interplay between state, group and threat of electric shock on the 
N1 and P2 components of the auditory evoked response for standard and deviant 
stimuli. Again, as no interaction between condition and session was found on self-
reported anxiety or SCRs, we included session as a random effect in the tested models. 
Figure 5.A shows the time-course of the auditory evoked responses across participants 
and sessions during threat and safe conditions and during FA, OP, and VD, separately 
for experts and novices and for standard and deviant stimuli. The best fitting model at 
the N1 latency showed how the N1 amplitude increases during threat, compared to the 
safe condition across all groups and states (Figure 5.B; χ2 (1) = 50.83; p < 0.001). A 
group by stimulus interaction was present (Figure 5.B; χ2 (1) = 4.85; p = 0.03), possibly 
showing a greater difference between standard and deviants for experts, compared to 
novices (experts estimate = 1.45, t-ratio (1426) = 14.12, p < 0.001; novices estimate = 
1.14, t-ratio (1426) = 12.09, p < 0.001) [N1 model Pseudo-R2 = 0.66, Pseudo-R2 (fixed 
effects) = 0.09]. Interestingly, a main effect of condition (safe, threat) on the N1 
amplitude was present also for those subjects that reported not difference in 
anticipatory anxiety between conditions (χ2 (1) = 16.29; p < 0.001).  
At the P2 latency, the best fitting model resulted in an interaction between group, state 
and condition (χ2 (2) = 7.9; p = 0.02) [Figure 5.C; Pseudo-R2 = 0.53, Pseudo-R2 (fixed 
effects) = 0.08]. At this latency, the amplitude of the auditory evoked response 
increased during the threat condition in all states, but especially during FA, for the 
novices group (FA estimate = -0.61, t-ratio (1417) = -4.89, p < 0.001; OP estimate = -
0.27, t-ratio (1417) = -2.17, p = 0.03; VD estimate = -0.25, t-ratio (1417) = -1.97, p = 
0.05). In the experts group, P2 amplitude increased during threat in OP and VD, while 
this increase was only marginally significant in FA (FA estimate = -0.23, t-ratio (1417) 
= -1.7, p = 0.08; OP estimate = -0.45, t-ratio (1417) = -3.29, p = 0.001; VD estimate = -
0.57, t-ratio (1417) = -4.21, p < 0.001). Additionally, P2 amplitude was higher for 
experts compared to novices in safe periods only during meditation (FA t-ratio (93) = 
3.14, p = 0.002; OP t-ratio (93) = 2.39, p = 0.01; VD t-ratio (93) = 1.17, p = 0.24). P2 in 
threat periods was higher in experts compared to novices during OP and VD, and 
marginally higher during FA (FA t-ratio (93) = 1.81, p = 0.07; OP t-ratio (93) = 3, p = 
0.003; VD t-ratio (93) = 2.3, p = 0.02). Finally, the amplitude of P2 was higher during 
meditation states, compared to VD, in expert practitioners in safe periods (FA-VD t-
ratio (1418) = 3.65, p < 0.001; OP-VD t-ratio (1418) = 3.63, p < 0.001; FA-OP t-ratio 
(1417) = 0.01, p = 0.99) and during OP, compared to VD, in threat periods (FA-VD t-
ratio (1418) = 1.17, p = 0.46; OP-VD t-ratio (1418) = 2.75, p = 0.01; FA-OP t-ratio (1417) 
= -1.57, p = 0.25). No difference between states was present in the novices group.  
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Figure 5. Electric shock threat increases the amplitude of early brain responses to auditory stimuli. P2 
amplitude is modulated by meditation states and expertise. (A) Event-related responses to standard (top) 
and deviant (bottom) tones at frontal ROI (see fig. S1) in safe (dashed lines) and threat (solid lines) periods 
during FA, OP and VD for experts (left) and novices (right). (B) Mean amplitude of responses in a 20ms time-
window centred around the most negative peak between 90 and 200m (N1) during safe and threat periods (left) 
and for standard and deviant tones in experts and novices (right). (C) Mean amplitude of responses in a fixed 
time-window (P2; 180-280ms) for safe and threat periods, during FA, OP and VD, in experts and novices. For B 
and C, error bars represent standard errors of the mean. ***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05. 
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3.5 Modulation of the P2 amplitude by meta-awareness and clarity  
As an exploratory analysis, we sought to better understand the functional significance 
of the P2 component of the auditory evoked response, which was differently modulated 
by meditation states in expert and novice practitioners. At the same time, we aimed to 
characterize the phenomenological dimensions, explored through self-reports, in 
terms of neurophysiological correlates. We investigated how clarity, and the difference 
between sound awareness and attention (Δsound), modulated the P2 amplitude.  
We found a significant interaction between clarity and states in predicting the P2 
amplitude (Figure 6.A; χ2 (2) = 6.42; p = 0.04; Pseudo-R2 = 0.53, Pseudo-R2 (fixed 
effects) = 0.07). The observed interaction showed that higher P2 during meditation 
was present when more clarity is reached. Post-hoc analyses showed that regression 
slopes differed between FA and VD, but not OP and VD (FA-VD t-ratio (1431) = 2.53, p 
= 0.03; OP-VD t-ratio (1438) = 1.31, p = 0.38; FA-OP t-ratio (1432) = 1.05, p = 0.54). 
Moreover, none of the slope coefficients for FA, OP and VD were higher than 0 (FA β = 
0.06 [95% c.i. = -0.03, 0.15], p = 0.18; OP β = 0 [95% c.i. = -0.10, 0.11], p = 0.94; VD β = 
-0.07 [95% c.i. = -0.16, 0.02], p = 0.13).  
A significant interaction between Δsound and different states on the P2 amplitude was 
also present (Figure 6.B; χ2 (2) = 7.88; p = 0.02; Pseudo-R2 = 0.54, Pseudo-R2 (fixed 
effects) = 0.06). In the same way as for clarity, the interaction showed that higher P2 
amplitude during meditation was predicted by higher Δsound. Post-hoc analyses 
showed that regression slopes differed between OP and VD in this case, while a 
difference between FA and VD was observed only as a statistical trend (FA-VD t-ratio 
(1434) = 1.94, p = 0.12; OP-VD t-ratio (1432) = 2.75, p = 0.01; FA-OP t-ratio (1435) = -
0.9, p = 0.63). In this case, when the slope coefficients were tested separately, only the 
one of VD was significantly different than 0 (FA β = -0.02 [95% c.i. = -0.08, 0.03], p = 
0.47; OP β = 0.01 [95% c.i. = -0.05, 0.06], p = 0.87; VD β = -0.08 [95% c.i. = -0.14, -0.02], 
p = 0.05). 
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 4. Discussion  
 
In the present study, we investigated the effect of anticipatory anxiety on perceptual 
learning and early stimulus processing and its modulation by different meditative 
states and meditation expertise. We also explored the relation between specific 
dimensions of subjective experience and third-person data, testing the hypothesis that 
the attentional and motivational stance cultivated during meditation underlies, at least 
in experts, emotion regulation mechanisms. We found that threat of electric shock did 
not modulate perceptual learning processes but resulted in a sensitisation of early 
brain responses to auditory stimuli in both groups of practitioners. However, a 
dissociation between physiological responses to threat and the experience of 
anticipatory anxiety was present in expert practitioners. This dissociation was 
predicted by subjective measures of clarity, which was higher in the experts group and 
associated to trait measures of cognitive defusion and interoceptive awareness. The 
amplitude of the P2 increased during threat periods and was higher in expert, 
compared to novice practitioners. Within this group, the P2 amplitude increased 
during meditation compared to a control condition. The increased amplitude of this 
component during meditation was predicted by subjective measures of clarity and 
meta-awareness. 
Figure 6. Higher P2 amplitude during meditation is mediated by clarity and meta-awareness. (A) 
Scatter plot for single-subject mean values of self-reported clarity and mean P2 amplitude during FA 
(green), OP (red) and VD (blue). (B) Scatter plot for single-subject mean values of self-reported Δsound 
(sound awareness – attention) and mean P2 amplitude during FA (green), OP (red) and VD (blue). In A and 
B, the regression lines and coefficients β are derived from linear mixed models including state, group and 
condition (safe, threat) as fixed effects and session, block order, stimulus type (standard, deviant) and 
subjects as random effects. ***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05. 
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4.1 Subjective experience in experts and novices  
The analysis of self-reports outlined different profiles between expert and novice 
practitioners in terms of phenomenological categories that are thought to be 
modulated by meditation training. Specifically, expert meditators reported less 
distraction, less engagement of attention, but same degree of awareness, to auditory 
stimuli and higher clarity compared to novice practitioners.  
Improved attentional stability and conflict monitoring in expert meditators have been 
reported in previous studies (e.g. Jo et al., 2016) and are within the main cognitive 
mechanisms proposed to be cultivated and fostered in mindfulness practices (e.g. 
Hölzel et al., 2011; Lutz et al., 2008). Nonetheless, it is possible that shorter forms of 
meditation training exert a negligible impact on attention regulation (MacCoon et al., 
2014). Here we found that reduced distractibility in expert meditators was present 
across all states; a trait effect that is supported by previous findings that found 
increased attentional stability after extensive meditation training (Lutz et al., 2009). 
Improved attentional stability and reduced mind wandering could impact emotion 
regulation (Jazaieri et al., 2016; Killingsworth and Gilbert, 2010). However, as we did 
not test this specific question in the present study and we did not implement any form 
of active attentional task, we will not discuss this result any further.  
Whereas experts and novices were equally aware of sounds during the oddball 
paradigm, expert practitioners’ attention was less captured by auditory stimuli. This 
dissociation possibly reflects the process of meta-awareness as developed in 
mindfulness practices. In the context of meditation, meta-awareness is intended as the 
capacity of becoming aware of transient internal (e.g. thoughts, bodily states) and 
external (e.g. auditory stimuli) events while retaining a specific task-set (e.g. focusing 
attention on an object or maintaining awareness of the present-moment) (Lutz et al., 
2015). Here, participants underwent a passive auditory oddball task and were 
instructed to ignore auditory stimuli. Therefore, the increased dissociation between 
sound awareness and attention in experts can be considered as an index of higher 
meta-awareness in the expert group. Based on the above-mentioned model (Lutz et al., 
2015), we would have expected higher meta-awareness in experts during OP, 
compared to FA, and during meditation compared to the control condition. It is unclear 
whether extensive meditation training could lead to changes in the subjective 
experience of background awareness in relation to any form of task-set, whether it is 
meditation practice or simply watching a movie. In general, few studies have tried to 
operationalise this phenomenological category in terms of underlying neural 
mechanisms (see Discussion section 4.4 for more details on this topic).  
Finally, expert practitioners reported higher phenomenal clarity during the paradigm, 
independently of the experimental condition. Clarity is described as the degree of 
vividness at which an experience occurs, whether it is a perceptual stimulus or an 
internal event (e.g. an affective state) (Lutz et al., 2015). It is thought to be intertwined 
with meta-awareness (Namgyal, 2001), a theoretical account confirmed in the present 
study by the strong relation that was found between self-reported clarity and the 
difference between sound awareness and attention (Figure 2.E). Interestingly, 
phenomenal ‘clarity’ (a translation from the Pali word ‘Vipassana’) is also thought to 
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arise, in the expert practitioner, together with insights over the delusional nature of 
phenomena (Schoenberg and Barendregt, 2016). Clarity could therefore be associated 
with the shift in the perception of phenomena as transient mental events rather than 
accurate representations of reality in mindfulness practices (Chambers et al., 2009b), 
a process referred to as “dereification” (Lutz et al., 2015) or simply “mindful attention” 
(Papies et al., 2012). This view is supported here by the observed relation between self-
reported clarity and the score in the DDS questionnaire, that represents a trait measure 
of “cognitive defusion” (i.e. “the ability to achieve psychological distance from internal 
experiences such as thoughts and feelings” , Forman et al., 2012) (Figure 2.F).  
To summarize, when asked about specific dimensions of their subjective experience 
during the task, expert practitioners reported low distractibility and high degree of 
phenomenal clarity and meta-awareness across all states, compared to novices. Higher 
clarity was associated with higher meta-awareness and lower distractibility (Figure 
2.D) and was predicted by a trait measure of cognitive defusion. This specific profile of 
subjective experience is discussed in the following paragraphs in relation to third-
person measures of bodily physiology and brain responses to auditory stimuli during 
threat and safe periods.  
 
4.2 Self-reported anxiety and skin conductance  
Participants in both groups reported higher levels of anticipatory anxiety during 
periods of threat, compared to safe periods. However, expert practitioners reported 
lower anticipatory anxiety, compared to novices, especially during threat periods 
(figure 3.A). Skin conductance responses (SCRs) were higher for auditory cues 
announcing the beginning of threat, compared to safe periods. The effect of threat cues 
on SCRs did not differ between groups or states. Interestingly, the amplitude of SCRs 
predicted the degree of self-reported anticipatory anxiety in novice but not expert 
practitioners (figure 3.D). This evidence highlights a dissociation between 
physiological responses to threat and the subjective experience of anticipatory anxiety 
in expert meditators and represents a key finding of the present study. There is a 
consistent body of literature describing the impact of mindfulness meditation on the 
regulation of emotional responses to nociceptive and emotionally negative stimuli (see 
Tang et al., 2015 for a recent review). However, very few studies have investigated the 
impact of meditation training on the anticipation of negative stimuli (Brown and Jones, 
2010; Lutz et al., 2013) and, to our knowledge, no previous research has focused on the 
anxious response to unpredictable threat. Here, the relation between the amplitude of 
SCRs and self-reported anxiety in the novices group confirms the involvement of the 
sympathetic branch of the autonomic nervous system in the anticipation of 
unpredictable noxious stimuli (Epstein and Roupenian, 1970). The dissociation 
between these two measures, observed in experts, is in line with theoretical accounts 
which propose that emotion regulation in expert meditators is a bottom-up process 
mediated by the specific attentional and motivation stance cultivated in the practice 
(Chiesa et al., 2013; Dahl et al., 2015; Lutz et al., 2015). Extensive meditation training 
would result in an increased sensitivity to physical and mental events, but a decreased 
emotional reactivity and lingering to such stimuli. This dissociation would be 
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meditated by the development of meta-awareness and dereification of thoughts and 
emotions associated to a specific event. Such perceptual configuration would favour 
cognitive defusion and de-centering from one’s own affective states while maintaining 
a functional, if not increased, awareness of bodily responses to stimuli that convey an 
emotional meaning. This view is corroborated here by the fact that the level of clarity 
mediated the dissociation between the subjective experience of anxiety and SCRs 
(figure 3.F). Moreover, the degree of clarity was predicted by trait measures of 
cognitive defusion and interoceptive awareness.  
 
4.3 Modulation of MMN amplitude by anticipatory anxiety and meditation states 
We can maintain, based on the results discussed in the previous section, that the 
experimental paradigm effectively manipulated levels of anticipatory anxiety in both 
expert and novice participants. However, we did not find a difference in the amplitude 
of the MMN between safe and threat periods during meditation states or during a 
control condition in experts or novices. This result held true regardless of whether a 
difference in MMN amplitude was tested in a canonical frontal ROI or at a central scalp 
site (electrode Cz). No effect of the experimental manipulation was found when 
subjects that did not report any difference in anticipatory anxiety between conditions 
were excluded from the analysis.  
Possible reasons underling the lack of modulation of the MMN amplitude by threat of 
electric shock are discussed in detail in a separate report (see Study 2). In brief, we 
tried here to replicate previous findings from studies that used electric shock threat as 
mood induction procedure (Cornwell et al., 2017, 2007) and recorded brain activity 
with magnetoencephalography (MEG). As we discussed in the separate report, that 
included only data from novice participants during the control state, a lack of 
modulation of the MMN amplitude is in line with previous EEG studies. We proposed 
that MMN amplitude could be affected by threat only in subjects that scored high in 
state or trait anxiety. Regarding the present study, a possible explanation for the lack 
of modulation could be because data were averaged across two experimental sessions. 
Nonetheless, while an effect of session was present on both self-reported anxiety and 
SCRs (figure S1), it did not interact with the effect of threat, that was present in both 
sessions.  
In the present study, we found that MMN amplitude was higher in threat, compared to 
safe periods, for those subjects that scored high in dispositional anxiety, as measured 
by the trait scale of the STAI questionnaire, but only during the VD condition (figure 
4.D). This result indicates that both meditation practices could downregulate the effect 
of threat on perceptual learning processes in individuals with high dispositional 
anxiety. Increased MMN amplitude has been previously reported in EEG studies that 
investigated the modulation of the MMN by anxiety-related psychopathologies and 
dispositional anxiety  (e.g. Bangel et al., 2017; Chen et al., 2016; Ge et al., 2011; 
Hansenne et al., 2003). If replicated, the present findings could be of clinical relevance, 
showing how meditation can downregulate the effect of high trait anxiety on 
perceptual learning processes. However, the result reported here should be handled 
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with consideration. When tested separately none of the two slope coefficients (safe, 
threat conditions) during VD were significantly higher than zero.  
When we tested whether different meditation states and expertise modulated the 
amplitude of the MMN, regardless of the experimental condition (safe, threat), we did 
not replicate our previous findings (Fucci et al., 2018). This result was unexpected 
because previous research has shown an impact of meditation on the MMN amplitude. 
Especially, several studies reported increased MMN amplitude during FA meditation 
(Braboszcz and Delorme, 2011; Fucci et al., 2018; Srinivasan and Baijal, 2007) or as a 
trait effect in experts (Biedermann et al., 2016). There are several reasons that could 
explain the lack of replication in the present study. Firstly, participants underwent 
short oddball sequences embedded in safe or threat periods. Previous studies did not 
investigate the MMN modulation in the context of mood induction. It is possible that 
the emotional context masked effects that would otherwise be present in a neutral 
situation. Moreover, short sequences (~30 seconds) might not be long enough to 
capture subtle shifts in the interplay between predictions and prediction errors 
observed in longer oddball paradigms. Secondly, this paradigm was characterized by a 
short and fix inter-stimulus interval (I.S.I. 500ms). This is considered to be a reliable 
interval to elicit MMN signals (Duncan et al., 2009) and was used here to maximize the 
number of stimuli and conform to previous studies on MMN modulation by threat 
(Cornwell et al., 2017, 2007). However, it is possible that longer and variable intervals 
are required to highlight a modulation of expectations and deviance saliency by 
different meditation styles.  
 
4.4 Modulation of N1 and P2 amplitude by anticipatory anxiety and meditation 
states 
We found an impact of unpredictable threat on the amplitude of early neural responses 
to auditory stimuli unrelated to the source of threat. This effect was present across 
states and groups.  
Similarly to previous research (Ermutlu et al., 2005; Scaife et al., 2006b; White et al., 
2005), we found increased amplitude of the auditory N1 during threat, compared to 
safe periods (figure 5.B). This result is also in line with research that reports an impact 
of mild stress on the sensitisation of early sensory processing in other sensory domains 
(Qi et al., 2018; Shackman et al., 2011a). In the auditory domain, the increase in N1 
amplitude has been related to an increase in noradrenergic activity, affecting the ability 
to filter out irrelevant sensory information (Ermutlu et al., 2005). This effect was not 
modulated by meditation states and expertise. It represents, in our opinion, a robust 
mechanism of increased vigilance in response to unpredictable threats and an adaptive 
response in volatile environments. This view is supported by the fact that this effect 
was present also in those participants that did not report any degree of anxiety in either 
safe or threat periods.  
In the other latency explored (180-280ms), the amplitude of the auditory P2 increased 
in periods of threat, compared to safe periods, across all stimuli, participants and 
states. P2 was higher for experts compared to novices during OP in both safe and threat 
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periods, but only in safe periods during FA and threat periods during VD.  Within expert 
practitioners, it increased during OP compared to VD, and during FA compared to VD 
in safe periods only (figure 4.C). To summarize, this component was sensitive to threat, 
meditation expertise and especially high during OP in expert meditators. The P2 
component of the auditory evoked response has been poorly studied and historically 
thought to be part of the N1-P2 complex in response to auditory stimuli (Tremblay et 
al., 2014). Nonetheless, there are evidence indicating that N1 and P2 originate from 
different sources within the auditory cortex and likely serve different functions (Ross 
and Tremblay, 2009). It has been proposed that P2 reflects mechanism of stimulus 
attendance and classification, mostly related to excluding a stimulus from further 
processing or recognizing it as a target (see Crowley and Colrain, 2004 for a review). 
Indeed, P2 amplitude was found to decrease in response to target stimuli in dicotomic 
listening tasks (Novak et al., 1992) and increase in response to non-target stimuli in 
oddball paradigms (García-Larrea et al., 1992). Few studies have investigated the 
modulation of this component by meditation training. Cahn and Polich (2009) reported 
lower P2 amplitude in response to distracters during Vypassana meditation. 
Interestingly, Lutz et al. (2009) found increased P2 amplitude to unattended stimuli in 
a dicotomic listening task after three months of intensive meditation training.  
Based on these premises, we believe that, in the present study, the higher P2 amplitude 
reflects increased monitoring of auditory stimuli in response to unpredictable threat. 
Higher P2 in expert meditators is in line with theoretical accounts that hypothesise an 
increase in meta-awareness and dereification during meditation, and especially during 
OP, as a function of meditation expertise (Lutz et al., 2015). Thus, P2 amplitude could 
represent a biomarker of monitoring processes in meditation training. Supporting this 
hypothesis, we found that the difference in P2 amplitude between meditation and 
control condition was predicted by the self-reported measures of meta-awareness and 
clarity. 
 
 
Overall, the present work provides empirical evidence of the mechanisms underlying 
emotion regulation in expert meditation practitioners. It describes the relation 
between the attentional and motivational stance cultivated in mindfulness practices 
and the modulation of early stimulus processing in unpredictable threatening 
situations. Most importantly, it shows how the phenomenological dimensions of clarity 
and meta-awareness are strongly related and predicted by trait measures of cognitive 
defusion and interoceptive awareness. This phenomenological profile mediates the 
regulation of emotions and impacts neurophysiological responses to auditory stimuli 
that are related to attentional monitoring processes.  
It is unknown whether mindfulness meditation modulates perceptual learning 
processes in emotional contexts. A possible mediating effect was observed for 
individuals with high trait anxiety and future studies could focus on this specific 
population. Finally, the findings reported here are unclear in terms of state and trait 
effects on emotion regulation and neurophysiological processes. It is possible that, in 
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emotional contexts, trait differences prevail over subtle changes in states that could be 
observed in neutral environments. Future research could try to elucidate this question 
implementing paradigms that allow for longer periods of neutral and negative valence.  
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Chapter 7 
General discussion 
 
 
 
7.1 General summary 
 
In this work, we aimed to understand the mechanisms of mindfulness meditation in 
neutral and emotional settings by investigating the effect of different meditation states 
and levels of expertise on neurophysiological markers of perceptual learning and 
attention. This objective is ascribed into a broader research on the biomarkers of 
cognitive functions that are thought to be fostered by mindfulness practices, according 
to recent theoretical models based on Buddhist phenomenological accounts. We 
hypothesized that the cognitive processes cultivated in mindfulness practices, and 
their related phenomenological categories, would differentially modulate the auditory 
mismatch negativity in neutral contexts, depending on the level of expertise (Study 1). 
Furthermore, we thought that a previously observed effect of unpredictable threat on 
the MMN would be downregulated during meditation states in expert practitioners 
(Study 3). In both studies we also explored neurophysiological responses to auditory 
stimuli that have been related to attentional processes, with the aim of individuating 
putative neurophysiological markers of the heightened monitoring of perceptual 
phenomena that is supposed to characterise mindfulness practices. Finally, we sought 
to clarify the role of specific cognitive and motivational processes in emotion 
regulation, by relating self-reports of subjective experience to third-person measures 
of neural and bodily physiology.  
We implemented cross-sectional studies including cohorts of expert meditation 
practitioners who were rigorously selected based on quantitative and qualitative 
criteria that addressed current limitations in this field of research. Additionally, an 
active control group of naïve practitioners was trained to practice different styles of 
meditation, as well as to recognise and describe changes in several dimensions of their 
subjective experience during and outside of the practice. These methods were 
implemented to create a common linguistic and experiential framework between 
expert and novice practitioners and researchers in the context of 
neurophenomenological investigations (Study 3).  
In Study 1, we found that open presence, a nondual mindfulness practice, could be 
differentiated from a focused attention style of practice in terms of their impact on 
perceptual learning processes (i.e. MMN amplitude) in expert and novice practitioners. 
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This differential effect was better characterised by looking at the interplay between the 
MMN amplitude and neurophysiological responses related to attentional monitoring 
and was predicted by differences in brain oscillatory activity. Specifically, we found 
that, in experts, the MMN increased during FA, compared to OP, while the opposite 
pattern was observed on the amplitude of an ERP component linked to stimulus 
attendance (late frontal negativity). However, these findings were not replicated in 
Study 3. Here, no effect of meditation or expertise was found on the amplitude of the 
auditory MMN, when controlling for the effect of different emotional contexts (safe and 
threat periods). On the other hand, we found an increased amplitude of the P2, another 
ERP component related to stimulus attendance and attention, during meditation states 
(especially OP) in expert practitioners.  
Concerning the impact of emotional context on perceptual learning processes and its 
modulation by mindfulness practices, the findings contradicted our initial hypotheses. 
In Study 2, which focused on the group of novice practitioners during a control state, 
we were not able to reproduce results from previous studies that found increased 
amplitude of the auditory MMN during threat, compared to safe periods. In Study 3, we 
did not find any effect of mindfulness practices or expertise on the MMN amplitude in 
either of the two periods. However, we found that a modulation of the MMN by 
unpredictable threat was present for subjects with high trait anxiety and that 
meditation might downregulate this effect.   
In Study 3, we found a dissociation between physiological responses to threat periods 
and the subjective level of anxiety in expert meditation practitioner. This finding is in 
line with previous reports on the downregulation of affective responses, but increased 
interoceptive sensitivity, as a result of meditation training. Here, we found that this 
dissociation was predicted by subjective measures of clarity, which was higher in the 
experts group and associated to trait measures of cognitive defusion and interoceptive 
awareness. In general, Study 3 highlighted different profiles between expert and novice 
practitioners, independently of meditation or control states, in terms of 
phenomenological dimensions that are thought to be modulated by meditation training 
and how these dimensions impact emotion regulation and monitoring processes.  
In the next sections, I discuss these findings in relation to the existing issues in 
cognitive neuroscience and research on meditation. Specifically: 1) I consider different 
explanations for the lack of coherence in the results on the modulation of perceptual 
learning processes, within the present work and between this work and existing 
literature; 2) I analyse the relation between some of the cognitive functions, and 
associated phenomenological dimensions, cultivated in mindfulness practices and 
their putative neurophysiological markers, in terms of attentional monitoring and 
emotion regulation; 3) I examine possible reasons underlying differences in state and 
trait effects observed within the groups of expert and novice meditators, with specific 
emphasis on the characterisation of the state of open presence. For all these points, I 
suggest directions for future research.   
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7.2 Perceptual learning in neutral and 
emotional settings: evidence from meditation  
 
 In this project, we considered the auditory MMN, a neurophysiological marker of 
perceptual learning, to constitute an intriguing framework for investigating the 
neurocognitive mechanisms of mindfulness practices and their associated 
phenomenological dimensions. The notion of perceptual learning is embedded in a 
theory of brain functions which is broad enough to encompass different mental 
phenomena and permits suitable comparisons with theoretical accounts of the 
processes developed in mindfulness meditation. Our investigation has led to 
interesting findings as well as new questions.  
 
7.2.1 Perceptual learning in neutral settings and replication issues 
 
In Study 1, we demonstrated that different meditation states impact perceptual 
learning processes differently in expert and novice practitioners. It was the first study, 
to our knowledge, to characterise a nondual practice (OP) in terms of its effect on brain 
predictive processes. We hypothesized that the radical suspension of subject-object 
duality in OP would downregulate the formation of perceptual habits while increasing 
the monitoring of the sensory environment. In this sense, exploring the interplay 
between the LFN, an ERP component related to stimulus attendance and attention 
monitoring, and the amplitude of the auditory MMN represented the best way to test 
our hypothesis. In fact, the LFN increased in both OP and FA in experts, reflecting 
higher attentional monitoring or “background awareness”, as described in recent 
theoretical models (Lutz et al., 2015). However, these two practices differ significantly 
in terms of task-set. While in OP the monitoring aspect is unrelated to any object, it is 
cultivated during FA in relation to a task-set of focusing on and selecting a perceptual 
object, which increases the saliency of task-unrelated stimuli. As it has been shown by 
studies on the effect of attention and expectations on the MMN amplitude (chapter 
2.8.1), specific task goals play a crucial in modulating perceptual learning processes. 
The results of Study 1 enrich this view by showing, for instance, that the MMN 
amplitude increases during FA although auditory stimuli were not selectively attended, 
while during OP, in experts, the MMN does not increase compared to a state of 
absorption even if the auditory stimuli were attended more (this was probably the case 
for novice practitioners, that showed an increase in the MMN during OP compared to 
the other states). These findings suggest that studying the impact of mindfulness 
meditation on perceptual learning processes could lead to 1) a better characterisation 
of the neural mechanisms underlying different practices, which are widely 
implemented in clinical interventions, and levels of expertise and 2) foster the 
understanding of the factors that modulate these processes in neutral settings. 
In Study 3, we sought to replicate our previous findings on the modulation of the MMN 
by different states and levels of expertise. More specifically, we tested the same 
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hypothesis as in Study 1, performing the same analysis on the MMN amplitude but 
controlling for the effect of different emotional conditions (this factor was entered as a 
random effect in a linear mixed model). In this case, we did not find any interaction 
between meditation states and the level of expertise. This result was unexpected and 
could be due to several different reasons (some of which are discussed in Study 3):  
1) Even if a possible effect of emotional contexts was controlled for in the 
statistical model, the paradigm implemented in Study 3 differed significantly 
from previous studies that found a modulation of the MMN during FA or as a 
trait effect in expert practitioners (Biedermann et al., 2016; Braboszcz and 
Delorme, 2011; Srinivasan and Baijal, 2007). Subtle differences between states, 
in terms of MMN amplitude, could have been obscured by the increased 
variability introduced by embedding oddball sequences in safe and threat 
periods.  
2) The task differed from previous studies not only in terms of emotional context, 
but also concerning the structure of the oddball sequences. Specifically, 
compared to previous studies, we implemented shorter sequences (~30 
seconds) and a shorter fixed inter-stimulus interval of 500ms. It is possible that 
longer and variable intervals, as well as longer sequences, are required to 
highlight a modulation of perceptual learning by different meditation styles, 
which might not be a phenomenon that happen as soon as a new sequence is 
presented.  
3) Another reason for the lack of replication could be due to the small subjects’ 
sample size in Study 1. It has been recently highlighted that small sample sizes 
could undermine reproducibility of neuroscientific findings, especially in 
studies using fMRI (Button et al., 2013). Although no such analysis has been 
performed on studies using EEG, we cannot exclude that Study 1 was somehow 
underpowered and at risk of false positives, given the smaller sample (n = 31) 
compared to Study 3 (n = 65 after data pre-processing). 
Overall, the lack of replication between the studies of the present work could be due to 
a concomitance of the factors outlined above. Future studies are needed to address 
these specific issues and clarify the impact of mindfulness states and expertise on 
auditory perceptual learning in neutral settings.  
 
7.2.2 Perceptual learning under threat and replication issues 
 
In study 2, we sought to replicate previous findings on the impact of anticipatory 
anxiety on auditory perceptual learning in the healthy population (especially, Cornwell 
et al., 2017, 2007). To this aim, we analysed a subset of data from Study 3 (i.e. data from 
novice practitioners during a control state). We can maintain that the experimental 
paradigm effectively manipulated levels of anticipatory anxiety, as measured by self-
reports, skin conductance responses and a sensitisation of early brain responses to 
auditory stimuli during periods of threat. However, we did not find differences in the 
MMN amplitude between safe and threat periods. We extensively discussed these 
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findings in relation to previous EEG and MEG literature on this topic in Study 2 and 
provided some putative explanations. Here, I provide a summary and additional 
suggestions on the possible reasons underlying the lack of replication of previous 
findings: 
1) It is possible that novice practitioners did not represent a typical sample of 
healthy subjects in this study. In fact, they were trained and practiced 
meditation during the period preceding data acquisition (see Protocol Study for 
further details). Even if practiced for a short period of time, meditation has been 
shown to downregulate the effect of stress on cognitive functions (Mohan et al., 
2011). However, it seems unlikely that the short training only affected the 
modulation of the MMN amplitude by periods of threat, and none of the other 
subjective and physiological measures. This view is corroborated by the 
findings in Study 3, where an effect of meditation training, in experts, was found 
on subjective measures of anxiety.  
2) Previous studies have used analysis methods and ways of reporting findings 
that could have biased a rigorous assessment of this phenomenon. As discussed 
in Study 2, previous findings reporting differences in the MMN amplitude during 
threat periods (or after the application of different stressors) presented some 
limitations. Some of these limitations are related to the implementation of 
statistical analyses and significance thresholds that could increase the rate of 
false positives (Cornwell et al., 2007; Elling et al., 2011). Other studies did not 
report any post-hoc analysis that should have been used to clarify the direction 
of effects in different conditions (Cornwell et al., 2017).  
3) More generally, these issues can be discussed in the recent and ongoing debate 
on the reproducibility of scientific studies in the field of experimental 
psychology and neurosciences (John et al., 2012; Munafò et al., 2017; Open 
Science Collaboration, 2015). Besides the biases associated to small sample 
sizes (as discussed in the previous section 6.2.1) and the use of analysis 
methods that could lead to false positives, previous literature on this topic could 
have been affected by the lack of publications reporting negative results (i.e. 
positive bias).  
Surely, some of the reasons discussed above (especially point 3) represent a personal 
speculation in light of unexpected results. Future studies should clarify these issues 
with accurate replications of the paradigm used in the present project (derived from 
Cornwell et al., 2017, 2007) using EEG or through meta-analyses of existing studies.  
Given the lack of modulation of auditory perceptual learning by unpredictable threat, 
it is not surprising that, in Study 3, we did not find any difference in the MMN amplitude 
during safe and threat periods between experts and novices and during meditation 
compared to a control state. However, we found that the MMN could indeed be 
modulated by unpredictable threat, but only in those subjects with high trait anxiety, 
and that meditation could downregulate this effect. These findings are discussed in the 
next section.  
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7.2.3 Anxiety as a dimensional construct: effect of meditation states  
 
Anxiety is not an on-off response. Previous theoretical models have highlighted how 
stressful situations can exert different effects, according to the interaction between 
situational and individual factors (Endler and Kocovski, 2001). Person variables, such 
as the level of dispositional anxiety, interact with situational variables (e.g. an 
unpredictable threat) and lead to changes in state anxiety and reactions (e.g. 
behavioural and biological changes) that depend on the type of interaction. 
Considering anxiety as a dimensional construct can help conciliating different results 
on the effect of threat on perceptual learning and general auditory processing, as well 
as its modulation by meditation.  
In study 2 and 3, we found that perceptual learning processes seem to be affected (i.e. 
higher MMN amplitude during threat periods) only in individuals who scored high in 
trait anxiety (data from Study 2 showed also a dependency on the level of state anxiety, 
but this effect was lost when data were combined with those from experts and 
meditation conditions). At mild levels of anxiety, brain responses to otherwise 
irrelevant stimuli are increased, an adaptive feedback to unpredictable threats in 
uncertain environments. However, when specific dispositional factors (i.e. high trait 
anxiety) interact with a threat situation, it affects the way the brain makes sense of the 
environment and learns about its features. Such view distinguishes between an 
adaptive role of anxiety on processing efficiency and the detrimental impact on 
perceptual learning observed in anxiety disorders (e.g. Bangel et al., 2017; Ge et al., 
2011). Interestingly, the increase in MMN amplitude during threat, compared to safe 
periods, for those subjects that scored high in dispositional anxiety, was observed only 
during a control condition. This result indicates that both meditation practices could 
downregulate the effect of threat on perceptual learning processes in individuals with 
high dispositional anxiety. While this is an interesting finding that could be of clinical 
relevance, it should be taken with consideration due to some unclear points. When 
taken separately, none of the two regression slopes (safe and threat periods) in the 
control condition was significantly different from zero, although a significant 
difference between the slopes was present. Most importantly, it is unclear why a 
general state effect was present across both groups of participants, whereas a trait 
effect was present on the level of self-reported anxiety. Finally, we included only 
healthy participants and it is unclear whether these findings could be translated into a 
clinical population.  
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7.2.4 Future directions 
 
As discussed in the previous sections, investigating the effect of mindfulness 
meditation on perceptual learning processes, in neutral and emotional settings, has led 
to a number of open questions and unclear findings. Future studies and analyses will 
be able to address several issues, clarify different points and improve the validity of 
results.  
Future research should replicate the same paradigm used in Study 1, increasing the 
sample size. Moreover, different parameters of oddball sequences can be manipulated 
to identify an optimal setting, in terms of temporal and physical features, that can be 
sensitive to differences between states and levels of expertise. Additionally, it will be 
crucial to determine whether a specific meditation state is being instantiated by a 
practitioner in a given period (e.g. an experimental block). This would limit confounds 
on the reasons underlying the variability of neurophysiological responses to 
experimental stimuli. A promising field, in this sense, is the study of neural oscillatory 
activity in different states and levels of expertise. Specifically, an analysis of 
spontaneous patterns of oscillations will be performed on the data from Study 3 to 
assess whether the lack of replication of findings from Study 1 was due to different 
oscillatory profiles.  
Finally, a way to drastically improve the research on this topic in both emotional and 
neutral contexts is the implementation of computational models that can test 
mechanistic hypotheses. This methodological approach has received increasing 
interest in the recent years and has provided relevant insights on the mechanisms 
underlying the MMN and the modulation of perceptual learning processes by attention, 
expectations and emotional contexts (e.g. Lieder et al., 2013; Mathys et al., 2014; 
Watanabe et al., 2013). Most importantly, computational approaches allow the 
formulation of hypothesis regarding changes learning parameters that can be tested 
on a trial-by-trial basis.  
 
 
 
7.3 Subjective dimensions: monitoring and 
emotion regulation  
  
The present work is embedded in a broader research agenda that aims to confirm and 
update theoretical models of mindfulness meditation. This can be achieved through 
investigating the relationship between dimensions of subjective experience that are 
thought to be modulated by meditation training and neurophysiological and bodily 
responses. To this aim, we collected and analysed data unrelated to perceptual learning 
processes (i.e. the MMN), which constituted our main outcome measure. In Study 1 and 
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3, we explored additional components of the auditory evoked response, as well as 
measures of bodily physiology (EDA). In Study 3, we collected data on different 
dimensions of subjective experience through self-reports and related them to the 
above-mentioned measures. What emerges is that different phenomenological profiles, 
related to meditation states and expertise, can be mapped into neural and bodily 
correlates of attention and emotions. Especially, the present word helped in identifying 
neural correlates of meta-awareness and monitoring processes and in elucidating the 
role of meta-awareness, clarity and dereification in emotion regulation.  
 
7.3.1 Do late ERP components reflect monitoring processes in 
meditation? 
 
In both Study 1 and 3, we found that late components of the auditory evoked response 
were sensitive to meditation states. Specifically, in Study 1 we found higher amplitude 
of the late frontal negativity (LFN) during meditation, compared to a control state and 
across both expert and novice groups. In Study 3, we found higher amplitude of the P2 
component in experts, compared to novices, and during meditation, compared to a 
control state, within the expert group (this represents a general description; some 
post-hoc comparisons were significant during threat or safe periods only).  
Previous studies have linked components in these latencies to processes of stimulus 
attendance and monitoring  (Bendixen et al., 2007; Crowley and Colrain, 2004; 
Karayanidis and Michie, 1996) and an effect of meditation training on the P2 amplitude 
has been reported in practitioners after a three-months retreat (Lutz et al., 2009). In 
our opinion, the modulation of these components reflects increased meta-awareness 
of auditory stimuli during  mindfulness meditation (Lutz et al., 2015). This view was 
supported, in Study 1, by the correlation between the difference in alpha oscillatory 
activity between periods of OP meditation and a control condition (i.e. reading, RE) and 
the difference in amplitude of the LFN between OP and RE (see Study 1 for a discussion 
on the role of alpha oscillations in this context). Most importantly, in Study 3 we found 
a direct link between the subjective experience of meta-awareness and the increased 
amplitude of the P2 during meditation states. Based on these findings, it is possible that 
the increased monitoring of stimuli unrelated to a specific task-set during meditation 
(i.e. meta-awareness) is reflected by increased responses to sensory stimuli in late 
components of the evoke responses previously associated to stimulus attendance and 
monitoring.  
This view presents some limitation and open questions. First, the effect of meditation 
was present on different components in Study 1 and 3. Whereas responses in these 
latencies have been related to similar processes, we cannot converge on a clear 
biomarker of monitoring processes in meditation. On the other hand, it is possible that 
the modulation of different components between the two studies was due to 
differences in the oddball paradigm, especially concerning the inter-trial interval. 
Additionally, effects on later components in Study 3 could have been masked by the 
high-pass filter (2hz) implemented. As it has been previously shown, late ERP 
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components (after 200ms) are sensitive to the choice of high-pass filtering frequency 
(Acunzo et al., 2012; Tanner et al., 2015) . Secondly, it is unclear whether these 
components are affected differently by different states and levels of expertise. Results 
on this topic are contradictory and does not necessarily confirm the hypotheses of 
previous models in terms of differences in meta-awareness between experts and 
novices and between FA and OM meditations (Lutz et al., 2015). As discrepancies 
between trait and state effects were present on different measures in the present work, 
they are discussed separately in section 6.3 of this chapter.  
 
7.3.2 Understanding emotion regulation through subjective experience  
 
In Study 3, we found a dissociation between physiological responses (SCRs) to threat 
and the subjective experience of anticipatory anxiety in expert meditators. It is, to our 
knowledge, the first evidence of the effect of meditation training on the anticipation of 
unpredictable nociceptive stimuli. Previous studies have considered the nonevaluative, 
accepting, moment-to-moment experiential stance cultivated by mindfulness practices 
as a mediating factor for eliminating the conditions that establish anticipatory anxiety 
of predicted nociceptive stimuli (Lutz et al., 2013). This is in line with theories that 
describe emotion regulation by mindfulness practices as a bottom-up process 
mediated by a specific attentional and motivation stance (e.g. Chambers et al., 2009). 
However, similarities between mindfulness and different emotion regulation 
strategies (such as top-down reappraisal mechanisms) have been largely debated (see 
Chiesa et al., 2013 for a review), mostly in the context of contrasting description of 
mindfulness as a construct or a state.  
Here we showed that operationalizing mindfulness practices as the modulation of 
specific cognitive functions, based on phenomenological dimensions, can help 
elucidating the mechanisms of emotion regulation. We found that the dissociation 
between physiological and subjective state of anticipatory anxiety was meditated by 
the level of clarity reported by each participant and the end of an experimental block 
and was significantly higher in expert practitioners. As mentioned in the introduction 
of the present work (chapter 2.3.3), phenomenal clarity does not only refer to the 
degree of vividness of perceptual events, but is thought to be related to the process of 
dereification (Schoenberg and Barendregt, 2016). This view is supported here by the 
fact that the level of self-reported clarity was predicted by a participant’s score in a 
questionnaire measuring the general degree of cognitive defusion (Forman et al., 
2012). Self-reported clarity also predicted subjective measures of meta-awareness, 
highlighting the relation between the latter and dereification in meditation practices 
(Lutz et al., 2015). Nonetheless, as we did not implement a self-report measure of 
dereification during the paradigm, but relied on correlations with trait measures, these 
associations remain exploratory and future studies are required to address this issue.  
This was the second study highlighting an association between phenomenal clarity and 
measures of emotional responses (Lutz et al., 2013). Overall, we demonstrated that 
collecting data on different dimensions of a participant’s subjective experience can 
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help understanding the mechanisms underlying emotion regulation in mindfulness 
meditation. Future studies should try to operationalize these measures in terms of 
neurophysiological correlates, to investigate biological causes of regulatory processes.  
 
 
 
7.3 State and trait effects  
 
In the present work, we found that different neurophysiological, subjective and bodily 
measures were modulated either by 1) meditation states across all groups of 
participants, 2) by meditation states but only in experts or 3) by the level of expertise 
across all experimental conditions. For instance, in Study 1, we found a state by group 
interaction on the MMN amplitude and on the power of gamma oscillatory activity, but 
a general effect of meditation on the amplitude of the LFN and on the power of 
oscillations in the alpha frequency band. In Study 3, we found a state by group 
interaction on the P2 amplitude, but a main effect of expertise on subjective measures 
and on the relation between SCRs and the degree of subjective anxiety. In Study 1, OP 
and FA could be differentiated, in experts, by looking at the interplay between LFN and 
MMN amplitude. In Study 2, the P2 amplitude in experts was not different during OP, 
compared to FA, but was higher in OP during both safe and threat periods, compared 
to novices, while the same was not true during FA. Overall, it is unclear which measures 
are sensitive to meditation states and levels of expertise, and in which context.  
Recent models of mindfulness meditation have been constructed following the 
hypothesis that the phenomenological dimensions, and related cognitive functions, 
cultivated in the practice are modulated by different states and levels of expertise. For 
instance, meta-awareness would be higher in experts, compared to novices, and during 
OM styles of practice, compared to FA (Lutz et al., 2015). According to previous 
operationalisation attempts, the state of OP in experts should be the one characterised 
by the highest phenomenal clarity (Lutz et al., 2007). On the other hand, other theories 
affirm that practicing mindfulness meditation repeatedly across sessions, individuals 
can develop a greater tendency to exhibit mindful attitudes and behaviours in the 
everyday life. As such, processes such as increased meta-awareness, dereification and 
clarity could develop into a trait in expert practitioners as a result of neuroplastic 
changes in brain activity and structure (e.g. Davidson and Kaszniak, 2015; Kiken et al., 
2015). Not many studies have investigated different meditation states and compared 
them to control conditions, and those that did it reported contrasting results. It is the 
case, for instance of the state by group interaction on gamma oscillatory power 
observed in Study 1, that contrasts with a previous study reporting a main effect of 
expertise on this measures (Braboszcz et al., 2017).  
Within the present work, we can discuss some trends and speculate on possible 
cofounds that limit the sensitivity of a study for state or trait effects: 
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1) Findings from Study 1 and 3 indicate a main effect of meditation states on ERP 
components related to attentional monitoring (LFN, P2). Nonetheless, in Study 
3, a trait effect was present on subjective measures of meta-awareness. It is 
possible that in complex paradigms, comprising different states and 
experimental conditions (e.g. safe and threat periods), subjective measures lose 
some discriminatory power as subjects are prompted to report changes in 
experience that were not necessarily of high relevance for them. 
2) From another perspective, it is possible that in emotional settings trait effects 
prevail over subtle effects of different states. In fact, paradigms eliciting 
affective states can be more similar to everyday-life scenarios and therefore 
trigger mechanisms that are embedded outside the meditation practice.  
3) Although we tried to apply rigorous methods of selection of expert and training 
of novice practitioners, the quality of experience during meditation can change 
between subjects and within a single session for the same individual. This is 
especially true for the state of OP, which is known to be difficult to stabilise, 
especially when people are asked to meditate for short periods of time.  
Overall, accessing differences in subjective experience, and related neurobiological 
changes, in experts and novices during different states is not an easy challenge. 
However, developments on this topic are very much needed and necessary for 
progressing in this field of research. 
 
7.3.2 Future directions  
 
The present work highlights several limitations for the study of the neural mechanisms 
of meditation states at different levels of expertise. Nonetheless, this field is still in its 
infancy and the studies presented here can generate new methodological questions 
and causes for improvements. 
Future studies should construct paradigms and select participants according to the 
specific aim and field in which the study is positioned. For instance, if there is an 
interest in studying emotion regulation mechanisms, selecting a group of participants 
with a regular and long-term practice and focusing on trait differences might increase 
a paradigm’s sensitivity. On the other hand, if one is interested in the specific neural 
dynamics of different states, it would be ideal to measure practitioners attending 
intensive retreats and acquire data during longer sessions. This is especially true for 
the study of advanced practices such as open presence, which could benefit from 
single-case studies on practitioners that are known to be able to maintain such state 
for long periods of time or who are practicing intensively in the context of a traditional 
retreat. 
In general, developing methods for describing and keeping track of changes in 
subjective experience during a practice or a paradigm is a crucial point that need to be 
addressed by future studies. To let practitioners, and participants, guide the research 
with accounts of their experience is fundamental and a key aspect of the 
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neurophenomenological framework. Additionally, meditation practitioners could and 
should be involved in the conception, design and piloting of experimental paradigms.  
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Chapter 8 
Conclusion 
 
 
 
In this work, we addressed several unresolved issues in the field of neuroscientific 
research of mindfulness meditation. We implemented specific methods of participants 
selection and data analysis, and we collected and related different types of data in line 
with the epistemological framework of neurophenomenology.  
We studied the impact of different practices and levels of expertise on auditory 
perceptual learning processes in neutral and emotional settings, as a proxy to 
understand the neurocognitive mechanisms of mindfulness practices. This 
investigation has led to intriguing results and many open questions. Specifically, we 
characterised different mindfulness practices in expert practitioners in terms of the 
interplay between biomarkers of attentional monitoring and perceptual learning, in 
line with the specific phenomenology of each state. Nonetheless, these findings await 
future replication. We demonstrated that auditory perceptual learning is not affected 
by anticipatory anxiety, except for individuals with high dispositional anxiety. This 
effect on learning could be downregulated by during mindfulness meditation. Again, 
future studies are needed to confirm these findings, especially in clinical contexts.  
A broader aim of this work was to map phenomenological dimensions underlying 
cognitive processes cultivated in mindfulness practices into neural and bodily markers 
of attention and emotions. In this context, we identified late components of the 
auditory evoked responses as putative neural correlates of heightened monitoring 
during mindfulness styles of meditation. Moreover, we highlighted a direct link 
between phenomenal clarity, dereification and emotion regulation in expert 
meditation practitioners.  
Further research is needed to differentiate effects of mindfulness-related processes 
during meditation states or as general correlates of expertise. In this sense, future 
studies will have to implement more refined methods to track changes in subjective 
experience. Finally, future studies could rely on uncommon frameworks, such as 
single-case paradigms and long-term retreats, to elucidate the general questions raised 
by the present work.  
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Foreword 
Brain & Mindfulness is an ERC-funded research project led by Antoine LUTZ, carried out in               
Lyon (France) from 2015 to 2019. The main aim of this project is to investigate the                
phenomenological, behavioral, neural and physiological correlates of meditation in cognitive          
and emotion regulation processes. It is embedded in the more general exploration of             
processes and biomarkers of mental health and wellbeing. 
 
This document presents the scientific context and the overarching goals of the study, its              
general methodology, and the experiments that compose it. 
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Context and goals 
Over the last decades, the scientific study of meditation, especially the so-called mindfulness             
meditation, has received increasing attention in the fields of medicine, psychology and            
cognitive neurosciences. The growing interest for the practice of meditation is also supported             
by its widespread implementation in cognitive therapy. Mindfulness-based therapies are          
successfully applied in contexts such as stress management, depression relapse and           
chronic pain, among others. 
 
Nevertheless, the understanding of the neurocognitive mechanisms underlying meditation is          
still quite limited. Whereas an increasing number of studies have described how meditation             
training impacts several cognitive and affective processes in terms of observed behaviour            
and related neural correlates, this field of research is still facing a number of shortcomings.               
Neuroimaging studies of meditation, pain and emotion regulation, as well as of specific             
meditation states, has not reached a consensus on the neural networks implicated in the              
practice. The actual neurophysiological mechanisms underlying the observed modulation of          
behavioural and neuroimaging markers are also poorly understood. Moreover, this field of            
research often lacks a precise characterisation of subjective accounts of meditation           
experience and their correlation with neurophysiological and neuroanatomical measures.         
Finally, previous cross-sectional studies have been limited by a lack of rigorous selection of              
expert meditation practitioners and have often not provided an in-depth introduction to the             
practice for control participants. 
 
This project tries to address these limitations by proposing a methodological approach that             
1) takes into account the variety of meditation practices such as Focused Attention (FA),              
Open Monitoring (OM) and Compassion, 2) provides a detailed meditation introduction to            
novice practitioners through experiential exercises and home practice, and 3) brings together            
a group of expert practitioners that followed a similar path of extensive practice in the same                
tradition. Within this general framework, we attempt to bridge the gap between third and              
first-person methods by implementing measures of neural activity (fMRI, EEG, MEG) and            
bodily physiology (e.g. heart rate, respiration, etc.) together with subjective accounts of the             
experimental conditions provided by self-report scales and extensive interviews. 
 
The aim of this manual is to provide the scientific community with an overview of the core                 
methodological aspects of this project. In the first section, the reader will find detailed              
information on the recruitment process of novice and expert meditators, along with a short              
presentation of their training. In the second section, we provide a brief description of the               
experimental aspects of the project, including a list of the tasks, the implemented paradigms,              
and primary outcome measures. For background information on the paradigms used in the             
tasks, the reader is referred to relevant sources in the existing literature. Specific             
methodological information pertaining to each task will be available in forthcoming           
publications, listed at the end of the manual. 
 
 
5 
Participants 
Recruitment 
Meditation naive participants were recruited locally from January 2016 to January 2018            
through flyers and posters in public places, on mailing lists, Facebook and notifications to              
research participant databases. Long term practitioners (hereafter referred to as LTPs or            
experts) were recruited by a long term practitioner (with extensive contacts within the             
Nyingma community) from multiple meditation centers, predominantly in France but also           
internationally. Interested candidates received a detailed study information sheet, informed          
consent, and initial screening questionnaire for general inclusion and exclusion criteria.  
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Inclusion and exclusion criteria 
General 
- Aged between 35 and 65 years 
- No use of medication affecting the central nervous system (e.g. anti-depressants,           
opioids) or the pain system (e.g. nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drugs) 
- No neurological and/or psychiatric illnesses (e.g. epilepsy, depression) and/or condition          
involving sensitization to pain (e.g. chronic pain, fibromyalgia) 
- No family history of epilepsy 
- A score to the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) below 20 
- No severe hearing loss 
- For women: not pregnant, breastfeeding or having given birth in the last 6 months  
- MRI compatibility (no claustrophobia or metal implants, not including dental  prostheses) 
- Affiliation to the social security system 
- Motivation to participate in the project in an effective manner 
- Willing to sign the informed consent 
 
Specific to novices 
For novices, there was an additional inclusion criteria in the screening questionnaire: 
- No significant experience with meditation or other mind-body techniques (e.g. yoga,           
tai-chi, chi-gong, sophrology, neuro linguistic programming) 
 
Potential novices who satisfied the general criteria had a medical check by a physician who               
also collected their informed consent, before being formally included in the study. As             
recruitment of novice and expert practitioners progressed simultaneously, a selection of           
candidates for the novice group was sometimes made to improve the matching between the              
two groups in terms of age, gender, hand laterality and education level. 
 
Specific to experts 
Potential LTPs who satisfied the general inclusion criteria then entered a second screening             
phase. They were contacted to check the following additional inclusion criteria:  
- having followed at least one 3 year meditation retreat 
- having a minimum of 10 000 hours of meditation practice 
- sustaining a daily practice of a minimum of 45 minutes over the past year 
- being familiar with either Mahamudra or Dzogchen teachings and practices 
 
Finally, they had an interview by phone with a medical doctor who gave his agreement for                
the inclusion of the participant in the study. 
 
One expert had a BDI score above our criterion threshold. However, considering that he has               
never been clinically diagnosed for depression and the difficulty of recruiting LTPs satisfying             
our practice criteria, we decided to include him in the study. 
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Task-specific  
For novices, participation to the task PAR (see below, Outcome measures) was conditioned             
on a pain threshold above 47 C°. A standard pain calibration procedure (method of limits)               
was performed using a Medoc TSA-II stimulator with a 30 x 30 mm flat thermode. This was                 
done to ensure better matching with LTPs, as LTPs showed elevated pain thresholds in a               
previous study by the principal investigator (Lutz et al. 2013, data not reported in the original                
paper). 
 
For both novice and expert participants, participation to the experiments in           
magnetoencephalography (MEG) was conditioned on sufficient signal quality. Signal quality          
was potentially impaired in participants with dental restoration. Assessment of signal quality            
was performed on a few minutes of resting-state recording, based on the nature of the               
planned analyses and on the expertise of the MEG engineer. 
 
 
Meditation training 
Novices  
Included meditation naïve participants participated in a training weekend. The training           
protocol was based on ‘Joy of Living’, a secular meditation program authored by Yongey              
Mingyur Rinpoche and rooted in Tibetan Buddhism, and included teachings on, and            
practices with three different styles of meditation (focus attention, FA; open monitoring, OM;             
and compassion, CO). The program was modified to also accommodate various experiential            
exercises designed to familiarize participants with different phenomenological categories of          
interest to the research program (Lutz et al. 2015), in order to ensure they accurately               
understood these different constructs. The training was provided by a qualified instructor            
with 13 of years of practice in the Karma Kagyu and Nyingma traditions and 8 years of                 
teaching experience with the Joy of Living program. A total of five meditation weekends were               
hosted in the Lyon Neuroscience Research Center from March 2015 until September 2018             
(fig. 1). More details on the aims, contents and structure of the meditation weekend will be                
described elsewhere (submitted paper). 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Timeline of the 5 meditation weekends 
 
Experts 
We included 30 long-term practitioners within French and European Tibetan buddhist           
communities. 17 participants were trained in the Nyingma school (Mahamudra), 11 in the             
Karma Kagyü school (Dzogchen), and 2 in both. Two participants received additional training             
from Theravadin monks, and one from the Gelug Tibetan school. 
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Core practices shared by all participants included “calm abiding” (shamatha, Skt. śamatha;            
Tib. shyiné), “insight” meditation (Skt. vipaśyanā, Pāli vipassanā), Vajrayana practices, and           
at least one open presence style of practice aiming at the recognition and sustaining of the                
“nature of the mind” (Tib. Wylie, sems nyid or sems kyi rang bzhin) or one's “fundamental                
awareness” (Tib. Wylie, rig pa). 
 
Outcome measures 
Self-administered questionnaires 
All participants were invited to fill a series of 13 questionnaires (see table below).              
Answers were saved anonymously and participants were informed of this. 
 
Novice participants filled the questionnaires prior to the meditation week-end, in the            
lab, on a computer. Because of technical issues, 10 participants had to fill 8              
questionnaires at home, after the meditation training.  
 
Expert practitioners filled the questionnaires either on a computer in the lab, during             
their visit, or from home afterwards. 
 
Acronym Full name Reference 
BDI Beck Depression Inventory Beck et al. 1961 
BDIR Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding Paulhus 1991 
CFQ Cognitive Fusion Questionnaire Gillanders et al. 2014 
DDS Drexel Defusion Scale Forman et al. 2012 
FFMQ Five Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire Baer et al. 2006 
FLANDERS Flinders Handedness Survey  Nicholls et al. 2013 
IRI Interpersonal Reactivity Index Davis 1980 
LHQ Language History Questionnaire Li et al. 2006 
MAIA Multidimensional Assessment of Interoceptive Awareness Mehling et al. 2012 
PCS Pain Catastrophizing Scale Sullivan et al. 1995 
PNCS Pommier and Neff Compassion Scale Pommier 2010 
PSWQ The Penn State Worry Questionnaire  Meyer et al. 1990 
STAI State Trait Anxiety Inventory Spielberger 1970 
9 
Behavioral, neurophysiological and phenomenological measures 
Subjects participated to up to 16 experiments/tasks, spread over 8 sessions, for a total of 5                
to 7 days. Experts’ participation was spread either over 2 visits (4 days + 2 or 3 days) or 1                    
single visit lasting 6 days. Novices came 5-7 times to the lab during a period ranging from 1                  
to 4 months. For novices, two experimental sessions were sometimes combined in a single              
visit. Some subjects did not participate to all experimental sessions. In particular, some tasks              
had specific inclusion criteria (see Task-specific inclusion criteria): 
- for novices, the participation to experimental session 2 was conditional on a sufficiently              
high pain threshold 
- only MEG-compatible participants (from both groups) did experimental session 3 
Experimental session 1 
Modalities: MRI, behavior 
Duration: half a day 
 
CODE MEASURES PARADIGM REFERENCES 
ANAT - structural anatomy 
- T1, T2, T2* 
- FLAIR 
- DWI 
- Hippocampal scan 
Villain et al. 2010 
La Joie et al. 2010  
PERC - BOLD MRI - ECG, respiration - Multisensory stimulation López-Solà et al. 2014 
SMRI - BOLD MRI - ECG, respiration - Resting-state  
BLAST - behavior - Delayed visual discrimination  
FLANC - behavior - Likert scales 
- Posner cueing 
- Eriksen flanker Trautwein et al. 2016 
 
Experimental session 2 
Modalities: MRI 
Duration: half a day 
 
CODE MEASURES PARADIGM REFERENCES 
PAR 
- BOLD MRI 
- ECG, respiration 
- behavior 
- Likert scales 
- semi-structured interview 
- Anticipation and relief in 
thermal nociception 
- Regulation of pain through 
mindfulness 
Atlas et al. 2010 
Leknes et al. 2012 
Lutz et al. 2013 
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Experimental session 3 
Modalities: MEG 
Duration: half a day 
 
CODE MEASURES PARADIGM REFERENCES 
MIMOSA 
- MEG 
- ECG, EGG, respiration 
- behavior 
- Likert ITEMS 
- semi-structured interview 
- Visual passive oddball 
- Visual consciousness 
report 
Stefanics et al. 2014 
Park et al. 2014 
Richter et al. 2016 
SMEG 
- MEG 
- ECG, respiration 
- Likert scales 
- semi-structured interview 
- Resting-state  
 
Experimental session 4 
Modalities: EEG 
Duration: one full day 
 
CODE MEASURES PARADIGM REFERENCES 
MMN 
- EEG 
- Likert scales 
- semi-structured interview 
- Auditory passive oddball 
- Stress induction Cornwell et al. 2007 
PEC 
- EEG 
- Likert scales 
- ECG, respiration 
- Electrical stimulation 
- Emotional images Ring et al. 2013 
 
Experimental session 5 
Modalities: EEG 
Duration: half a day 
 
CODE MEASURES PARADIGM REFERENCES 
CAAT 
- behavior 
- ECG, respiration 
- skin conductance 
- Likert scales 
- semi-structured interview 
- Approach-avoidance 
- Emotional videos 
Baquedano et al. 2017 
Klimecki et al. 2013 
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Experimental session 6 
Modalities: EEG 
Duration: half a day 
 
CODE MEASURES PARADIGM REFERENCES 
RIV 
- EEG 
- behavior 
- Likert scales 
- Binocular rivalry 
- Affordance 
Riddoch et al. 2002 
Pace & Saracini 2014 
 
Experimental session 7 
Modalities: behavior, interview 
Duration: one full day 
 
CODE MEASURES PARADIGM REFERENCES 
FBI - behavior - Likert scales - Full body illusion 
Lenggenhager et al. 
2007 
HBA - behavior - Heartbeat counting Khalsa et al. 2008 
PPS - behavior - Likert scales - Peripersonal space Canzoneri et al. 2012 
 
In addition, this experimental session included a 1h semi-structured in-depth interview to 
explore participants' backgrounds, motivations and worldviews. 
 
Experimental session 8 
Modalities: behavior 
Duration: half a day 
 
CODE MEASURES PARADIGM REFERENCES 
WIM - behavior - Visual short-term memory 
Vandenbroucke et al. 2011 
Rerko et al. 2014 
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Annex II 
Supplementary information 
 
 
 
II.1 Protocol Study: supplementary 
information 
 
 
1. Experiential exercises implemented in the phenomenological training protocol 
 
Effort 
The dimension of effort was introduced in the context of practicing Focused Attention 
on the sound of a bell. The teacher asked the participants to experience the difference 
between concentrating on a specific sound while preventing the mind from wandering 
and simply recognizing the same sound in the field of awareness (“just listen to the 
sound”). 
 
Absorption and Meditative Awareness 
The difference between being absorbed in a mental phenomenon and being aware of it 
and its nature has been described during teachings throughout all the course of the 
training weekend. In particular, participants have been invited to recognize the switch 
between absorption and awareness that occurs at the very moment they realize their 
mind has wandered away during meditation. 
 
Object Orientation and Aperture 
In the context of a guided practice, subjects were asked to focus their attention over a 
small visual object (a flower, a piece of tissue, etc.). Subjects were first asked to 
concentrate on a specific detail of the object, then on the entire object and finally on the 
entire visual field. This exercise was implemented to introduce the concepts of object 
orientation and aperture with a direct experience of the different degree of attentional 
focus in a given sensory modality, and the aperture of the field of awareness.  
 
Foreground and Background Awareness 
During the weekend, participants were guided through a meditation practice using 
physical sensations as support and then shifting the attention over the visual field. 
Participants could experience that, although their attention shifted and changed the 
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main object of focus, physical sensations that were previously in the “foreground” 
could still be experienced in the “background”. 
 
Empathy and Compassion 
During the second day of the training weekend, subjects were introduced to the 
processes of empathy and compassion with the help of an experiential exercise. The 
aim of this exercise was to help the subject experiencing and understanding the 
practical meaning of compassion, as intended in the Buddhist framework. The access 
to this understanding and experiential testing was fostered by the contrasting 
experience of empathy, based on the process of eidetic reduction and imaginative 
variation (Husserl 2008). 
In practice, two highly emotional pictures, depicting people suffering, were shown to 
the subjects. The pictures were taken from the Internal Affective Picture System 
database (IAPS, Lang et al. 1997) and selected based on negative valence and high 
arousal. Subjects were warned that the pictures were characterised by a strong 
emotional content. They were first asked to look at the picture without any instruction 
(for about 3 minutes). Subsequently, they rested their mind for some minutes and 
shared their experience of looking at the pictures. The teacher acknowledged the 
subjects’ experiences and introduced the concept of empathy and the practice of 
compassion. 
Subjects were asked to look at the pictures again and were guided by the teacher to 
empathize with the sufferer with sentences such as: “the person suffers, and you suffer 
with her”. They were also prompted to silently repeat sentences such as: “I feel your 
sufferance” or “Your sufferance is my sufferance”. Moments of “empathy training” were 
intermixed with the practice of open awareness. Subjects were then guided through a 
practice of compassion, using the same pictures as support. This practice followed the 
classical form of compassion meditation as implemented in the secular program of the 
Buddhist tradition on which the training was based. 
Finally, participants were encouraged to share their thoughts and comment on the 
difference between the two experiential exercises and the processes of compassion and 
empathy, as well as their understanding of these processes before and after the 
exercise. 
  
Clarity 
The dimension of clarity was introduced and described to the participants at the end 
of the weekend. They were asked to recall how clear their mind was when undergoing 
the thermal pain threshold calibration, compared to trying to use drowsiness as a 
support for meditation. The practice on drowsiness was proposed after lunch on the 
weekend days. This exercise aimed to help novices familiarizing with different degrees 
of clarity of their mental experience, which can partly depend, at least at an early stage 
of the meditation practice, on physiological states.  
 
 
199 
 
2. Characteristics of novices’ practice 
 
 
 
 
 
Supplementary Fig. 1 Distributions of the four metrics over the group of novice participants. 
Participants were asked, but not required, to meditate daily for 20 to 30 minutes for the whole duration 
of the study, which ranged from 6 to 23 weeks. (b) Participants favored the practice of Open Monitoring 
(OM) over Focused Attention (FA) and tended to neglect the practice of Compassion (CO). We did not 
find any effect of type of practice (FA, OM, CO) on Session length (one-way repeated measure ANOVA: F 
(2,80)=1.47, p=.23). In order to determine whether individual preferences towards a given practice 
were present at the outset or emerged over time, we used the percentage of weekly practice time 
dedicated to the preferred practice as a measure of practice bias. Thus defined, practice bias ranges from 
33.3% (no bias: the participant dedicates the same amount of time to each of the three practices) to 
100% (full bias: the participant engages in only one practice). Practice bias was found high already in 
the first week after the training weekend (M=59%, SD=16%), and increased linearly over weeks 
(R²adj=.27, p<.016, β=.46, 95% CI [.10, .81]; data not shown). Significance levels: *: p<.05; **: p<.01; ***: 
p<.001 
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Supplementary Fig. 2 The amount of daily practice decreased steadily over time (a). A closer look 
reveals that this effect is mostly due to a decline of the Frequency of practice (b) rather than a shortening 
of Session lengths (c). Errors bars are 95% confidence intervals.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Temporal dynamics of Stability and Clarity 
 
 
Supplementary Fig. 3 The temporal dynamic of Stability and Clarity ratings in novices. Error bars = 
95% CI. 
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4. Model selection for self-reported phenomenological effects  
 
Presented below are the detailed results of each of the model selections performed. The 
following information is provided for each model: the variables that compose it, the difference 
between the AICc of the model and the AICc of the best model (ΔIC), the variance explained by 
the model (R²adj), the global level of significance of the model (p), and the p-value of each of the 
model’s terms (main effects and two-way interactions, if any; bold: <.05; italics: <.1; n.s.: >.1). 
In addition, we provide the relative evidence weight, a measure of relative importance of each 
term across the entire model space (Calcagno and de Mazancourt 2010), comprised between 0 
and 1. 
 
 
model # ΔIC R²adj p BIDR INT EXP FOB FOB:INT FOB:EXP 
A1 0 .38 .010  .007 n.s. .09  .007 
A2 1.13 .25 .048  .04 n.s. n.s. .053  
A3 1.44 .27 .025  .07  n.s. .033  
Relative evidence weight .31 .85 .66 .86 .35 .55 
 
Supplementary Table 1 Models selected for the state effect on Aperture 
 
 
model # ΔIC R²adj p BIDR INT EXP FOB BIDR:INT BIDR:EXP 
B1 0 .34 .016 n.s. n.s.  .007 .017  
B2 0.90 .17 .050  .066  .071   
B3 1.69 .45 .010 n.s. n.s. n.s. .004 .003 .056 
B4 1.81 .08 .098  .098     
B5 1.97 .07 n.s    n.s.   
Relative evidence weight .60 .66 .34 .74 .36 .10 
 
Supplementary Table 2 Models selected for the fatigue effect 
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model # ΔIC R²adj p BIDR INTfocus INTopen 
C1 0 .15 .034  .034  
Relative evidence weight .40 .74 .34 
 
Supplementary Table 3 Models selected for the fatigue effect, after differentiating Intensityfocus and 
Intensityopen. 
 
 
model # ΔIC R²adj p BIDR INT EXP FOB 
D1 0 .19 .023   .023  
Relative evidence weight .23 .30 .84 .21 
 
Supplementary Table 4 Model selected for phenomenological specificity, defined as the difference 
between correlations between variability of reaction time on one hand, and Stability and Clarity on the 
other hand.  
 
 
 BIDR Intensity Experience 
Intensity 0.431 * [0.034, 0.711]   
Experience 0.131 [-0.287, 0.508] 
0.617 ** 
[0.284, 0.817]  
FOB 0.197 [-0.224, 0.556] 
-0.061 
[-0.454, 0.351] 
-0.058 
[-0.451, 0.354] 
 
Supplementary table 5 Pearson cross-correlations between variables of interest. Values between 
square brackets are 95% confidence intervals. Values in bold are significant. Significance levels: *: p<.05; 
**: p<.01 
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II.2 Study 1: supplementary information  
 
1. Meditation instructions for novices 
Training for Focused Attention: 
This state is better known as the Buddhist practice of “one-pointed concentration”. 
This is a state in which one tries to focus all one’s attention upon one object, keep it 
on that object, and bring it back to that object when one finds that one has been 
distracted (by outer perceptions or inner thoughts). During the training session, the 
participant should focus his/her attention on a small object (coin, shirt etc.). For this 
experiment, it is important that the object on which one focuses is visual, rather than 
focusing on the breath, mantra, or a mental image. Ideally, this “one-pointed 
concentration” should be clear (vivid) and unwavering (calm and stable), free from 
all types of distraction, the main types being sinking into dullness and being carried 
away by mental agitation. 
 
 
Cultivation of Open Presence: 
Generate a state of total openness, in which the mind is vast like the sky. Maintain a 
clear awareness and presence open to the surrounding space. The mind is calm and 
relaxed, not focused on something in particular, yet totally present, clear, vivid and 
transparent. When thoughts arise, simply let them pass through your mind without 
leaving any trace in it. When you perceive noises, images, tastes, or other sensations, 
let them be as they are, without engaging into them or rejecting them. Consider that 
they can’t affect the serene equanimity of your mind. 
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2.1 Subject-specific ICA profiles: a formal test to investigate their contribution in 
brain signal.  
Independent component analysis highlighted an intriguing set of components, subject-
specific and mainly found in subjects belonging to the Expert group. After inspection of 
time-course, spectrogram, and topography, we noted a component characterized by a 
peak of activity in the gamma-range that tends to decline over higher frequencies, is 
sustained along particularly wide time-windows during the whole session (possibly 
reflecting the meditation state), and presents a variable scalp-distribution (although 
mainly concentrated in fronto-central regions) and a rather superficial possible dipole 
(i.e. see Figure S3). We classified these components as “decline”. From a visual 
inspection, these components have some common characteristic with components 
related to muscle activity, such as dipole location and increase in gamma frequencies. 
Nevertheless, muscle activity does not tend to decline at higher frequencies, is not 
sustained as much over time, and is more superficial and localized at the edges of the 
scalp compared to the components we found. Moreover, previous studies have already 
found an increase in oscillatory gamma activity in the frontal regions for expert 
meditators (e.g. Lutz et al., 2004), but have treated such findings with caution due to 
the possible contribution of high frequency muscle activity. 
To be able to determine whether the components found in the present study were 
caused by muscle activity or rather represented a source of genuine brain signal, we 
implemented a formal and rather conservative method to test for the contribution of 
each single component in the ERP. Epochs were generated for each subject (see 
Methods section for the epochs generation method) who had one or more “decline” 
component, after rejecting all other components (including typical brain signal). Each 
“decline” component was tested alone. Epoched data were not baseline-corrected and 
a normal averaging method was applied to generate ERPs. Before averaging, data from 
three consecutive blocks and for all states were concatenated for the “deviant” stimulus 
condition, while epoched data for standard stimuli (this time including all presented 
standard stimuli) were concatenated across blocks, while keeping the different states 
separated. The ERPs for each subject were subsequently z-transformed to the mean 
and standard deviation of the baseline signal 300ms before stimulus onset, and the 
global mean field was calculated across all electrodes at each time point of the ERP. 
Finally, an arbitrary stimulus-locked time-window was chosen (0-600ms after 
stimulus onset) and we computed the percentage of time-points in the latter window 
which were above or below three standard deviations (3 sigma) from the baseline (the 
3 sigma threshold was arbitrarily set after inspecting with the same method 
components clearly reflecting brain signal, as well as others clearly reflecting 
artefacts). Following a conservative approach, we set a threshold of 15% of time-points 
trespassing 3 sigma, above which the specific component was kept for ERP and future 
spectral analyses; it was otherwise rejected.  
 
 
205 
 
We found that, even after applying this rather conservative method (components did 
not necessarily have to contribute to the ERP and stringent thresholds were used), 
several “decline” components could still be interpreted as reflecting genuine brain 
signals. This is further supported by the fact that some subjects, showing these special 
profiles of activity, lacked “normal” components reflecting brain signal (characterized 
by a peak of activity in the alpha-range, a broad topography, and a deeper source). The 
results of the above method thus usefully supported the results of spectral analysis, 
which were free of contamination from muscle activity. 
 
 
 
 
 
2.2 Average number of trials after data pre-processing  
 
 
Table showing mean number of trials (MEAN) and standard deviation (STD) for each 
group (EXP = experts; NOV = novices), stimulus type (std = standard; dev = deviant) 
and state (FA, OP, RE). Notice that only standard tones preceding deviants were 
included in the analysis.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 std_FA std_OP std_RE dev_FA dev_OP dev_RE 
MEAN EXP 146.6 143.9 141.6 145.7 144.4 141.8 
STD EXP 2.1 8.7 9.8 2.8 7.6 9.8 
MEAN NOV 145.0 145.7 140.4 144.7 145.9 139.8 
STD NOV 3.3 10.9 11.6 4.6 9.9 11.6 
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2.3 Differences in response to standard and deviant stimuli  
To investigate differences in response to standard and deviant stimuli between 
experimental conditions and groups, we performed additional statistical analysis in the 
MMN time-window (90 to 180 ms) and frontal ROI. More specifically, we fitted two 
linear mixed-effects models, comprising the average response amplitude to either 
deviant or standard stimuli as dependent variable, the interaction between STATE (FA, 
OP, RE) and GROUP (Experts, Novices) as fixed effect, and subjects as random effect. 
The model was tested using an ANOVA analysis of variance (Type II Wald chi-square 
test). Paired t-tests, corrected for multiple comparisons using Tukey honestly 
significant difference test (HSD), were used as post-hoc tests comparing least-squared 
means. The analysis of responses to standard stimuli yielded a marginally significant 
interaction between STATE and GROUP (χ2 (2) = 4.7; p = 0.09). Descriptive statistics 
showed how the average response to standard stimuli during OP was decreased, 
compared to other states, in novices and increased in expert practitioners (see figure 
S4). Nonetheless, post-hoc tests did not highlight significant differences between states 
and groups in response to standard stimuli. The analysis of response to deviant stimuli 
yielded a statistically significant main effect of STATE (χ2 (2) = 9.6; p = 0.007). Post-hoc 
tests showed how, across both groups, the response to deviants was lower during RE 
compared to OP and FA (t-ratio (58) = -2.3; p = 0.05 and t-ratio (58) = -2.9; p = 0.01, 
respectively).  
None of these tested yielded informative results to explain the interaction between 
states and groups, observed in the analysis of the MMN component. The marginally 
significant interaction, resulted from the analysis of responses to standard stimuli, 
might point towards understanding differences in the MMN in terms of different 
average amplitude of response to this stimulus type between states and groups, 
especially concerning the OP condition. A trial by trial analysis, with the help of 
computational modelling, could help elucidate this critical research question.  
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Figure S3. Comparison between an ICA component defined as “decline” (top) and one 
displaying an artefact (bottom). From left to right: topography of the component and time-
course, spectral power and graph showing the contribution of the component in the global 
mean field for each state (FA, OP, RE). Grey lines on the graph represent the 3 sigma 
threshold for the inclusion criteria. 
 
 
209 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure S4. Mean values of responses to standard and deviant auditory stimuli in MMN 
latency (90-180ms) at frontal ROI for FA, OP and RE conditions. Grey bars represent expert 
practitioners (standards: light grey; deviants: dark grey) and blue bars represent novice 
practitioners (standards: light blue; deviants: dark blue. 
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II.3 Study 2: supplementary information  
 
 
1. Self-report questions 
 
1) To which degree did you experience anxious feelings in the “threat” condition?  
Labels: 1=”not at all” 5=”moderately” 7=”very much” 
2) To which degree did you experience anxious feelings in the “safe” condition?  
Labels: 1=”not at all” 5=”moderately” 7=”very much” 
3) To which degree, on average, were you aware of listening to sounds during 
this block? 
Labels: 1=”never” 5=”sometimes” 9=”always” 
4) To which degree, on average, were you distracted during this block? 
Labels: 1=”never” 5=”sometimes” 9=”always” 
 
 
 
 
Figure S1. Electrodes layout after data pre-processing and frontal ROI (grey area) used in 
the analysis of MMN amplitude and N1 and P2 components of the auditory evoked response.  
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II.4 Study 3: supplementary information  
 
1. Self-reports  
 
To which degree did you experience anxious feeling in the “threat” condition?  
Labels: 1 = not at all 5 = moderately 7 = very much 
 
To which degree did you experience anxious feeling in the “safe” condition?  
Labels: 1 = not at all 5 = moderately 7 = very much 
 
To which degree, on average, were you aware of sounds during this block? 
Labels: 1 = never 5 = sometimes 9 = always  
 
To which degree, on average, were you aware of listening to sounds during this block? 
Labels: 1 = never 5 = sometimes 9 = always 
 
To which degree, on average, were you distracted during this block? 
Labels: 1 = never 5 = sometimes 9 = always 
 
To which degree, on average, you mind was clear? 
Labels: 1 = not at all 5 = moderately 9 = very much  
 
 
 
2.1. Number of blocks for each experimental condition following data 
preprocessing  
 
 
 
FA OP VD 
Expert 57 57 59 
Novice 69 68 67 
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2.2 Mean epochs per session for group, state, condition and stimulus type  
Group State Cond Stim Mean SD 
Exp FA Safe std 55.0 2.1 
Exp FA Safe dev 54.9 2.3 
Exp FA Threat std 54.0 2.7 
Exp FA Threat dev 54.1 2.8 
Exp OP Safe std 54.9 2.1 
Exp OP Safe dev 54.8 2.0 
Exp OP Threat std 53.8 2.6 
Exp OP Threat dev 54.1 2.3 
Exp VD Safe std 55.1 1.8 
Exp VD Safe dev 55.1 2.1 
Exp VD Threat std 54.4 2.3 
Exp VD Threat dev 54.4 2.7 
Nov FA Safe std 52.4 5.6 
Nov FA Safe dev 52.3 5.8 
Nov FA Threat std 51.4 5.7 
Nov FA Threat dev 51.3 5.7 
Nov OP Safe std 51.8 6.1 
Nov OP Safe dev 51.9 6.0 
Nov OP Threat std 51.7 5.8 
Nov OP Threat dev 51.9 5.5 
Nov VD Safe std 52.3 6.1 
Nov VD Safe dev 52.2 6.0 
Nov VD Threat std 51.4 5.7 
Nov VD Threat dev 51.6 5.4 
 
 
 
 
Figure S1. Electrodes layout after data pre-processing and frontal ROI (grey area) used in 
the analysis of MMN amplitude and N1 and P2 components of the auditory evoked response.  
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Figure S2. Session effect on self-report and skin conductance responses. Mean values of self-
reported distractibility and clarity (bottom), mean amplitude of skin conductance responses (top 
right) and mean values of self-reported anxiety in experts and novices (top left) for the two sessions 
of the experimental paradigm. ***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01 
Figure S3. Clarity mediates the relation between SCRs and subjective anxiety. Johnson-Neyman 
plot representing the estimated cut-off value (light-blue dashed line) of clarity (x-axis) at which the 
regression slope coefficient of SCRs and anxiety (y-axis) is statistically significant (light blue slope) 
at p < 0.05.  
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